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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the social and economic history of the 
communities of the Akwanga division of Plateau province in central Nigeria from the 
beginning of formal British administration in 1911 to the end of colonial rule in 
1960. The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first looks at the early history of 
the peoples of Akwanga with emphasis on their political, religious and economic 
organisation. It also discusses the effect of the nineteenth-century Sokoto jihad on 
settlement patterns in the region. Chapter 2 deals with resistance to the colonial 
conquest, which lasted up to 1925. Chapter 3 discusses the development of the 
indirect rule system and native administration, focusing on the creation of chiefs, 
divisional boundaries and the native administrative policies pursued by successive 
Governors of Nigeria. Chapter 4 looks at taxation and cash crop production and their 
impact on the peoples of Akwanga. Chapter 5 examines the use of local labour for 
building the infrastructure of colonial rule and for tin mining, which dominated the 
economy of Plateau province. Chapter 6 discusses the religious encounter between 
Islam, Christianity and indigenous belief and how these two world religions shaped 
the political identity of the people of the region. Chapter 7 focuses on the demise of 
indirect rule and the emergence party politics in Akwanga with emphasis on minority 
politics and the role of the educated groups in the politics and process of 
decolonisation.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with the economic and social history of the peoples of 
Akwanga division of Plateau Province in central Nigeria during the period of colonial 
rule. Before the advent of British rule in central Nigeria, the communities that would 
later become Akwanga had no descriptive name for the region. Akwanga was first 
created in 1911, when Mr Campbell Irons was appointed as the first Resident. In 1930, 
following the reorganisation of the Northern Provinces, the name of the division was 
changed from Akwanga to Southern division. The thesis aims to re-incorporate into 
history the neglected communities of Akwanga and contribute to the debate 011 the 
notion of states and “pagan” tribes in the West African savannah. Until recently, the 
study of the so-called “pagan” societies was largely the domain of anthropologists, while 
“states” became the preoccupation of historians. This thesis attempts to break that barrier 
and to demonstrate that people living on the periphery of state systems have a history. It 
will be argued that the peoples of Akwanga region created their own history by resisting 
their powerful centralised neighbours and the British colonial state in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.
The main focus of the thesis is the social and economic changes that occurred in 
Akwanga during the colonial period, particularly taxation and cash crop production, 
mining and labour migration. Although colonial rule in Akwanga was brief, it 
profoundly and irreversibly transformed the region. One important aspect of that
14
transformation was the re-organisation of labour and production. The establishment of 
British rule drew the peoples of Akwanga into a cash economy, involving taxation and 
labour migration. Another aspect was rapid population growth as a result of the progress 
in medical science, which reduced the death rate and increased life expectancy. This was 
in addition to the influx of immigrants into the region who took advantage of British law 
and order to trade or seek employment at the commercial and administrative centre of 
the division. Other changes were demonstrated in the transformation of the nature of 
religious belief. Christian and Muslim missionaries also took advantage of the peace and 
order and pushed further into hitherto inaccessible areas, gaining far more ground than 
had been the case in the nineteenth century. However, it should be noted that colonial 
change was contradictory and subtle; new did not simply replace old, but blended with it 
and the peoples of Akwanga adapted and reshaped these changes to meet their needs.
In the nineteenth century, what would become the so-called Middle-Belt of 
central Nigeria was a vast region largely outside the control of the Sokoto Caliphate, 
comprising small chieftaincies and communities in varying stages of political 
development. Although most communities in the region can be described as “stateless,” 
there were also a number of states that were under some form of control from the 
emirates of Bauchi and Zaria. Buchanan and Pugh have described central Nigeria as 
situated in the Middle-Belt zone, which represents a transition zone between the forest to 
the south and the savannah to the north with a form of transitional woodland vegetation.1 
It covers an area of approximately 342,390 square kilometres or 37 per cent of the total 
land area of Nigeria and it is bordered to the east and west by Cameroon and Benin
1 K,M. Buchanan and J.C. Pugh, Land and People in Nigeria (London, 1962), p.35.
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respectively. British colonial administration m central Nigeria began in 1900, when
Frederick Lugard declared northern Nigeria as part of the British Empire. The
communities that inhabited what would become Akwanga division were administered
initially under Nasarawa province but were later transferred to Plateau province after its
creation in 1926. Nasarawa province was at first called Lower Benue province, but
following the formal submission of the emir of Nasarawa to the British early in 1902,
the headquarters of the province was moved from Akwanaja to Nasarawa town and the
name of the province was subsequently changed to Nasarawa.3 The headquarters of the
province was further moved to Keffl in late 1902 and following the discovery of tin at
Jama’a in 1912, the headquarters of the province was moved there.4 With the
reorganisation of the Northern provinces in 1926, Plateau province was created out of
Bauchi, Muri and Nasarawa provinces and it became the smallest province in northern
Nigeria.5
The peoples of Akwanga included indigenous groups such as Mada, Eggon, 
Rindre and Kantana, as well as settler groups like Hausawa, Igbo and Yomba. Akwanga 
covers an area of 1290 square miles and lies to the southwest of the escarpment of the 
Jos Plateau.6 Population records are non-existent before the advent of British rule, but 
people of the area numbered 43,380 by 1914 and 75,224 by 1928.7 Before the advent of 
British rule, there was no collective name for the peoples that lived in the area, but were 
each known by their different settlements.
2 P.D. Dawan, “Aspects o f the Geography o f Central Nigeria Area,” in A.A. Idrees and Y.A. Ochefii (eds), 
Studies in the Histoiy o f  Central Nigeria Area (Lagos, 2002), pp.3-4.
3 J.C. Sciortino, Notes on Nasarawa Province (London, 1920), p. 19.
4 Ibid, p.20.
5 C.G. Ames, Gazetteer o f  Plateau Province (Jos, 1934), p.8.
6 National Archive Kaduna, Secretary Northern Provinces [hereafter NAK SNP] 17/11263: Notes on 
Akwanga Division, by Captain Masterton Smith, 1928.
7 Ibid.
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The history of central Nigeria has been neglected by scholars compared to the 
Hausa states to the north of it. Historical scholarship on northern Nigeria is dominated 
by the history of Hausa people at the expense of the numerous small-scale communities 
of central Nigeria, which were often treated as reservoirs for slaves and providers of 
tribute to the Hausa-Fulani state-builders. One of the obvious difficulties in studying the 
communities in central Nigeria is that the societies were decentralised. Information that 
exists about the peoples in the region is limited and mostly written during the colonial 
period. Therefore, the general understanding about the local people in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries is mostly based on the views held either by the Hausa-Fulani or 
the British colonial administration. The consequence of such a view is that the groups in 
the area are treated as static and having virtually been unchanged from the jihadic period 
to the “ethnographic present” of the mid-twentieth century.8 Thus, looking at this 
research from the perspective of African historiography, it will not only cover the 
vacuum that existed but will also contribute to the general historiography of central 
Nigeria. Although the study focuses on Akwanga, it has wider implications for the 
Nigerian Middle-Belt as a whole and for small-scale “stateless” societies in the West 
African savannah generally.
CENTRAL NIGERIA AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF AKWANGA
Central Nigeria is one of Africa’s most ethnographically complex areas -  a 
region with a diverse array of distinct and competing identities. Despite the differences 
that exist amongst the communities in the region, in the seventeenth century, they
8 B. Sharpe, “Ethnography and a Regional System: Mental Maps and the Myth of States and Tribes in 
North-Central Nigeria,” Critique o f  Anthropology, 6 (1986), p.35.
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created a distinct identity for themselves known as “Kwararafa”. Colonial writers 
sometimes took such claims out of context. For example, based on oral information 
collected in the 1930s, Mr. Hunter Shaw, the District Officer of Akwanga, wrote that the 
Eggon and Rindre people were at one time part of the Kwararafa kingdom.9 Similarly, 
most of the colonial records 011 the traditions of the communities in central Nigeria claim 
that at one time they all lived together in “Kwararafa.” The concept of a common home 
should not be taken literally. Rather, it is a symbolic expression of a culture, which to a 
large extent they share.
Richard Shain has analysed the emergence of the Kwararafa state through the 
prism of Apa identity.10 He argues that the Apa identity first emerged in the sixteenth 
century and at its inception, it linked together the peoples producing and trading salt in 
Nigeria’s Benue river valley. Those peoples later formed a state, Kwararafa, which 
became a major Sudanic power in the seventeenth century. Shain maintained that 
Kwararafa was highly decentralised, culturally diverse and was never physically 
contiguous. Politically, it embodied what Appadurai referred to as “sovereignty without 
territoriality.”11 Therefore, Shain argues that Kwararafa was an archipelago state and 
region composed of economic, religious and political nuclei along the river valley of 
central Nigeria and that it lacked both identifiable boundaries and a spatial focal point.12 
The crux of his argument is that the Apa identity was the product of an enduring alliance 
of three groups: the many different local salt producers; the Jukun rain makers and
9 NAK Jos, Provincial Headquarter (hereafter Jos Prof) 488, Volume II: The Eggon Tribal Area, Summary 
of Intelligence Report on, 1935.
10 R.M. Shain, “The Salt that Binds: The Historical Geography of a Central Nigerian Regional Identity,” in 
A.M. Howard and R.M. Shain (eds), The Spatial Factor in African History: The Relationship o f  the 
Social, Material, and Perceptual (Boston, 2005).
11 A. Appadurai, “Sovereignty Without Territoriality: Notes for a Post-national Geography,” in P. Yaeger 
(ed), The Geography o f  Identity (Michigan, 1996), p.40.
12 Shain, “ Salt that Binds,” p.248.
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Hausa-speaking Abakwariga salt merchants. These groups were bound together by a 
common interest in manufacturing and distributing salt. The formation of this salt 
complex resulted in an “increased density of the interconnectedness of group to place 
and place to other places.”13 Out of this “increased density of interconnectedness” grew 
first the Apa regional idenity and then Kwararrafa state. In other words, a regional 
pattern of production held the Apa idenity together and laid the foundation for the 
Kwararrafa state. He further argues that in the second half of the twentieth century, a 
revitalised Apa identity constituted one of the principal historical and ideological 
foundations of Nigeria’s Middle-Belt sub-region.
For the most part, despite their central position, the people of the region have 
been represented as politically and economically peripheral: marginal, when viewed 
from the northern state centres, or as part of a hinterland, when seen from the coast. 
Central Nigeria was considered by the Hausa as Kciscishen Bauchi (Bauchi countries) as 
most communities in the area were mistakenly considered to be part of the Bauchi 
emirate.14 For instance, the British take-over of the Jos tin mines was based on a treaty 
between the Royal Niger Company (RNC) and the emir of Bauchi in 1888, signed under 
the erroneous assumption that the area was part of Bauchi.15 According to Barrie Sharpe, 
historical accounts of central Nigeria presuppose that the nineteenth century was marked 
by a “widespread movement to incorporate previously isolated ‘tribal’ societies into the 
slaving economies of the jihadic ‘state,’”16 The history of the region until recently was 
largely ignored by historians who were more concerned with the diplomatic, political
13 J.N. Entrikin, The Betweeness o f  Place (Baltimore, 1991), p.129.
14 A. Mahdi, The Hausa Factor in West African Histoiy (Zaria, 1978), especially chapter 2.
15 NAK SNP 9/488/1923: Royalties on Mineral, Correspondence Relating to 1888-1905.
16 Sharpe, “Ethnography and a Regional System,” p.35.
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and economic history of “Hausaland.” The “pagan” societies, as already mentioned, 
became the focal point of research by anthropologists. The colonial government 
encouraged research by anthropologist and used it as the basis for the application of the 
native administration system in the region. Therefore, anthropology became an academic 
discipline that developed with British colonial expansion. Anthropology was a colonial 
science dedicated to the study of the non-Western peoples and the anthropologists 
focused on small communities over a limited period and dealt with the people “as 
residents of a ‘timeless present5 abstracted from history.”17 According to Kuldick, 
anthropology was a brainchild of colonialism, which constructed a distinct identity that
‘ |  odepended on its relationship with imperialism. It encouraged the study of the language
and culture of the peoples being administered, which were subsequently embodied into
administrative strategy.
Anthropologists of the colonial period colluded with colonial officials by
justifying their research as attempts to provide an ethnographic record of people without
history.19 The assertion that African societies were profoundly conservative was “by no
means always intended as an indictment of African backwardness or reluctance to 
« 0 0  *modernise.” British colonial administration employed “Government Anthropologists” 
who were dispatched to study central Nigerian communities. One of the leading 
anthropologists of the colonial period was Charles Meek (District Officer and Census 
Commissioner for Nigeria), who after the 1921 census was commissioned to write an
17 B. Freund, The Making o f  Contemporary Africa: The Development o f  African Society Since 1800 
(London, 1998), p.5.
18 H. Kuklick, The Savage Within: The Social History o f  British Anthropology, 1885-1945 (Cambridge, 
1991), p.62.
19 J. Goody, The Expansive Moment: Anthropology! in Britain and Africa, 1918-1970 (Cambridge, 1995), 
p.57.
20 T. Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,” in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds), The
Invention o f  Tradition (Cambridge, 1983), p.247.
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ethnographic account of the peoples of the Northern Provinces.21 Meek's publication 
was originally intended to be a census report for the Northern Provinces, which included 
a considerable amount of ethnography. This was followed in 1931 by his works on the 
“tribal” peoples of northern Nigeria and the study of the Nupe people.22 The former was 
essentially a survey of more than fifty non-Muslim groups with the aim of providing a 
“practical assistance” for the colonial government for effective administration of the 
“pagan” societies.23 Although Meek based his studies of some of the groups in the 
monographs from reports given to him by the colonial administration, it nevertheless 
became the first anthropological work that covers a wide area of the “pagan” peoples of 
northern Nigeria.
Colonial administrators and anthropologists were more concerned with larger 
groups like the Tiv, Nupe, Idoma and Jukun, with the result that smaller groups like 
those of Akwanga have been neglected. For example, in 1933, Captain Roy Abraham, 
the Anthropological Officer of northern Nigeria earned out an extensive study of the Tiv 
people and their language, which resulted in the publication of several monographs.24 hi 
1942, S.F. Nadel a professionally trained Anthropologist, published his classic 
monograph on the Nupe kingdom, which was followed by his study of Nupe religion in
251954. Unlike earlier ethnographer-officials, Nadel’s aim was not directly to provide 
information on the peoples of central Nigeria which could be useful to the colonial 
administration. In his introductory remarks on the history of the Nupe people, however,
25 C.K. Meek, The Northern Tribes o f  Nigeria (London, 1925), 2 volumes.
"  C.K. Meek, Tribal Studies in Northern Nigeria (London, 1931); idem, A Sudanese Kingdom: An 
Ethnographical Study o f  the Jukim-Speaking Peoples o f  Nigeria (London, 1931).
23 Meek, Tribes o f  Nigeria, p.v,
24 R.C. Abraham, The Tiv People (Lagos, 1933); idem, The Grammar o f  Tiv (Kaduna, 1933); idem, The 
Principles o f  Tiv (London, 1940); idem, A Dictionaiy o f  Tiv Language (London, 1940).
25 S.F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium: The Kingdom o f  Nupe in Nigeria (London, 1942); idem, Nupe Religion: 
Traditional Beliefs and the influence o f  Islam in a West African Chiefdom (New York, 1954).
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Nadel wrote: “it has been said that modem anthropology is destined to be of great 
assistance to colonial governments in providing the knowledge of the social structure of 
native groups upon which a sound and harmonious Native Administration as envisaged 
in Indirect Rule, should be built.”26
In 1945, the International African Institute began to engage in the preparation 
and publication of an ethnographic survey of Africa with grants made available by the 
British Colonial Development and Welfare Fund. The aim of the survey, according to 
Daryll Forde, general editor of the series, was “to present a concise, critical and accurate 
account of our present knowledge of the tribal groupings.”27 The grants made available 
by the institute increased anthropological research into the peoples of central Nigeria. 
Anthropologists that benefited from the grants and carried out fieldwork in central 
Nigeria included Paul and Laura Bohanan (on the Tiv); Robert Armstrong (Igala and 
Idoma); Paula Brown (Igbira) and Daryll Forde (Nupe).28 Although an attempt was 
made to study the peoples of Plateau region by Harold Gunn, he concentrated on the 
Berom, Jarawa, Pyem and Ganawuri of the Jos Plateau at the expense of the peoples of 
Akwanga.29
Post-colonial anthropological and historical research in central Nigeria has 
continued to marginalise the peoples of Akwanga. However, Idrees and Ochefu edited a 
recent book on the communities in central Nigeria which includes a chapter by John 
Nengel on the colonial conquest of the polities of the Jos Plateau including the Eggon
26 Nadel, Black Byzantium , p.vi.
27 See Daryll Forde’s foreword to H.D. Gunn, Peoples o f  the Plateau Area o f  Northern Nigeria (London, 
1953).
28 Paul and Laura Bohanan, Tiv o f  Central Nigeria (London, 1953); D. Forde (ed), Peoples o f  the Niger- 
Benue Confluence: Nupe, Igbira, Igala and Idoma (London, 1955).
29 Gunn, Peoples o f  the Plateau Area.
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and Mada people.30 He relied on an unpublished paper by Kasimu Kigbu to analyse the 
resistance of the peoples of Akwanga to the British penetration into the region.
In the economic studies of the peoples of Plateau, the groups in Akwanga have 
also been neglected. For example, Bill Freund in his study on the tin mines in Plateau 
province only referred to the communities in Akwanga in passing although the people of 
the area were part of the province and were engaged in tin mining. He focussed 
specifically on the Berom of Jos at the expense of the minority mining communities of 
the province.31 Despite this short-coming, Freund’s treatment of the problem of food 
supply to the mines does touch on the changing economy of the peoples of Akwanga, 
although he approached the issue in terms of administrative efforts at control from Jos, 
the provincial headquarters.
The nature of relationship between the “pagan” societies of the Kauru and 
Pengana hills in the Plateau highlands and the Hausa-Fulani state builders is analysed by
^9John Nengel. The study examines the relations within and between these polities and 
between them and the Islamic states which emerged in their neighbourhood in the 
nineteenth century. It considers both patterns of peaceful coexistence and military 
confrontations between the Hausa-Fulani state builders and their “pagan” neighbours. 
The nature of the relationship that existed between the people of Pengana and Kauru and 
their powerful neighbours negates the fact that “stateless” societies in the West African 
savannah were passive victims of predatory action by their powerful neighbours. Until 
recently, the formation and development of militarised states like the Sokoto Caliphate
30 Idrees and Ochefu (eds), Histoiy o f  Central Nigeria, pp.279-303.
31 B. Freund, Capital and Labour in Nigerian Tin Mines (New Jersey, 1981), pp. 156-170.
32 J.G. Nengel, Precolonial African Intergroup Relations in the Kauru and Pengana Polities o f  Central 
Nigerian Highlands 1800-1900 (Paris, 1998).
23
and its emirates was associated with the transfer of population from the decentralised 
societies of central Nigeria through slave raids. The decentralised communities were 
presented as helpless victims of the slave raids from the emirates and sub-emirates of the 
Sokoto Caliphate. Andrew Hubbell has described this form of argument as the predatory 
state thesis, arguing that the simple distinction between the predatory states on the one 
hand and their victims on the other is grossly inadequate to explain the phenomenon.33 
In other words, the decentralised societies were not passive victims of predatory action, 
but were sometimes participants in regional political economies. This kind of 
relationship existed between the peoples Akwanga and the sub-emirates of Keffi, Lafia 
and Jama5a, which were established in the beginning of the nineteenth centmy. Although 
the major relationship between the emirates and the “pagan” societies was slave raiding, 
many of the communities in Akwanga had shown themselves capable of militarily 
resisting the incursion of the Hausa-Fulani state-builders.
Robert Netting explores the relationship that exists between the Kofyar people of 
the Jos Plateau, their means of livelihood, and certain features of their social and cultural 
organisation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.34 Netting’s work is 
supplemented by Glenn Stone’s research on the Settlement Ecology of the Kofyar 
people.35 Stone’s research was aimed at a better understanding of the linkages between 
the social and the spatial organisation of production. In many respects, Netting and 
Glenn’s work can be applied to the Eggon in understanding their cultural ecology of 
self-sufficient agriculture.
3j A. Hubbell, “A View o f the Slave Trade from the Margin: Souroudougou in the late Nineteenth Century 
Slave Trade of the Niger Bend,” Journal o f  African Histoiy, 42 (2001), pp.25-47.
34 R. Netting, Hill Farmers o f  Nigeria: Cultural Ecology o f  the Kofyar o f  Jos Plateau (London, 1968).
35 G.D. Stone, Settlement Ecology: The Social and Spatial Organization o f  the Kofyar Agriculture 
(Arizona, 1996).
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Adamu Mahdi looks at the spread and influence of Hausa culture and the 
establishment of Zangon Hausawa (Hausa settlements) in West Africa.36 The book, 
together with an earlier article, gives some information about the influence of Hausa 
culture in the development of the socio-political and economic structures of the people 
of central Nigeria.37 According to Mahdi, the agents for the spread of Hausa culture in 
West Africa were the malamai and yankctsiiwa, (clerics/teachers and traders, 
respectively). Others included the artisans (blacksmiths, prostitutes, tailors and 
butchers), slaves, soldiers of fortune (dakaru), farmers and hunters.38 The Sokoto jihad 
of 1804 and the emirates that were established as a consequence helped in the spread of 
Hausa culture into new frontiers like Keffi and Lafia.39 These towns became the bases of 
operation of Hausa warriors, malams, traders and musicians. This was in addition to the 
existing Hausa settlements established by the eighteenth century in Lagos, Dahomey, 
Abomey and Kana. The extent of the Hausa influence especially in central Nigeria needs 
to be looked at in perspective, as his source of information about the people of the region 
is often from the eyes of the Hausa people that settled in these areas.
Colonial administrators that worked in the region wrote most published work that 
exists about the peoples of Akwanga. One of such early works was Sciortino’s Notes on 
Nasarawa Province, published in 1920.40 Sciortino looks at the process of British 
penetration into the region and the administrative structures that were established 
thereafter. However, he was more concerned with the history o f native administration
j6 Mahdi, Hausa Factor.
37 A. Mahdi, “The Spread of the Hausa Culture in West Africa,” Savanna, 5 (1976), pp.3-13.
38 Ibid, pp.9-12.
39 Ibid, p.8.
40 J.C. Sciortino, Notes on Nasarawa Province (London, 1920).
25
and therefore concentrated on the emirates in the province at the expense of the peoples 
of Akwanga and other “tribal” groups. Similarly, Charles Temple edited a work on the 
peoples of northern Nigeria based on information compiled from official records.41 He 
gave a sketchy overview of the history of the Eggon and Rindre people in no more than 
five pages.
A.G. Ames, following in the footsteps of Sciortino and Temple, published the 
Gazetteer o f Plateau Province42 He gave a general description of the province treating 
each unit of the province (division) separately. In the section on Akwanga, he gave an 
overview of the process of British penetration into the area, the native administrative 
structure, religion and tribal laws of the local peoples. Although these works have some 
useful information about the peoples of Akwanga, their major weakness is that they 
were based on the uncritical use of reports obtained from Divisional Officers that 
worked in the region. In other words, they were cut and paste exercises, which were not 
based on systematic study of the people.
Although there is no systematic historical study of the peoples of Akwanga, there 
are isolated publications on the Eggon people. The first scholarly research to be 
published on the Eggon was a 1984 article on ritual warfare by David Dorward.43 
Dorward argued that the British conquest of the Eggon resulted in the cessation of the 
cycle of intercommunity ritual warfare that was central to their communal definition. 
According to him, a cycle of continuity gave way to an epoch of change and uncertainty. 
He maintained that colonial rule brought fundamental changes not only to political and
41 C.L. Temple (ed), Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States o f  the Northern Provinces o f  
Nigeria (Lagos, 1922).
42 Ames, Plateau Province.
43 D. Dorward, “Ritual Warfare and die Colonial Conquest o f the Eggon,” Histoiy in Africa, 11 (1984), 
pp.83-98.
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economic activities, but also to cultural norms and values. Dorward also wrote on the 
impact of colonialism on the economy of the Eggon people.44 He observed that Eggon 
perceptions of past social and economic institutions are distorted by current practices. 
He argued that understanding current practices often bear little resemblance to past 
fanning practices, crops systems, and the relative significance of specific crops. Hence, 
he argued that the current view that yam cultivation was the traditional mainstay of the 
Eggon economy is incorrect, as Tiv and Igbo railway labourers introduced the crop into 
the area in the late 1920s.
Kasimu Kigbu’s publication on the Eggon people is a compilation of 
dissertations and theses from the University of Jos 45 The first chapter, which was based 
on a dissertation by Kasimu, looks at the history of Eggon people at the turn of the 
twentieth century with emphasis on the social and political organisations and the 
relationship between the Eggon with their neighbours 46 However, Kasimu failed to link 
the prevalence of the Eggon hill settlements in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries to the activities of the sub-emirates of Keffi, Lafia and Jama’a. Ignoring the 
development of these sub-emirates and how they affected the inter group relations and 
settlement patterns of the Eggon gives an inaccurate history of the local people in the 
nineteenth century. In other words, it is difficult to analyse the history of the Eggon 
people in the nineteenth century in isolation from the activities o f these sub-emirates.
44 D. Dorward, “The Impact of Colonialism on a Nigerian Hill-Farming Society: A Case Study of 
Innovation among the Eggon,” The International Journal o f  Historical Studies, 2 (1987), pp.201-224.
45 K. Kigbu et al, The Eggon o f  Central Nigeria (Jos, 1996).
46 Ibid, pp. 1-48.
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METHODOLOGY, SOURCES AND ORGANISATION
Jan Vansina defines oral tradition as “verbal messages which are reported 
statements from the past beyond the present generation.”47 However, there are several 
problems with oral history. History is often used to justify situations or claims in the 
present. This usually leads to distortion or to the fabrication of traditions. As Hobsbawm 
and Ranger have observed, traditions, which “appear or claim to be old are often quite 
recent in origin and sometimes invented.”48 Despite some of the weaknesses regarding 
oral history, it was a crucial source of information for this research. Oral information 
was collected by conducting interviews (individually or collectively) in parts of 
Nasarawa and Kaduna states. Interviews were conducted in Lafia, Keffi and Jama’a in 
order to ascertain the nature of the relationship that existed between these sub-emirates 
and the peoples of Akwanga. The people interviewed were mostly elders from different 
backgrounds, who because o f their age were familiar with their history. The interviews 
were conducted mostly in Hausa and recorded, with transcripts written after the 
interview. Sometimes during my first visit, some of the informants immediately began to 
talk and I often recorded the conversation. Where the interview was formal, I began by 
asking the origin of the people and their history of migration. Individual interviews were 
conducted mostly in the houses of my informants while group interviews were held at 
the palaces of the Village or District Heads. Where possible, interviews were conducted 
more than twice and information was cross checked by raising the same question at 
different times or by reframing similar questions in different order.
J. Vansina, Oral Tradition as History (Oxford, 1985), p.27.
48 Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds), Invention o f  Tradition, p .l.
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Figure 0.1: Some of my Eggon informants at Angbaku, March 2003
This research also utilised archival records from the Public Records Office, 
London and the National Archives at Kaduna, Nigeria, for documents covering colonial 
correspondence and administrative policies and practices. The bulk of the archival work 
was carried out in Nigeria because detailed divisional records are kept there, while only 
summaries of despatches are deposited at the PRO. The summaries of despatches only 
reflects on important events that happened in the provinces/regions in general and since 
this research was on a division, it became necessary to go through both the details and 
summaries of these reports. Nevertheless, the PRO holds an enormous amount of 
information on the decolonisation period and on the colonial government’s official 
policies, as well as military and intelligence reports on northern Nigeria. Focusing on the 
archives gave an insight into the initial colonial encounter, although such records were 
only in fragments. The records were expressions of how colonial administrators 
perceived the local people and, as such, have to be considered with care. In other words,
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most of the documents were not written for the local people, but were aimed at readers 
in Britain. What was observed by the colonial administrators and committed into writing 
became official knowledge, and therefore, keen observation became central to what they 
did. The archives at Kew and Kaduna also have a collection of records regarding 
schools, missions, mines, health, transport and police, all of which were essential for this 
research.
Mission records constituted another important primary source used in this study. 
Although mission work started later in Akwanga than in the other parts of Nigeria, it 
served greatly to increase the amount of first-hand documentation about the people of 
the region. The history of Christian mission in northern Nigeria began with the activities 
of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) in the immediate aftermath of colonial 
conquest. The CMS began their mission amongst the Hausa at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, but local and administrative pressures meant that the missionaries had 
to refocus their attention to the numerous “pagan” communities of central Nigeria. The 
Sudan United Mission (SUM) dominated missionary activities amongst the peoples that 
were later incorporated into Plateau province in 1926. Much of what the missionaries 
observed and recorded gives important insights into the people they were dealing with 
and their annual letters to the mission headquarters are an important source of material. 
Once a year the mission headquarters wished to hear directly from their missionaries. 
These letters were used in the compilation of the annual report, which was directed to 
people back in the mission’s country of origin in order to advertise their work, satisfy 
their donors and to solicit recruits and funds. For these records, this research relied on 
the SUM records from the Centre for Christianity in the Non-Western World at the
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University of Edinburgh. The South African branch of the SUM dominated mission 
work in Akwanga, but their archive in Cape Town was closed at the time of writing this 
thesis. However, I benefited from Mr. Alexander of Cape Town, who was able to 
contact on my behalf some of the missionaries who had insights on some of the SUM 
records. The British branch of the SUM was the representative o f the branches of the 
mission under a field secretary and their archival documents were an important source of 
information on the mission’s dealings with the colonial government in Nigeria and the 
Colonial Office in London.
Another important primary source were the memoirs of Sir Charles Arden- 
Clarke, a District Officer in Akwanga between 1922 and 1927. Although only some of 
these letters were published in his biography, I am grateful to Professor Richard 
Rathbone who gave me his personal copies of the letters of Arden-Clarke. These letters 
recorded Arden-Clarke’s personal observations, as opposed to those in his official 
reports, which in some instances were contradictory. Official colonial documents were 
often censored and often camouflage the truths that were often clearly stated in private 
letters. Arden-Clarke was bom in India in 1898 to a missionary of the CMS.49 He left 
school in 1917, joined the army and served with the Machine Gun Coips in France. In 
1920, he joined the colonial service, arriving in Nigeria in December 1921 and being 
posted to Jama’a, the Provincial Headquarters of Nasarawa. In 1922, he was transferred 
to Akwanga as an Assistant District Officer where he served (with intervals) until 1927. 
In 1936 he left Nigeria for Bechuanaland, finally becoming the last governor of the Gold 
Coast in 1949. He was one of the longest serving political officers in Akwanga and his 
intimate knowledge of the area makes his assessment reports and letters important for 
49 D. Rooney, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke (London, 1982), pp. 1-19.
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this research. His annual reports on Alcwanga are the most detailed and comprehensive 
deposited at the National Archive in Kaduna.
The research covers the period from the beginning of formal British 
administration in 1911 to the end of colonial rule with the independence of Nigeria in 
1960. Before 1910, only sporadic attempts had been made to enter into Akwanga and it 
was in 1911 that Mr. A. Campbell Irons became the first administrator. The thesis is 
divided into seven chapters. The first looks at the early history of the peoples of 
Akwanga with emphasis on their political, religious and economic organisation. It also 
discusses the effect of the nineteenth-century Solcoto jihad on settlement patterns in the 
region. Chapter 2 deals with resistance to the colonial conquest, which lasted up to 1925. 
Chapter 3 discusses the development of the indirect rule system and native 
administration, focusing on the creation of chiefs, divisional boundaries and the native 
administrative policies pursued by successive Governors of Nigeria. Chapter 4 looks at 
taxation and cash crop production and their impact on the peoples of Alcwanga. Chapter 
5 examines the use of local labour for building the infrastructure of colonial rule and for 
tin mining, which dominated the economy of Plateau province. Chapter 6 discusses the 
religious encounter between Islam, Christianity and indigenous belief and how these two 
world religions shaped the political identity of the people of the region. Chapter 7 
focuses on the demise of indirect rule and the emergence party politics with emphasis on 
minority politics and the use of religion in politics and process of decolonisation in 
Alcwanga.
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CHAPTER ONE
AKWANGA IN THE PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD
This chapter examines the history of the peoples of Akwanga in the nineteenth 
century with emphasis on their traditions of origin, political, economic and social 
organisation and local ecology. It will also examine the relationship between the peoples 
of the region and the Hausa-Fulani state builders, who established new settlements at 
Keffl, Lafla and Jama5 a in the early nineteenth century as a consequence of the Sokoto 
jihad. The emergence of these sub-emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate had important 
political, economic, demographic and social implications for the Akwanga region.
This chapter aims to contribute to the debate on the nature of the relationship 
between the centralised and decentralised societies in what would later become northern 
Nigeria. As noted in the introduction, it was previously thought that the development of 
militarised states in West African savannah was associated with the transfer of 
population from the decentralised societies to their centralised neighbours. The 
decentralised societies were presented as helpless victims of depredation. The simple 
distinction between the predators and their victims is too simplistic. This chapter 
emphasises the complexity of the relationships between the emirates and the peoples of 
Akwanga. It will be argued that the peoples of Akwanga were able to effectively defend 
themselves from the depredation of the Hausa-Fulani state builders, while others paid 
tributes or allied with the intruders in order to safeguard their independence.
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ECOLOGY AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF AKWANGA
Akwanga lies to the southwest of the escarpment of the Jos Plateau in central 
Nigeria. Jos Plateau is a boot-shaped highland area which covers an area of some 3000 
square miles at a level of about 4200 feet above sea level and surrounded by high plains 
with altitudes ranging from 2000 to 3000 feet above sea level.1 The area is geologically 
representative of the Pre-Cambrian Basement Complex, the ancient group of crystalline 
rocks which form part of the main African continental mass.2 The crystalline rocks 
include those carrying minerals, such as tinstone, columbite and gold. Climatic 
conditions are characterised by two distinct seasons. The dry season usually lasts from 
November to March and is characterised by the predominance of north-easterly trade 
winds which brings with them harmattan dust. The rainy season lasts from April to 
October and the period is dominated by south westerly winds and tropical maritime air 
mass. The Jos Plateau is classified as Northern Guinea Savanna and although the 
vegetation has been a continuous cover of broad-leafed species, long established 
agricultural use has turned much of the area around villages into open grassland. 
Intensive farming with short fallow periods and persistent firewood collection are the 
practices which prevents regeneration of tree growth. Trees that continue to flourish in 
the area are almost all economically useful species growing in tilled areas and these 
include the palm trees, locust beans and mango.
1 Udo, Geographical Regions, p. 127.
“ Buchanan and Pugh, Land and People, p .l.
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Map 1.1: Map of Nasarawa Province 1911, showing Akwanga Division 
Source: SNP 7/971/1912: Nasarawa Province, Annual Report, 1911
The main water systems in Akwanga are on the east: Farin-Ruwa runs through 
the center of Mama and the Sherigia River (which later joins the Farin-Ruwa) lies 
further to the west. In the western part of the area lies the Mada River, which runs north 
and south. Further south and north of Akwanga lies a group of hills rising some 3000 
feet above sea level.3 Before the advent of British rule, there was no collective name for 
the people that lived in the area. Each group were known by their settlement names.
3 NAK SNP 17/K. 3234: Notes on the Eggon, South Mada, by Masterton Smith, 1929.
35
Eggon, which describes the people and their language, occupied the southern part of 
Akwanga. They are located some thirty miles southwest of the Jos Plateau and are 
bordered in the north and east by the Mada and Rindre respectively. In the nineteenth 
century, the sub-emirates of Lafia and Keffi were established in the south and southwest 
of the Eggon. The Eggon hills rise abruptly 600 to 1000 feet from the surrounding 
plains. The Arikya River cuts within a few hundred yards of the hills’ northeastern 
escarpment, while to the west the hills are skirted by the Mada River. The plains, 
particularly those to the south, are etched with a network of tributary streams which are 
subject to flash flooding caused by sudden run-off from the face of the hills. The 
dominant fault lines of the hills themselves appear to run from the northeast to southeast, 
the northwest half being veiy broken, with numerous peaks in excess of 2,800 feet. In 
the southeast half, the land is more open and level, forming a high bluff with precipitous 
sides dropping 600 to 80 feet to the plains. Finally, there is a line of isolated mountains, 
1,200 to 1,340 feet high, extending eastward from the Eggon hills.
The Eggon are the largest ethnic group in Akwanga. Their population was 
estimated in 1907 at 7,678, which rose to 17,916 by 1930.4 Eggon people had no generic 
name for themselves before the advent of British rule. In the nineteenth century, the 
Hausa-Fulani and the Kanuri that settled in Keffi and Lafia called them Madan dutse 
(Hill Mada), which describes their hill settlement. The name “Hill Mada” was adopted 
by the British when they arrived in the region and was later changed to Eggon in 1930 
after the re-organisation of Akwanga. According to Mr. Hunter-Shaw, a District Officer 
of the area in 1935, “Eggon, their word for a mountain group, being a name lfaute de
4 Ibid.
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mieux’ [for want of any better] applied to them by the administration.”5 However, not all 
Eggon lived on the hills as some also occupied lowland settlements such as Ubbe, 
Ginda, Alushi and Bakyeno Kassa. The Eggon are made up of three major clans, 
namely, Eggon Anzo, Eggon Eholo and Eggon Enro. Although they speak the same 
language (with slight dialectical variations), they are distinguished from one another by 
their facial marks. The Eggon Enro had nine marks on the face, three on the forehead 
and three each on either side of their mouth. Both the Anzo and Eholo clans had vertical 
marks made on either side of their checks but were normally not numbered. Eggon Enro 
are referred to by the Hausa-Fulani as Madan Tara (Eggon with nine marks) while the 
Eholo and Anzo who had vertical marks were called Madan Zube (Mada with vertical 
marks).6
The northern part of Akwanga is home to the Mada people. The term “Mada” 
also describes both the people and their language. They are bordered in the south and 
east by the Eggon and Rindre and the sub-emirates of Jama’a and Keffi in the north and 
west respectively. The western part is undulating with a few low hills and occasional 
dense belts of forests. The outstanding features of the landscape are the twin peaks of the 
Wawaye hills, which rise from the surrounding plain to a height of about 3000 feet 
above sea level. The Mada population was estimated in 1912 at 6,833 people and had 
risen to 18,216 by 1928.7 Before the advent o f the British, the Mada had no collective 
name for themselves, but described each other by their settlements, for example, mane
5 NAK Jos Prof 488, Volume II: The Eggon Tribal Area, Summary of Intelligence Report on, 1935.
6 Interview with Laka Bako at Ahgbor, 13 March 2004.
7 NAK KAL MIN number 20749: Nunku District, 1933, NAK, SNP 17/11263: Notes on Akwanga 
Division by Masterton Smith, 1928. It would be misleading to rely on this figure because during the same 
period, some of the Mada people were under the central Mada District. A more reliable estimate would be 
after the 1922 re-orgainsation.
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ban Gbunje (people of Gbunje or Gwanje) and mane ban Gbunchu (people of Gbunclm). 
Like their southern neighbours the Eggon, the Hausa-Fulani that settled in Keffi and 
Jam’a referred to them as Madan Kassa (plain Mada), which was later adopted and used 
by the British. As to the meaning of “Mada,” it conveys nothing either in Hausa or in the 
language of the local people. However, most of my Mada informants maintained that 
they knew themselves by the name “Mada” before any contact with the Hausa-Fulani 
and the British. According to Baba Lolco, “we know ourselves as ban Mada [Mada 
people] and it is wrong to suggest that the name was given to us by anybody.”s He 
argued that the Hausa-Fulani and the British could not properly pronounce the term 
“Mada” which resulted in the adulteration of the name. The term “Mada” according to 
him is pronounced with the first ‘a’ short and the second ‘a’ long with the stress 011 the 
second syllable ‘M ’da.’9 However, it is evident from the early colonial records that apart 
from some of the Mada villages that had contacts with the Europeans or Hausa, the rest 
of the Madan kassa villages seemed ignorant of the term “Mada.”10
The Rindre occupy the eastern part of Akwanga and are found in Wamba, Waju, 
Gitta, Kangbo and Konva. Describing the area in 1915, Mr. Mathews, an Assistant 
District Officer, wrote: “it is roughly rectangular in shape, about 19 miles from North to 
South and 14 miles from East to West and 250 square miles in area.”11 Their population 
was estimated at 8,480 people in 1915.12 Their neighbours call them “Nungu,” which 
was a Hausa derivative of the Rindre word ungu [an expression for someone that is in
8 Interview with Baba Loko at Ungwan Loko, 8 November 2003.
9 Ibid.
10 NAK Jos Prof 5061: Mada District-Administration of, 1922.
11 NAK SNP 10/555p: Nasarawa Province, Nungu Independent District, Lafia D ivision, Assessment 
Report, 1915.
12 NAK, SNP K/555: Nasarawa Province, Lafia Division, Assessment Report by Mr. Mathews, 1915.
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desperate need].13 The word is said to have come into being when some Hausa hunters 
lost their way in the Wamba area and were looking tired and hungry but could not relate 
their situation to the local people. The Rindre man was only able to show his sympathy 
by saying unga and the Hausa hunters misunderstood the term to be “Nungu.”14 The 
Hausa hunters thought therefore that iingu meant Nungu, the name and language of the 
people.
The north-eastern part of Akwanga is occupied by the Arum, Chessu, Kantana, 
Turkwan, Yashi and Buh, who inhabit the settlements of Jinni, Marhai, Kpara, Jidda, 
Abu, Nakere and Turkwan. The area is “roughly to the shape of a right angled... and its 
approximately 285 square miles of which 120 square miles lie on the West side and 165 
square miles lie on the East side of Farin Rau [sic] River.”15 The general level of the 
northern half of the area is about 1600 to 1800 feet above sea level. The peoples in the 
area spoke different languages and had varying traditions and were lumped together and 
called Mama until the 1920s.16 The name “Mama” has its origin in the nineteenth 
century when the Hausa-Fulani gave the name to describe the vegetation of the area, 
which was later adopted by the British. Mama is a Hausa word for breast, which was 
used by the Hausa to describe a tree in the area, nonon Giwa (elephant breast), which
1 7was subsequently used to call the people.
Just when the groups in the region came to live there is impossible to say, but 
evidence of human habitation of the Jos plateau region goes back to the Sangoan or even
13 Rindre is the language name that describes the people and the British inter-changeably used Nungu or 
Lindre (sic).
14 Interview at Wamba with Philip Maiangwa, 17 May 2003.
b NAK SNP 831 M am a District, Lafia Division, Nasarawa Province, Re-Assessment Report by H.F. 
Mathews, 1923.
16 NAK CSO/l 2601/Volume 5: Akwanga Division Annual Report by Hale Middleton, 1927.
17 Interview with Mohammed Yakubu at Mama, 20 April 2004.
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Achulean periods between 250, 000-90, 000 BC.18 A linguistic and ethnographic survey 
of the area suggests that the peoples who inhabited the Jos plateau region at the 
beginning of the twentieth century had been living there for at least several hundred of 
years.19 However, it is difficult to say with certainty whether the groups who occupied 
the Jos Plateau by the beginning of the twentieth century were the direct forebears of the 
pre-historic civilization revealed by archeological evidence.20
Some of the groups in the region have a common tradition of origin, migration and 
settlement. Amongst the Eggon people, decent from a common ancestor with the 
neighbouring Rindre people is claimed in an episode analogous to the Jacob-Esau legend 
in the Bible. One version of the tradition has it that the founders of the Eggon and 
Rindre settlements came from an unknown land in the southeast under the leadership of 
Abro, bora of the sky god. Abro was accompanied by his brothers, Jada Oku and Ubina 
[founders and folk heroes of the Rindre people]. Jada and Ubina crossed the Arikya 
River to establish their settlement at Wamba while Abro remained south, turning west 
and eventually founding Arugwadu on one of the outlyiirg mountains.21 While Abro was 
out hunting with his three sons, Abe, Anzo and Affro, he found a lost boy wandering 
near the Arikya River, who he adopted and named Eholo, meaning river. Eholo later got 
married and had children in Abro’s house. Eholo tried unsuccessfully to deprive his
18 S.G.H. Daniels, “The Early Stone Age” in T. Shaw (ed), Lectures in Nigerian Prehistoiy and 
Archaeology (Ibadan, 1969), pp. 14-29, R.C. Soper, “The Stone Age in Northern Nigeria,” Journal o f  the 
Historical Society o f  Nigeria (JHSN), 3 (1965), pp. 175-194; B.E. Fagg, “The Nok Culture in Prehistory,” 
JHSN  1 (1959), pp.228-293.
19 J.A. Ballard, “Historical Inferences from the Linguistic Geography of the Nigerian Middle Belt,” Africa 
41 (1971), pp.294-305; J.H. Greenberg, The Languages o f  Africa (Bloomington, 1966), p.46.
20 Professor Richard Fardon: Personal communication.
21 Ames, Plateau Province, pp. 260-262; NAK SNP K. 3234: Notes on the Eggon, South Mada by 
Masterton Smith, 1929; NAK SNP 23691: Intelligence Report on the Eggon Tribal Area by J. Hunter- 
Shaw, 1935.
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foster brothers of their birthright and fled to settle at Wana while Anzo in pursuit of him 
eventually settled at Alogani. In a series of interviews conducted in the 1930s by Mr 
Shaw, the District Officer of Akwanga, very few elders traced their descent back to 
Abro through eight to ten generations, thus placing the date of the exodus from the 
southeast to about 1700. He concluded that the Eggon and Rindre people were at one
99time part of the Jukun kingdom of Kwararafa. However, it should be noted that in the 
colonial period, writers tended to see Jukun influence everywhere. The concept of a 
common home already mentioned in the introduction should not be taken literally. 
Rather it is a symbolic expression of a culture which they share.
There has been no archaeological research in the Eggon hills, but the first 
microliths recognised in Nigeria in 1931 were found at Wana (in heart of the Eggon 
hills) by Reverend Hepburn, a missionary of the Sudan United Mission.23 Similar stone 
implements were excavated by Bernard Fagg at Rop (less than 200 kilometres from 
Wana) and the early dates for the late stone age falls around 5000 to 6000 BC, (but in 
some parts of Nigeria, it is suggested that the period can be dated back to 10,000 B.C).24 
Similar findings suggest that the Eggon hills were an ancient settlement site. In the 
Rindre area, one of the archaeological finds was the Nolc terracotta head found in 
Wamba. The period during which the Nok heads were made had been estimated as 
between 900 BC and 200 AD. Moreover, clay figures depicting tools, bodily ornaments, 
hairstyles and the exploitation of oil palm tree have been recovered from many sites
22 NAK SNP 23691: Intelligence Report on the Eggon Tribal Area by J. Hunter-Shaw, 1935.
2j T. Shaw, Nigeria: Its Archaeology and Early Histoiy (London, 1978), p .39.
24 S.G.H. Daniels, “The Middle and Late Stone Age,” T. Shaw (ed), Nigeria Prehistoiy and Archaeology 
(Ibadan, 1969), pp.23-9.
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spanning from Nok, Kafanchan, through Wamba to Katsina~Ala.25 This archaeological 
evidence suggests that settlements in the area are longstanding and the present-day 
populations appear to be autochthonous.
Arum, Chessu, Turkwan and Yashi have a common tradition of origin and 
migration. From the interviews conducted in these villages, my informants were in 
agreement that they have a common route of migration. According to an informant, 
“before we came to this place, we first of all settled down at Aphia Cha. All these groups 
[Chessu, Turkwan and Yashi] passed through Aphia Cha before moving to their present 
site.”26
Although the groups in Akwanga spoke different languages from each other, this 
did not hinder inter-group relations amongst them. The nature of inter-group relations 
was manifested in their social, political and religious lives. Religion was a medium that 
cemented the relationship of the peoples of the region. Traditional religious ceremonies 
were organised to appease the gods and the spirits of the ancestors, to pray for protection 
and also to celebrate good, drought-free harvests. These occasions were usually 
celebrated with the consumption o f burukutu (local beer), followed by dancing and 
rituals conducted by the elders in secret. The Mada, Rindre and Kantana attend the 
Likiya festival, which is organised by the Eggon people to mark the end of the harvest 
season while the Ruchi Kubo farming festival to instill discipline among the Rindre 
people was adopted by the Bull and Chessu.27
251. James (ed), The Settler Phenomenon in the Middle Belt and the Problem o f  National Integration in 
Nigeria (Jos, 1998), p.32.
26 Interview with the late Musa Gun at Wamba, 22 May 2002.
27 Group interview at Angbaku with Kuje Kigbu, Ablika Gabi and Tsaku Musa, 1 March 2004; Interview 
at Abu with Dauda Madaki, 16 December 2003,
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Trade was another factor that encouraged inter-group relations, although there was 
only a low level of exchange among the different regions. This was partly because they 
produced similar products and also because there was no cheap and efficient transport 
system. Specialization in the production of crafts was one avenue for inter-household 
and inter-community exchanges. Local trade was also practiced between households on 
a direct basis when one household exchanged an item which it had in excess for another 
which is required. This was earned out mostly on a barter basis between households.28 
Despite the low level of exchange, there were markets in pre-colonial period that 
brought the communities in Akwanga together. For example, the markets in Ngapwar 
and Andaha attracted people from Keffi, Jama’a and Wamba.29 The markets in Wakama, 
Wana and Agidi did not only attract the Eggon but also people from Lafia, Wamba and 
Garalcu.30 The peoples of Akwanga also had trading relations with those of the Jos 
escarpment. Mr. Mathews, the District Officer of Akwanga described the nature of trade 
in the western parts of the division in 1922:
The Mama pagans’ only requirement which they do not 
produce for themselves are, meat, salt and hoes. The hoes 
were obtained from certain Plateau villages which specialize 
in making them. They get their salt by barter through 
middlemen from the south. The salt is produced from the 
brine springs at Keana and Awe.. .Cattle were obtained from
28 Interview at Gwanje Bishu with Bala Maisha, 14 November 2003. Amongst the Eggon, ingots were 
used as means of payments and exchange and were also used by the local blacksmiths.
29 Interview at Andaha with the late Dauda Rija, 12 March 2004.
30 Interview at Endehu with Likita Abimiku, 15 November 2004.
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the Plateau having passed through a chain of middlemen. In 
exchange they pay palm oil, guinea com and honey.31
Inter-group relations were also expressed through marriages. The importance of 
marriage in predominantly agriculturalist economies was great. This was because 
marriage led to an increase in the size of the family, which was the basic social and 
economic unit and women were valued both as workers and child-bearers.32 The early 
colonial census has shown that women were in the minority compared with men 
amongst the different groups in Akwanga.33 This meant that men that could not find 
women to many within their groups had to look outside their villages to contract 
marriage. For instance, the Eggon people from Alushi found it convenient to marry from 
their neighbouring Mada villages.34 Inter-group marriages helped to reduce conflict 
between the groups and also encouraged strong relationships.
RELATIONS WITH THE SUB-EMIRATES OF KEFFI, JAMA’A AND LAFIA
The beginning of the nineteenth century witnessed a violent Islamic revolution in 
present-day northern Nigeria which resulted in the establishment of the Sokoto 
Caliphate. The impact of the Caliphate on Akwanga region came about through the 
creation of the sub-emirates of Keffi, Lafia and Jama’a. Although the jihad was fought 
mainly in Hausaland, the effects of the war were felt by the people in the central Nigeria 
region and down as far as the tropical rainforest in the south. The jihad was fought under
31 NAK SNP 831/1923: Reassessment of Mama District, 1922.
32 J. Goody, Production and Reproduction, (Cambridge, 1976), p .33.
33 NAK SNP 10/572p: Nasarawa Province, Assessment Report, 1913.
34 Interview at Alushi with Reverend Mari on 22 May 2004.
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the leadership of a Fulani cleric, Usman Dan Fodio. He was bom at Maratta in Gobir in 
1754 to a father who earned the Fulani name of Focliye (the learned) through teaching.35 
The origin of the Sokoto jihad has been sufficiently dealt with by scholars and only 
needs mentioning here briefly.36 Central to the emergence of the reform movement were 
the political, economic, religious and social conditions in Hausaland in the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries. There was a general dissatisfaction with the Hausa 
governments of the day and corruption and oppression were common. Although these 
grievances were political and economic in nature, they were articulated in religious 
terms.
One of the immediate consequences of the jihad was the change in the rulers’ 
title from Sarki (king), to emir, signalling the dawn of a new Islamic era. In other words, 
the rule of emirs replaced the secular Hausa regimes. Another major consequence of the 
jihad was the demographic changes it brought about, which were far-reaching and 
revolutionary. The conquest and incorporation of many areas into the Caliphate set in 
motion processes of migration from one area to another. In some cases, it involved 
movement from relatively low-lying plains to hills and mountains for security against 
the consequent slave raiding as a result of the jihad. The jihad also resulted in the 
establishment of the sub-emirates of Keffi, Lafia and Jama’a, which subsequently 
became thorns in the flesh of many communities of Akwanga in the nineteenth century. 
The relationship between these sub-emirates and the peoples of Akwanga deteimined
35 M.D. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate (London, 1967), p .3.
36 A.M. Kani, The Intellectual Origin o f  the Sokoto Jihad in Nigeria (London, 1988); M. Bello, Infakul 
Maisuri, translated and paraphrased by E.J. Arnett, as The Rise o f  the Sokoto Fulani (Kano, 1922); Last, 
Sokoto Caliphate; R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria: The Sokoto Caliphate and 
its Enemies, 1804-1905 (Second Edition: London, 1977); J.P. Smaldone, Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate: 
Historical and Sociological Perspectives (Cambridge, 1977).
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internal migration and settlement patterns. In order to fully understand the nature of the 
relationship between the peoples of Akwanga with their powerful neighbours, we turn 
first to the emergence of the settlements of Keffi, Lafia and Jama’a and their relations 
with their overlords, the emirates of Zaria and Bauchi.
Although nomadic Fulani herdsmen had long visited the area that later became 
Keffi, they only began to settle at the end of the eighteenth century.37 Before the 
outbreak of the Sokoto jihad, Muhammad Gani, a Fulani from Zanga, used to bring his 
herds from Katsina eveiy dry season to graze in the area. This annual cattle grazing was 
continued by his son Abdullahi Zanga, who then decided to settle permanently. He 
eventually persuaded his other Fulani kinsmen to live under him. They finally settled in 
1802, built a stockade village and named it Keffi (stockade). Zanga then appointed
T9Umaru as his deputy. When the jihad broke out at Gobir in 1804, Usman Dan Fodio 
sent messages to all Fulani leaders and Abdullahi Zanga decided to go to Sokoto to 
obtain a flag for himself. He was prevented from obtaining it directly from Sokoto and 
was compelled to accept authority from Zaria. The first emir of Zaria (or Zazzau) Malam 
Musa, made it clear to Zanga that the area around Keffi and beyond was granted to him 
as fief by the Caliph, and therefore by accepting the authority Zaria, Keffi became its 
vassal.39
The establishment of Jama’a sub-emirate was a little different to that of Keffi. 
Before the outbreak of the jihad, malam Usman, who was an Islamic preacher from
37 Sciortino, Nasarawa Province, p.5.
38 S.J. Hogben and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, The Emirates o f  Northern Nigeria: A Preliminary Survey o f  
their Historical Traditions (London, 1966), p.530; Sciortino, Nasarawa, p.6; Mahdi, Hausa Factor, 
pp.101-104.
39 Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates o f  Northern Nigeria, p.531.
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Kebbi in Zamfara, went to preach to the Fulani who had settled in Kajuru (southern 
Zaria) and with the help of the local Fulani leader, Abdurrahman (Atona) organised 
them into a cohesive group 40 After the defeat of Makau (Sarkin Zaria) by the Fulani in 
1808, the sarki and his supporters escaped to Kajuru. The Fulani continued their attack 
for six months until Makau moved towards Zuba. As a result, the people of Kajuru 
became anxious and decided to eliminate any immediate danger by killing the herdsmen 
that had settled amongst them 41 The plot to kill the Fulani was leaked to them by 
Indema, the Fulani wife of Sarkin Kajuru; therefore most of the Fulani escaped and 
settled in the Darroro hills. The people of Kajuru, in a frantic effort to drive out the 
Fulani, were defeated by them and scattered. After this victoiy, the Fulani sent Malam 
Usman to Zaria to obtain a flag and a name for the new settlement from Malam Musa, 
the emir of Zazzau.42 These requests were granted and when the emir asked them who 
they were, they replied that they were a gathering {Jama ’a) of Fulani of Darroro. The 
emir then named the settlement Jama ’an Darroro (the gathering o f Darroro) in 1810 and 
it also became a vassal of Zazzau.43
Lastly, Lafia owes its origin to one Dunama who led a group of traders from 
Bomo and settled in the area in the eighteenth century.44 After several journeys, they 
settled down and with the assistance of Sarldn Kwandare captured the town of Anane. 
The Sarldn Kwandare was delighted and wished them to stay comfortably {Lafiya), 
which subsequently became the name of their settlement.45 M.G. Smith suggested that
40 Ibid, p.551.
41 S.J. Hogben, An Introduction to the History o f  the Islamic States o f  Northern Nigeria (London, 1967), 
p.312.
42 Sciortino, Nasarawa Province, p. 13.
43 Ibid\ Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p.553
44 Hogben, History o f  the Islamic States, p.306.
45 Ibid.
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Lafia had been a vassal state of Zaria until 1812, when it was transferred to the emir of 
Bauchi, although there seems to be no evidence to support this claim.46 The vassalage 
which bound Lafia to Bauchi, started in about 1817, when the emir of Bauchi, malam 
Yakubu, raided the town and besieged it for over two weeks. On the sixteenth day of the 
siege, the emir of Lafia, malam Umar (1814-1819), led a surprise attack on Yakubu and 
captured the emir’s drum.47 Malam Umar knew that Lafia could not withstand the 
Bauchi forces for the second time and decided to send his madald to negotiate terms of 
peace with Yakubu. It was after an agreement was reached that the emir “acknowledged 
Umar as his vassal and presented him with a flag and the captured drum.”48 The ruler of 
Lafia then agreed to send annual tributes to Bauchi. This clearly shows that the 
relationship between Lafia and Bauchi began five years later than Smith suggested.
The nature of the relationship between .Sokoto, the emirates and the sub-emirates 
was complex. For example, Zaria was a vassal of Sokoto, and had several vassals of its 
own. According to Smith, there were important differences in the relationship between 
Sokoto and Zazzau on one hand and Zazzau and its vassals on the other. He argued that 
Sokoto intervened in various ways in the internal affairs of Zaria, while Zaria on the 
other hand did not have a voice in the affairs of its vassals.49 The extent of Sokoto’s 
control over Zaria was firstly demonstrated by the deposition of its rulers in 1860, 1873, 
1881 and 1890 and Smith argued that by 1863 it was fair to suggest that the “sultan of 
Sokoto had appropriated powers to appoint and dethrone the rulers of Zaria.”50 While it
46 M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau 1800-1950 (London, 1960), p.72; a view also held by Hogben and 
Kirk-Greene. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p.545.
47 Sciortino, Nasarawa Province, p .l 1.
48 Ibid.
49 Smith, Zazzau, p.72.
50 Ibid, p.75.
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is true that Sokoto had a say in the internal affairs of Zaria, it is untrue to suggest that 
Zaria did not interfere in the internal affairs of its vassals. For example, in 1885, the emir 
of Zaria deposed Adamu, the then ruler of Jama’a, who was accused of drunkenness.51 
There were also similar depositions in Jama’a in 1850, 1881 and 1888 by the emirs of 
Zaria. Bauchi emirate also intervened in the internal affairs of Lafia. For example, 
during the reign of Mohammed Agwe (1881-1903) of Lafia, one of his aides, Mammadi 
Chillum, marched on the palace and demanded the resignation of the emir. Mohammed 
fled to Bauchi and eighteen months later, Mammadi and the elders of Lafia were 
summoned by the emir, malam Umam, who decided to imprison them and to order a 
return to the status quo.52
The supervision of Zaria by the authorities in Sokoto was done through the 
Waziri (vizier) of Sokoto who was responsible for the collection of tributes that were 
made twice to the Caliph during the Muslim festivals of Id-el-Kabir and Id-el-Fitr. On 
such occasions, the emirs of Zaria were expected to visit Sokoto, taking with them 
tributes in the form of slaves and horses. The Sultan of Sokoto had the right to inherit 
parts of the property left by emirs; in the case of a deposed ruler, he received half his 
slaves and cattle. In Zaria, as described by Smith, apart from the tributes sent to Sokoto 
(one-fifth of such tribute was appropriated by the Waziri of Sokoto), levies of grain were 
collected for the Waziri on his annual visits to Zaria. By 1860, it became customary for 
the newly appointed emirs of Zaria to make donations to Sokoto, known as kudin 
sarauta (money of taking office), to the Sultan and WazirL
51 Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p.545.
52 Ibid.
53 Smith, Zazzau, pp.73-76.
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As already mentioned, the sub-emirates of Keffi and Jama’a were vassals of 
Zaria while Lafia became a vassal of Bauchi. The rulers of Keffi and Jama5a were linked 
to the emir of Zaria through an intermediary or kofa (“door”), who was usually a titled 
official from Zaria. Limamin Junta* a originally supervised the vassal state of Jama5 a 
while Keffi was placed under Alhaji Musa, an untitled malam and pilgrim. The Madakin 
Zazzau later supervised both.54 It was through these intermediaries that Keffi and Jama5a 
submitted their tributes to the emir of Zazzau. The vassals paid gandu (tributes) rather 
than harciji (tax) and Zaria expected a hundred slaves to be given annually from its 
larger vassals like Keffi.55 The emir of Zaria enforced the collection of tributes by 
military means if they had not been paid for three consecutive years. For example, in 
1873, the emir of Zaria, Abdullahi, personally raided Keffi when the annual tribute had 
fallen into arrears and this led to his deposition because the enforced collection did not 
receive the blessing or approval of the Sultan.56
These sub-emirates became military outposts for operations against the peoples 
of Akwanga. The emirates of Zaria and Bauchi allowed their vassals to make war 
independently on “pagan55 communities, but not on each other.
The military operations that were earned out by these sub-emirates had nothing 
to do with the spread of Islam but used merely to obtain slaves and other booty. When 
the jihad was started at Sokoto, the issue of slavery and slave raiding was clearly defined 
by Mohammed Bello. He divided people into three categories, which included: “pure 
Muslims”; “those that have mingled heathen and Moslem practices55 and those of
54 Ibid, p.79.
55 Ibid.
56 Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, 533; Smith, Zazzau, pp.77-78; Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy, 
P-80.
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“heathen origin” or “pagans.” The latter, he made clear, could legally be enslaved, “their 
children and women.. .taken and their property divided.”57 According to Humphrey 
Fisher, Islamic law, on the one hand, “forbids any Muslim to enslave a co-religionist. On 
the other hand, jihad directed against non-Muslims, was approved by the shariah and
c o
might, in some circumstances, be a positive duty.” Therefore, slavery could be viewed 
as a “simile for the heathen condition -  a symbolic representation of the very antithesis 
of Islam.”59 The interpretation(s) of Islamic law on slavery reveals a contradiction in 
itself because the jihad in its effort to free men from unbelief became a device to deprive 
them of freedom.60 The sub-emirates were uninterested in the conversion of their 
“pagan” neighbours, as it would affect the supply of slaves and tributes.
The result of slave raiding was on-going conflict between the peoples of 
Akwanga and the sub-emirates, which early British officials considered to be inter-tribal 
wars. Mr. Lawrence, the Assistant Resident of Lafia, described the effects of slave raids 
on settlement patterns and inter-group relations when he wrote about the Eggon people 
in 1913: “they freely admitted that up to a short time ago, they killed any Hausa they 
could catch and said that it was right since their fathers did the same and that the Hausa 
had driven them from the plains.”61 It is difficult to say when the Eggon began their 
upward movement to the hills, but such migration probably predates the jihad. The 
prevalence of sleeping sickness and other endemic diseases along the watercourses on
57 M. Bello, Infaq al-Maysur, quoted by M. Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria (London, 1937), 
p.50.
58 H. J. Fisher, Slaveiy in the History o f  Muslim Black Afiica (London, 2001), p.46.
59 J.R. Willis (ed), Slaves and Slaveiy in Muslim Africa: Islam and the Ideology o f  Enslavement (London, 
1985), p.4.
60 Ibid, p. 16.
61 NAK SNP 10 338p: Assessment Report on the Mada sub-District of the Mada District of Lafia 
Division, 1913.
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the plains was one of the factors that encouraged the movement of the Eggon people to 
the hills. As observed by Glover and Aitchison, although slave raiding was a major 
cause of population movement, other possible factors were the presence of diseases like 
trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) and onchocerciasis (river blindness).62
However, this upward movement was intensified during the nineteenth century 
for security reasons as a result of raids from the sub-emirates. Most of the raids took 
place either at the beginning or the end of the rainy season, when people were most 
vulnerable as they came to the plains to cultivate their land. In the 1860s, the father of 
the emir of Keffi raided the Eggon village of Angbaku and several boys and a young girl 
were taken captive.63 He kept the young girl as his concubine and in 1880 she gave birth 
to a son, Bashayi, who later became the first District Head of the central district of 
Akwanga. In 1880, the emir of Zaria himself also conducted a raiding expedition in the 
area, which had a devastating effect on the people of the village of Angbaku.64 Present- 
day elders interviewed mentioned that during the course of the raids, the “horsemen” 
took over two-thirds of the villagers as slaves to Keffi and Zaria.65 During the nineteenth 
century, there were two settlements at Angbaku. The majority of the people settled on 
the plains, while a few people could be found in the nearby forest. In the course of the 
raids, the settlement on the plain was completely wiped out and the survivors were those 
that had settled in the forest.66 In order to protect themselves from the raids, those that
62 P.E, Glover and P.J, Aitchison, “Some Causes of Depopulation in Northern Nigeria,” Nigerian Field, 10 
(1969), pp.551-64.
63 NAK SNP10/572p: Nasarawa Province, Keffi-Mada District Assessment Report, 1913.
64 Ibid.
65 Interview with Arughen Oge Angbaku Karami, Enje Ughe, Tsaku Musa, Abliku Gabi and Kuje Kigbu 
at Angbaku, 1 and 6 March 2004.
66 Ibid.
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settled in forest dug defensive trenches, evidence of which still exists. Scouts were also
• • • • 7sent out to watch for unwelcome visitors approaching the village.
Figure 1.1: Village of Angbaku that survived the slave raids from Keffi and Zaria
Figure 1.2: Settlement site of Angbaku that was wiped out in the nineteenth century
67 Ibid.
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In the northern parts of Altwanga, the sub-emirates also raided the Mada people. 
According to an informant, Sidi Tide:
My grandparents told me that the Mada people suffered from 
raids from Keffi, led by the magaji. They raided the Mada 
people 011 horse-baclc and they used swords and spears in their 
raids. The horsemen also wore thick protective covering 
[armour] to resist the pointed stick arrows used by the Mada.
The Mada people moved into the forests or the surrounding hills 
because the horses could neither climb the hills nor enter the 
forests.68
In the 1880s, Magaji Dan Yamusa of Keffi led an unsuccessful raid on the forest 
settlement of Gwanje, which almost cost him his life.69 It is remembered that the people 
always had their poisoned arrows prepared in anticipation of any conflict and every 
morning, twelve people were selected to be lookouts, with each climbing a tall tree at a 
distance from the other.70 At the sight of the raiders, the first look out signalled his 
arrival to the next until the message got to the village where the women and children 
were immediately taken into hiding. The men dispersed in different directions and when 
the raiders arrived in the village, they were attacked from behind. In the confusion of the 
unexpected attack, many of the invading army and their horses were killed.71 At Rinze,
68 Interview with Sidi Tide at Gwanje, 15 November 2004.
69 Interview with Lurnbo, Tache Naluku and Maiganga Zenya at Gwanje, 14November 2003.
70 Interview at Gwanje with Sidi Tide, 20 November 2003; interview at Ungwa Loko with Baba Loko, 14 
November, 2003; Interview at Andaha with Malam Yakubu, 10 November 2003.
71 Ibid and also interview with Dawa Dandoka at Gbuje, 20 November 2003.
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the people also fought the raiders and even captured a sword, which is presently used as
t • • • 79the symbol of authority for the appointed District Head of the area. Although the 
people were terrorised by the slave raiders, some of them were never subdued and in 
some cases they even inflicted casualties on the invading forces. They retained their
•  • 7 1  .independence until the advent of the British. According to one colonial official, “they 
were never subdued by the Fulani and were only raided to a moderate extent for slaves 
when, as often as not, they held their own and sometimes even inflicted heavy loss on 
their would-be captors.”74
Figure 1.3: The District Head of Rinze with a sword that was captured in the 
nineteenth century
72 Interview at Rinze with Kasimu Nawani, Musa Waziri, Ahmadu Nasara, Amwe Inusa Jatau, Adamu 
Yakubu and Dauda Rabo, 24 February 2004 and 3 March 2004.
73 NAK Jos Prof 488, Volume II: The Eggon Tribal Area, Summary of Intelligence Report on, 1935.
74 NAK SNP 10 338p: Assessment Report on the Mada sub-District of the Mada District of Lafia 
Division, 1913.
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At the first sign of the raiders, the Eggon people that had moved to the hills, 
“retired to their almost inaccessible villages and greeted any further advance with a 
shower of poisoned arrows and spears.”75 Although the slave raiders never subdued the 
region as a whole, some individuals were captured and enslaved. In some of the villages 
where I conducted interviews, there were memories of people being captured by the 
“Hausa people on horses” and taken into slaveiy. As already mentioned, not all the 
Eggon people moved up to the hills, as villages like Ubbe, Alushi, Ginda and Bakyeno 
Kasa were located in the lowland. They survived the depredations of raids from the sub­
emirates by paying tributes. The payment of tribute was not only peculiar to these Eggon 
villages, as other communities in Akwanga had similar sorts of arrangements with the 
sub-emirates. The payment of tributes to their powerful neighbours was way of coping 
with the military threat. There was therefore a form of peaceful arrangement between the 
sub-emirates and some communities in the area. Usman Dan Fodio wrote a general 
instruction regarding the relationship between non-Muslim communities that had entered 
into formal treaty with the Sokoto Caliphate: “to make war upon the heathen to whom 
peace has been granted is unlawful by assent; wrongfully to devour their property is 
unlawful by assent, and to enslave them is unlawful by assent.”76
However, the rulers of the sub-emirates often ignored these instructions. For 
example, there was an arrangement between the Nunku clan and the sub-emirate of 
Keffi and later Jama’a. In the 1880s, the village of Nunku seems to have acknowledged 
some sort of allegiance to Keffi and paid a small annual tribute as a form of insurance or
75 NAK SNP 9/618: Re-Assessment Report on South Mada District, Lafia Division, 1922.
76 D.H. Bivar, “Manifesto of the Fulani jihad” Journal o f  African Histoiy (1961), pp.235-243.
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immunity against slave raids.77 The Nunku people, despite meeting their obligations,
were sometimes raided by Keffi. They soon became annoyed and changed their
allegiance to Jama’a.78 Jama’a and Nunku clan had had earlier trading relations and this
new relationship was utilised by the former as a base and source of intelligence for raids
in the southern parts of the area,79 One informant however, argued that the Nunku
people had never paid any tributes to Keffi but only to Jama’a which was militarily
stronger.80 He maintained that the beginning of the friendly relationship between Keffi
and Nunku began when the Magaji Dan Yamusa wanted to raid the village and he
discovered that the people were Muslims. Since the Koran forbids Muslims from
attacking each other, he extended his hand of friendship and promised not to attack the 
• 81village. However, the Nunku people were not recognized as equal in their relationship 
with Keffi and as politely observed by an informant from Keffi, “home kyaun tafarnuwa, 
ba ta yi kamar albasa ba” (“however fine the garlic may be, it is never like the 
onion”).82
The slave raiders from the sub-emirates also raided the western parts of 
Altwanga, present-day Wamba and Mama. The second emir of Lafia, Musa Dan Jaji 
(1809-1814), attacked the Mama area and raided as far as the Bauchi outpost at the foot 
of the Plateau.83 The raid on the Mama, however, did not succeed beyond Jimiya
77 NAK Jos Prof 5061: Mada District — administration of, 1926.
78 There is a possibility that the raids carried out by Keffi on Nunku were sometimes to enforce the 
payments of tributes.
79 Interview with at Kanbar with Maiganga Zenya, 14 November 2003; Interview with Bala Maishai at 
Gwanje Bishu, 14 November 2003.
80 Interview at Andaha with Malam Yakubu Alhaii Yusuf, 10 November 2003.
811bid.
82 Interview in Keffi with Alhaji Usman Bako, 16 April 2003.
83 Sciortino, Nasarciwa, p. 11
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village. According to reports from the 1920s, the emir of Lafia also regarded the 
Eggon villages as, “a slave raiding preserve more than anything else.”85 There is no 
concrete evidence to suggest that the entire Eggon people were subjects of the Lafia 
emirate.86 Although some of the border villages paid a small amount of tax to the emir, 
his claim over the Eggon people as a whole was not strong. Arden-Clarke observed that 
the emir of Lafia’s claim
was not a strong one as only the villages lying to the East,
Bakenu Kasa, Ume, Alizaga, Galle and small part of 
Alogani ever paid any tax. This tax was extremely small 
consisting of two or three goats and a little palm oil or 
guinea com from each village. Other villages in the 
interior never paid any tax whatever.87
The impact of slave raiding on the non-centralised communities has generally
QQbeen given prominence by historians. In Akwanga, although slave raiding by the sub­
emirates did not give rise to a situation in which the “pagan” groups raided each other 
for slaves on a large and organised scale, some groups collaborated with the invaders 
against their neighbours. As already mentioned, the warriors from Jama’a eventually 
came to rely on Nunku village as a base for their raids and the villagers participated in
84 Interview at Jiniiya with Audu Ali, 6 May 2004; Ames, Plateau Province, p.32.
85 NAK SNP9/618: Re-Assessment Report on South Mada District, Lafia Division, 1922.
86 From the various interviews conducted at Wakama and Kagbu, there was a general consensus that the 
local people were not at any stage subjected to the sub-emirates.
87 NAK SNP9/618: Re-Assessment Report on South Mada District, Lafia Division, 1922.
88 M.A. Klein, “The Slave Trade and Decentralized Societies” Journal o f  African History, 42 (2001), 
pp.49-65; Hubbell, “View of the Slave Trade from the Margin” in the same volume, pp.25-47.
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such events, which they regarded as “natural, practical and shrewd.”89 Therefore, some 
of the successes of the raiders in capturing slaves were direct result of cooperation they 
enjoyed. As already mentioned, some of the Eggon villages that were on the lowlands 
survived by developing their defences and the periodic payments of tributes to the sub­
emirates. The payments were made in kind and slaves and their victims were not 
captives in organised raids but sometimes strangers that ventured into the area.90 These 
occasional kidnappings were carried out in order to meet the tribute requirements of the 
sub-emirates. However, the continued raids by the sub-emirates and the resistance by the 
peoples of Akwanga resulted in the considerable loss of lives on both sides. The 
complex nature of the relationship between the peoples of Akwanga and their powerful 
neighbours negates the view that they were passive victims of the predation of their 
powerful militarised neighbours. Rather, slave raiding followed more complex local 
patterns.
There was a transfer of population from the raided to the raiders and some were 
sold at the local slave market at Keffi while others were absorbed within the plantation 
economy of some of the emirates. From the accounts of Maimaina, who was sent as a 
spy by the British from Lokoja to Kano in 1901, “it was at Keffi that I first saw slaves 
for sale in a market - men, women, and children too - all seated with their legs stretched 
out.”91 Goods were exchanged at the Keffi market for slaves while some were sold to the
• » 4 O '}plantation owners in either Zaria or Nupe. The slave raiders from Keffi also exchanged
89 NAK Jos Prof 5061/1942, Mada District -  administration of.
90 Interview at Ginda with Musa Bako, 21 May 2004.
91 A.H.M. Kirk-Greene and P. Newman, West African Travels and Adventures: Two Autobiographical 
Narratives from  Northern Nigeria (London, 1971), p. 142.
92 Interview at Gudi with Adamu Salihu and Alhaji Idirisu, 15 March 2004.
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their captives for salt that was locally produced at Keana.93 In addition, the emirate 
aristocrats and merchant class had slaves that worked on their plantations and for their 
businesses. Paul Lovejoy argued that the growth of plantations in northern Nigeria 
occurred in two stages.94 In the first half of the nineteenth century, growth of plantations 
arose near the cities of Kano, Katsina, Gwandu and Zaria, all established commercial 
centres, and near the new capital of Sokoto. In the second half of the nineteenth century, 
the development of plantations spread to Yola, Nupe and Ilorin. In Zaria, M.G. Smith 
identified 51 rinji (plantations) of various sizes owned by local aristocrats.95 The sources 
of the slaves were from raids and tributes.
The slave raids by the sub-emirates against the peoples of Akwanga in the 
nineteenth century had demographic consequences. Although there is 110 available 
demographic data on the peoples of central Nigeria before the twentieth century, there is 
no evidence that the region was densely populated. The sparse nature of the population 
of the area was until recently attributed to the effects of the slave raids by Sokoto and its 
emirates. According to Gourou,
In the dry season.. .the [Fulani] horsemen ravaged the plains of 
central Nigeria, massacring or carrying off the inhabitants as 
slaves...the Benue plains were more fiercely devastated; the 
Jukun kingdom was not even converted into a vassal stage, but
93 Ibid.
94 P.E. Lovejoy, Transformations in Slaveiy: A Histoiy o f Slaveiy in Africa (Second Edition: Cambridge, 
2000), p.203.
95 Smith, Zazzau, 81.
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was ruthlessly destroyed; its inhabitants were dispersed and the 
area became a dry-season grazing ground for Fulani herds.96
Michael Mason however, argued that central Nigeria had low population not as a result 
of the nineteenth century wars, but because of other factors, such as diseases and 
climatic conditions, which exerted their influence in the preceding centuries.97 In further 
response to Mason, Gleave and Prothero suggested that central Nigeria had low 
population densities only by comparison with high densities in areas to the north and 
south of it. They however concluded that slave raiding had modified the distribution of 
population in the area.98
There are biological, medical and environmental factors that could be advanced 
as the possible reasons for the low population density in central Nigeria. Central Nigeria 
was an area of low fertility and high mortality rates. According to John Iliffe, the region 
had low fertility rates compared to the other regions of Nigeria and that population 
growth before 1950 was a result of the reduction in mortality, rather than an increase in 
birth rates.99 This was made possible by the improvement in medical science and the 
bringing diseases like smallpox and sleeping sickness under control. The discovery of 
antibiotic drugs was able to overcome, for instance, gonorrhea, one of the major causes 
of infertility in Africa.100 From the early missionary records, it was clear that the Eggon
96 P. Gourou, A Tropical World: Its Social and Economic Conditions and its Future Status (London, 
1966), p .114.
97 M. Mason, “Population Density and ‘Slave-Raiding1 - The case of the Middle Belt of Nigeria,” Journal 
o f  Africa History, 4 (1969), p.563.
98 M.B. Gleave and R.M. Prothero, “Population Density and ‘Slave-Raiding’- A Comment,” Journal o f  
African History 2 (1971), pp.319-27.
99 J. Iliffe, Africans: The History o f  a Continent (Cambridge, 1993), p.239.
100 Ibid, p.241.
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people had high infant mortality and high mortality of women in labour especially 
during the hungry season. Mortality was made worse by periodic droughts.101 
Nevertheless, the effects of slave raids did not only involve the forceful removal of 
population, but also disruption and devastation, which created food shortages that led to 
famine. From the interviews conducted, my informants are of the agreement that the 
slave raids affected agricultural production, resulting sometimes in disease and famine. 
Slave raids alone could not be a possible explanation to the low population of the area as 
only limited areas were raided intensively while most communities effectively defended 
themselves.
Generally, towards the end of the nineteenth century, slaves formed a high
proportion of the population in the Sokoto Caliphate. In his description of Kano in the
nineteenth century, Barth observed that the numbers of slaves and free people were 
102about equal. In 1860 when the emir of Zazzau, Mannnan Sani died, he left nine 
thousand slaves to be divided up with his estate.103 In Yola, Barth also observed that the 
emir had “all his slaves settled in rumde or slave villages, where they cultivate grain for 
his profit.”104 By the end of the nineteenth century, the Sokoto Caliphate had in excess 
over a million slaves; more than anywhere in Africa or the Americas.105 Slaveiy became 
a crucial point of debate in the British conquest of the Caliphate, which was legitimated 
as an antrislavery measure. The British public was led to believe that colonial rule would 
end the scourge and horrors of slavery and slave raids and the suffering of “thousands of
101 Alexander: Personal communication, 2 March, 2004.
102 H. Barth, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa 1849 -  1855 (London, 1962), Volume 
II pp .124-5; pp.143-4.
103 Smith, Zazzau, p. 158.
104 Barth, Travels and Discoveries, II, p. 191.
105 P.E. Lovejoy and J.S. Hogendoni, Slow Death fo r  Slaveiy: The Course o f  Abolition in Northern 
Nigeria 1897-1936 (Cambridge, 1993), p .1.
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hapless victims brutally tom from their homes and marched off to lifetime bondage.”106 
Therefore, in order to gain the support of the sceptical British public and the Colonial 
Office in London, colonial officials in northern Nigeria sometimes exaggerated the 
extent of the tyrannical rule of the Fulani and their slave raids against the non-Fulani. In 
his annual report on Nasarawa province for 1902, Lugard noted:
In the Nassarawa country, a once fertile and populous 
province, one can only view the remains and ruins of large 
and totally deserted towns, bearing witness to the desolation 
wrought by one hundred years of internecine strife and slave 
raiding by the Fulani.107
British occupation did not automatically end slave raiding, however, as the defeat
of the emirs had thrown the emirates into confusion, resulting in individually organised
raids. Lugard, in his annual report of 1900-1901 anticipated that slavery and slave raids
would cease in Nasarawa province once a small military garrison was established in 
108 *Nasarawa town. However, m 1903, Constance Larymore, wife of a colonial official, 
saw a caravan of slaves on her way to Keffi, writing: “it was the first sign of obvious 
slavery I had ever seen.”109 In 1903, Lugard claimed that he had ended all large-scale 
slave-raiding in northern Nigeria. But some of the emirates continued to send tributes in 
slaves to Sokoto. For example, despite the establishment of a British garrison at Sokoto,
106 S. Mier and M.A. Klein (eds), Slaveiy and Colonial Rule in Africa (London, 1999), p .l.
107 Quoted by Sciortino, Nasarawa Province, p.5.
108 Northern Nigeria Annual Report'. Report for period from 1 January 1900, to 31 March 1901, p. 10.
109 C. Larrymore, The Resident’s Wife in Nigeria (London, 1908), p.47.
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Zaria still managed to send its annual tribute of one hundred slaves to the town.110 This 
had implications for the peoples of Akwanga region, as the British presence did not 
automatically end slave raiding by the sub-emirates.
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANISATION IN PRE-COLONIAL AKWANGA
The pre-colonial political organisation of the peoples of Akwanga was 
decentralised. In other words, there was no single political unit around which all power 
was centred amongst them. The general basis of government was customs and traditions 
handed down for generations, which were subject to the authority of the ancestors. The 
interpreters of such customs were the elders and government was basically 
gerontocratic. The elders were mostly members of the families or clans that were 
represented in community councils. Hence, any understanding of the nature of the 
political organisation of the people in the region must take into account the social 
organisation of the family and clan.
The family was the basic unit of production and reproduction, who lived together 
and traced descent from a remote common ancestor. Amongst the Eggon, for example, 
the hill settlement was divided into clusters of compounds, strung out along the crest of 
the hills. Such settlements were composed of extended family groups, each headed by a 
patriarch or andcikpo. In turn, members of each extended family resided in scattered 
households consisting of five to a dozen huts connected by walls around a small 
courtyard. The general population of the hill settlement was estimated in the early phase 
of British rule as nearly 36,000, dispersed fairly uniformly with slightly higher
110 Lovejoy and Hogendom, Death o f  Slaveiy, p.23.
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aggregations near the more open and level upland areas.111 The family consisted of the 
father, who was the head of the household and his wife or wives and children. Each 
member of the household had certain obligations to perform on behalf of the whole 
family. The economic, social and religious needs of the family were the responsibility 
of the head of the household. The head of the household dominated the affairs of the 
family. It should be noted, however, that the dominance of the head did not necessarily 
mean that he was the only contributor to the economic status of the family. Although the 
head of the household directed production, the labour of both the wives and young 
children was important.
The clan was a federation of groups of close blood relatives tracing their descent 
from a common ancestor. The role of the clan was important in village administration. 
Each family was represented by its head at the village council and gradually, the 
authority which was represented by the head of the household was transferred to the clan 
or village council. Therefore, the council exercised certain powers 011 behalf of families 
or clans. It should be noted that the council performed more religious than political 
functions. One colonial official in 1913 described the social organisation of the Eggon 
villages in the following words:
The community is organized in the usual way. There is no 
one big headman. There are what I call towns, which consist 
of a varying number of imgwas [streets]...Each ungwa has 
its own headman...He is not I think in a position to give
m NAK SNP 617/1922: Reassessment Report, Central Mada District, 1921; NAL SNP 618/1922: 
Reassessment Report, South Mada District, 1922.
65
orders, but he is primus inter pares, and of course his 
influence will depend greatly upon his personality.112
Amongst the Eggon, the clan was made up of the Igu (patrilineal lineage group). At the 
head of each clan was the and’ashim or head of the ashim cult, which was basically a 
form of ancestor worship. Entry into the cult was strictly based on age but some clans 
also considered mature heads of households with good judgement.113 The and'ashim 
was responsible for both the temporal and spiritual needs of his clan. The authority of 
the and’ashim was centred 011 religion, as he was the custodian of the cult. The emblem 
of the cult was the buffalo horn known as an Eku. The and’ashim in council with the 
M o’dako ashim (elders) were responsible for the running of the clans. However, this 
does not suggest that the council arbitrarily exercised authority, as all meetings were 
held in public and all adult males had the right of attendance and the right of speech. 
Therefore, the voice of authority reflected public opinion. The and’ashim however, was 
the acknowledged religious head of the clan. He was responsible for the maintenance of 
law and order and also the settling of disputes. The decision to go to war rested on the 
and’ashim, in concert with the elders. War was declared by the blowing of the eku 
(buffalo horn) after a quick mobilisation of able-bodied men able to fight.114 Weapons 
used in fighting wars by the Eggon were bows and arrows, swords and stabbing knives.
112 NAK, SNP 10/572p: Nasarawa Province, Keffi-Mada District, Assessment Report, 1913.
113 Interview witli Aruglien Oge Angbaku Kararni, Enje Ughe, Tsaku Musa, Abliku Gabi and Kuje Kigbu 
at Angbaku, 1 and 6 March 2004.
U4Ibid.
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The Eggon used pointed wooden arrows, smeared in poison, which were effective when 
fired at a close range.115
Similarly, the Mada village administration was in the hands of the elders of the 
cinci (clans). The lunku (elders) of each of the clans was represented in the village 
council of elders or the banlunku council. Admission to this council was purely by age 
and it performed a more religious rather than political function.116
Generally, administration was vested in the hands of the elders at the clan
council that formed executive authority. However, there were some fundamental
changes that occurred towards the end of the nineteenth century, as a consequence of the
establishment of the sub-emirates of Keffi, Lafia and Jama’a. After the establishment of
these sub-emirates, what were hitherto secure communities became subject to attacks
and this strengthened the need for groups to have a leader who could control their
defence and other activities.117 There was also the need for a leader who would take
tributes to the sub-emirates on behalf of those communities that had entered into mutual
arrangements. These, among other reasons, meant that local people began to concentrate
11 sdecisions on a single person as opposed to the group of elders. However, despite this 
transformation in the nineteenth century, local societies did not develop bureaucratic or 
chiefly offices like their Hausa-Fulani neighbours. According Kasimu Kigbu, with 
regard to the Eggon:
In the colonial records we have the impression that the region was
115 Ibid.
116 Interview with at Kanbar with Maiganga Zenya, 14 November 2003; Interview with Bala Maishai at 
Gwanje Bishu 14 November 2003.
117 Ibid.
118 Interview with at Kanbar with Maiganga Zenya, 14 November 2003.
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treated as if  there were no chiefs or as segmentary or stateless 
societies... but in point of fact there was the institution and the 
chief was called Adan Ubin and was assisted by a council Moa 
Andalopo Ashim...It is enough to point out that these societies 
were not ‘stateless’ or ‘segmentary.’119
It is true that some of the colonial records had misconceptions about local society.
However, it is baseless to argue that the local people had chiefly offices like the sarauta
system of the Hausa-Fulani. David Dorward argued more convincingly that the Eggon
was a “chiefless” society based 011 a number of complementary institutions. The power
of the elders rested on “the combination of kinship loyalties, personality and ritual
knowledge as well as narrowly defined powers as patriarch of an extended family
unit.”120 The institution of Ari (chief) was a post-jihad development, influenced by the
Hausa-Fulani. The office of Ari was generally alien to the Eggon people and in the
villages of Angbashu and Ginda, the Ari were installed with traditional ceremonies and
were presented with the royal hat, gown, sandals and a staff of office in the form of a
121brush made of the fronds of the palm tree.
At the Mada village of Nunku by the 1880s, Moinda, who served as the first 
intermediary between Nunku and the emir of Keffi, was intentionally styled the first 
Sarki by the emir although he was not the head of the village.122 As already noted,
119 K. Kigbu et al, Eggon o f  Central Nigeria, pp.7-8.
120 Dorward, “Nigerian Hill-Farming Society,” p.205.
121 NAK Jos Prof 488, Volume II, The Eggon Tribal Area, Summary of intelligence Report on, 1935.
122 NAK Jos Prof 5061: Mada District -  administration of, 1942.
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Nunku changed its allegiance to Jama’a after they were raided by Keffi and in order to 
avoid any further relations with Keffi, the emir of Jama’a arbitrarily appointed Zumbi as 
the village head of Nunku after the death of Moinda. The appointment of Zumbi, who 
had no established authority in his clan, was not unconnected to the need for Jama’a to 
have a contact for their slave raids in the area. With the advent of the British, Zumbi was 
put in charge of the North Mada District, but before that he had no authority whatsoever
123over the Mada people as a whole. Commenting on the appointment of the Mada chief, 
the Resident of Plateau province noted in 1927:
This cannot be said to be an hereditary appointment. There was 
no paramount chief of North Mada prior to the British 
administration. The title is an artificial creation of our own...it 
is not the policy of the government to create a strong 
administration among pagan tribes where such did not exist 
before our advent.124
THE RELIGIOUS WORLD-VIEW OF THE PEOPLES OF AKWANGA
A people’s world view is usually defined as "the complex of beliefs, and 
attitudes which they have concerning the origin, nature, structures, organisation and 
interaction of being in the universe with particular reference to mail.”125 This seeks to 
answer key questions about the place of man in the universe and does not consist only of 
the multiplicity of supernatural beings, concepts, beliefs and attitudes, but is also the
m Ibid.
124 NAK Jos Prof 433: North Mada District-Appointinent of District Head, 1927.
125 E. Ikenga-Metuh, Comparative Studies o f  African Traditional Religion (Onitsha, 1987), p.61.
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underlying logic which holds the society together.126 In the world-view of the peoples of 
Akwanga, there was a close connection between the material and spiritual world and the 
aim of the interaction of human beings and the supernatural was intended to preserve 
balance and harmony in society. Their worldview was man-centred, so man attempts to 
manipulate nature and the supernatural in such a way that he ensures his continual 
survival. Therefore, indigenous religion provided a coherent belief system which 
explained the great life crises of illness and death, and which gave man the feeling that 
he was in charge and could manipulate his environment, both natural and supernatural, 
to his advantage.
Although the term “traditional” is used in this discussion to describe indigenous 
religions or belief systems, it should be noted that the concept of “traditional religion” is 
a cultural construction.127 Shaw located its origin in the use of Judaeo-Christian 
terminology and theology by missionaries when they “translated” elements of the belief 
systems of the people they were trying to convert.128 Parrinder was the first to use the 
concept of African traditional religion in his book, which was later adopted by leading
« ♦ 190African theologians like John Mbiti. African theologians used it in the period of 
cultural and religious decolonisation and Africanisation, which made “African 
Traditional Religion” into the dominant paradigm in the study of the indigenous 
religions. According to Westerlund:
African Traditional Religion was constructed as the single, pan- 
African belief system comparable to Christianity, a
126 Ibid.
127 R. Sliaw, “The Invention of African Traditional Religion,” Religion 20 (1990), pp.339-353.
128 Ibid.
129 E.G. Parrinder, Afi-iccni Traditional Religion (London, 1954).
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megahomology in comparison to the much more limited 
delineation of equivalence in missionary cultural translations.130
Although the peoples of Akwanga believed in a supreme being, the direct 
relationship with God was rarely explicit and he did not intervene in the day-to-day 
affairs of life. These were governed by other invisible forces (good or evil) from whom 
it was possible to win favours through rituals and spirits of the ancestors. The Mada 
believed in a supreme being called MIq?aru or Ri, literally translated as sky and sun 
respectively. MJcparu was believed to have created the universe and directs its affairs 
through bri or spirits. These spirits reside in trees, streams, forests and land and 
sacrifices were offered to them regularly in order to keep supplying man with those 
natural necessities under their control. The bri could either be good or bad and the latter 
included the souls of people that met violent deaths or died prematurely and witches and 
wizards who disguised themselves as animals at night to harm others. The good spirits 
were those of the ancestors, which reside beneath the earth. The spirit of the ancestors: 
Act as intermediaries between the living and tire supernatural 
world. They intercede in times of crisis on behalf of their 
descendants, they assist and guide them and protect them from 
hunger and mischievous schemes of enemies and they 
undermined natural disasters. They see that crops of their
130 Quoted by Shaw, “Trditional Religion,” p.345.
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descendants grow and that their animals increase in number and 
that their descendants have more children.131
The spirits of the ancestors were believed to shuttle between the spiritual world and the 
mundane world. While in the world of the living, they reside either in the village grove, 
forests or caves. Sacrifices were offered to them at the beginning of planting season, 
harvests or during other festivals and initiation rites, to express communal appreciation 
for their support, protection and guidance.132 It was also the recognition of the vital link 
between the two worlds that necessitates the glu-kyu (funeral dance), which was a rite of 
passage from the land of the living to that of the ancestors. During the funeral festival, 
the spirit of ancestors comes to commune with the people through the njwi 
[masquerade]. The highest religious body serving as the link between the spirit of the 
ancestors and the living was the nri society, restricted to grown men. The initiation rites 
were performed every year, during which all male children who reached the age of 
puberty were presented before the cult by their fathers or guardians and taken to the 
sacred groove for initiation. Implicit in the worship of the cult was its significance for 
the fertility of the land.
The Eggon also believed in the existence of one God called Ahogbren, who was 
approached in rituals through sacrifices. Formal religious ceremonies were channelled 
through the ashim cult, which is headed by its leader and ’ ashim.133 The ashim cult was 
a form of ancestral worship and the tendency therefore was every household to also have
|jl C.T. Saleh, “Cosmology of the Mada People” in S.I.O. Okita (ed), Studies in Nigerian Culture (Zaria, 
1982), p.23.
132 Interview at Akwanga with Chnbe, 26 May 2004.
133 Interview with Ebuga at Nasarawa Eggon, 14 April 2004.
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its own ashim to whom he prays. The head of the household becomes the and’ ashim of 
his own family and prayers were offered at the backyard of the house called anva 
ashim}24 Membership to the ashim cult was through initiation, age being the sole 
criterion. Every village had its own adan ashims and they were answerable to the ada 
nbin (father of the land) on whose instructions and on whose behalf they were 
performing any duties.135 Like their Mada neighbours, the Eggon believed in ancestral 
spirits who asserted their authority through the elders in the community. The spirits 
(.Abibli) o f the ancestors were represented in communal activities by the masquerades, 
which was under the custodianship of the ashim cult. Even though the masquerades were 
performed by masked individuals, they were regarded as the physical manifestation of 
the ancestral spirits and their presence symbolised the intervention of the metaphysical 
world into human affairs.136 The good spirits were those of the ancestors, who were 
vested with mystical powers and authority. They retained a functional role in the world 
of the living, specifically in the life of their living descendants. The elders were the 
representatives of the ancestors and the mediators between them and the descendants.
Indigenous beliefs systems had their first encounter with Islam in the nineteenth 
century. Islam came into the region through the northern border village of Nunku. 
According to an informant, Alhaji Yusuf:
Islam came before Christianity when Hausa traders settled 
among the Mada people. Islam came to Mada land through 
Nunku during the reign of Moida. The Hausa that visited Nunku
135
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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were hosted by Moida and some of them began to settle, which 
resulted in the emergence of a Muslim community in Nunku. As 
a result, of this, few people were converted to Islam. A few of 
the people sent their children to the Quranic schools to learn 
how to read and write in Arabic. Some of them could recite the
1 77Koran and justice was earned out through Islamic laws.
It is difficult to say exactly when the Hausa-Fualni began to settle amongst the 
Mada people in the nineteenth century. Present-day informants maintained that the 
Sokoto jihad triggered the movement of the Hausa-Fulani to Akwanga, who began to
1 7 Rsettle m the surrounding areas like Jama’a, Keffi and Lafia. They at first began to 
trade with the border villages like Nunku and Ugwan Zaria and gradually began to settle 
amongst the local people. Thus, Hausa-Fulani traders were the pioneer immigrants to 
settle in the region and were followed by Muslim clerics, who specialised in handing out 
charms against evil spirits.139
Although there is no statistics of the number of Hausa-Fulani immigrants that 
settled in Akwanga region in the nineteenth century, in the 1921/22 assessment of the 
Mada district, Arden-Clarke reported that there were three Hausa settlements at Nunku, 
Andaha and Numwa Babb a and one Hausa family in Katanza.140 In Akwanga town, 
there was only one Hausa settlement by 1922 with a population of 185.141 The Hausa
137 Interview at Andaha with Alhaji Yusuf, 10 November 2003.
ljS Interview at Rinze with Kasimu Nawani, Musa Waziri, Ahmadu Nasara, Amwe Inusa Jatau, Adamu 
Yakubu and Dauda Rabo, 24 February 2004 and 3 March 2004.
139 Ibid.
140 NAK SNP 17-K5922: North Mada District, Akwanga Division Reassessment, 1922.
141 NAK SNP 9/617: Central Mada District, Lafia Division, Nasarawa Province, 1922.
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that settled maintained their religious practices and some of the Mada people accepted it 
because of the advantages they thought they could gain from it.142 One of the important 
benefits of Islam was the use of talismans that were given out by the Muslim clerics. 
These were seen as a protection against evil spirits and also as a panacea to numerous 
day-to-day problems.143 Another area of ready agreement between Islam and indigenous 
beliefs system was the practice in matters of divination and the use of magic. Islamic 
practice encouraged divination and the use of good magic. Islam approves and sanctions 
magical procedures, which were directed towards such legitimate ends as the cure of 
disease, the prevention and curtailment of misfortune, and assurance of prosperity and 
success. Therefore, the growth of Islam amongst the Nunku clan was because of the 
ability of the new religion to adapt to local customs and therefore made its assimilation 
easy. For instance, the Koran mentions many spiritual beings, including angels, aljcinu 
(jinn) and is hold (bad spirits), which were easily assimilated into the Mada belief system, 
and Islam was not strict on its new adherents to abandon their accustomed confidence in 
all their mystical forces. By the turn of the twentieth century, some of the Mada people 
from Nunku were literate in Arabic. For example, in 1913, Mr. Sciortino, the Divisional 
Officer in charge of Jama’a gave the village head of Nunku a detailed list in Arabic of 
the whole assessment of the Mada district.144 Therefore, when one seeks to explain the 
steady growth in the number of Muslims amongst the Mada in the nineteenth century, it 
seems undeniable that the power credited to the mcdamai and traders played a significant 
part in it. At the very least, it provided an effective entry to Muslim concepts by giving
142 Interview with at Kanbar with Maiganga Zenya, 14 November 2003; Interview with Bala Maishai at 
Gwanje Bishu 14 November 2003.
143 Ibid.
144 NAK SNP 10/133p: Nasarawa Province, Jama’a Division, Mada Patrol, 1914.
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practical answers to some of the people’s problems in terms which were culturally 
acceptable. In the southern and eastern parts of Akwanga, Islam only made a successful 
penetration in the early twentieth century after the establishment of the British rule in the 
area.
THE PRE-COLONIAL ECONOMY OF THE PEOPLES OF AKWANGA
Agriculture was the dominant productive activity in pre-colonial Akwanga and 
the peoples of the area showed a very high degree of mastery of their contrasting 
environments. Different methods of cultivation were practised, varying from terracing 
on the hill slopes to shifting cultivation and bush fallowing in the plains. The Mada, 
Rindre, Arum and most of the groups that settled in the plains had two types of farms, 
namely, compound and bush farms. The former relates to a piece of land behind the 
house, intensively cultivated with its fertility maintained by the application of animal 
manure, compost (leaves plucked for use as sleeping mats and after thrown into the 
farm), household refuse and ashes. Bush farms, on the other hand, were far away from 
home and their fertility was maintained by the compost of rotten leaves of shrubs cut 
down on the farms during the clearing period.145 These farms were often fallowed as 
long as there were other portions to cultivate. According to an informant, a piece of land 
would be farmed for three to five years, and when it showed signs of declining 
productivity it was rested for two or more years, and when it showed signs through thick
545 Interview with Alhaji Gwamna at Akwanga, 22 March 2004; Interview with Dawa Dandoka at Gbuje, 
6 December 2003.
76
grass cover that it had regained some of its fertility would be brought back into 
cultivation.146
Agricultural production was based on an intimate knowledge of the local rain 
and soil conditions as well as on a wide familiarity with the local trees, grasses and other 
plants. Knowledge of the fauna and flora was handed down from generation to 
generation and possession of such knowledge, especially by the elders, was important 
for seasonal agricultural cycles. Elders, on the basis of their experience and age, gave 
advice on the best time for tilling, planting and harvesting and also deciding on when the 
workforce of the family should move to another locality for the purpose of shifting 
cultivation, bush fallowing and the system of crop rotation.147 The process of production 
in the agricultural sector was earned out in four different stages. Firstly, the clearing of 
the bush and the burning of rubbish was the preliminary stage in the production process, 
which was carried out by both men and women. Then followed tilling and ridge making 
for most of the crops which was performed mostly by men. The second stage was the 
sowing or planting process, which differed according to the kind of crop. While the 
seeds of guinea com, groundnut and maize were sown on the top of the ridges, beniseed 
was sown by spreading or scattering the seeds on both the ridges and furrows.148 Sweat 
potatoes and cocoyams were planted on the ridges. For this both male and female labour 
was employed. The third stage in the process of production was the maintenance of the 
crops, which involved weeding, pruning and transplanting of crops like guinea com. 
Both men and women performed weeding at this stage. The final stage was the harvest,
146 Interview with Isuwa Ambi at Endehu, 15 November 2003.
147 Ibid.
148 Interview with Alhaji Gwamna at Akwanga, 22 March 2004; Dawa Dandoka at Gbuje, 6 December 
2003.
77
which depended largely on the types of crops. For guinea com, it involved cutting down 
the stalk, removing the heads and then tying them into bundles. This was done by men 
and the women earned the bundles from the fields to their homes where these were 
stored by the men in the granaries, out if which the head of the household gave out 
portions of the crops to the family when the need arose.149
As already mentioned, the depredations by slave raiders from the sub-emirates 
intensified the movement of some of the Eggon people to the defensible hilltops. While 
acknowledging the defensive aspect, this factor should not be regarded as the sole 
explanation for the hill settlement. The generalised Eggon assertion that the hills were 
“healthier” as already mentioned needs to be seen against the prevalence of 
trypanosomiasis and microfilarial diseases on the surrounding plains.150 Moreover, the 
sophisticated terraced agriculture, which the Eggon had evolved to meet the demands of 
the ecosystem of the hills was extremely efficient in terms of land and labour input, a 
possible explanation for the persistence of hill fanning in so many areas in central 
Nigeria.151 However, the intensification of the movement of the Eggon people to the 
hills created a series of problems, especially the limited amount of and poor quality of 
land for cultivation. The Eggon began extensive hill agriculture and they developed a 
system of terracing across the hilly slopes, which enabled them to conserve the topsoil 
and create a series of stepped level benches suitable for fanning. The farnis proper were 
at the foot of the hills on the plains and those parts on the hills were described in 1913 as
149 Ibid.
150 NAK SNP 338p: Assessment Report, South Mada District, 1913.
151 For a detail discussion of a hill farming community in central Nigeria, see Netting, Hil! Farmers o f  
Nigeria.
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“healthy, [and] every foot of land is cultivated.”152 Although the people constructed their 
permanent settlements on the hills, during the rainy season they moved to their 
temporary settlements on the plains. They usually descended from the hills in large 
numbers armed with their bows and arrows and their agricultural tools. Lookouts who 
climbed on tall trees and nearby hills were used and the approach of an enemy was 
signalled by the sound of trumpets, warning them to retreat to the hills.153 Raids on the 
local people made it difficult to practice shifting cultivation on the plain. The people 
responded creatively by constructing anti-erosion barriers and building terraces on the 
hills. They also practised crop rotation and used animal and vegetable manure in order to 
maintain soil fertility, allowing successive food crops to be produced with little or no 
intervening fallow period. Although my informants could not remember how terraces 
were constructed, they were similar to those described by Robert Netting of the nearby 
Kofyar people:
The method was to build up a stone wall leaning slightly in 
from the vertical toward the hill slope. After the wall had 
risen a foot or two, earth was hoed down from the slope 
above to fill in the space behind it. If a higher wall was 
required, the process could be repeated.154
The construction of the stone wall at the heart of the Eggon hills fascinated Mr. Patrick, 
the Assistant Resident of Keffi division: “I was much struck with the excellence of these
152 NAK SNP10/338p: Assessment Report on Mada sub-District of Mada District of Lafia Division, 1913.
153 Interview with Likita Abimiku and Isuwa Ambi at Endehu, 15 November 2003.
154 Netting, Hill Farmers o f  Nigeria, p.58.
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dry stone walls, they are well made as any that one sees in Derbyshire.”155 Arden-Clarke 
also admired the Eggon hill agriculture and terracing:
The people are expert agriculturalists. Many farms situated 
011 steep and rocky hill slopes are well and cleverly terraced, 
showing signs of a great expenditure of time and labour. The 
Madas [sic] are also clever in building the stone walls 
surrounding their compounds. These walls are well made 
and almost equal to those to be seen in Yorkshire or 
Durham.12)6
Similarly, Mr. Farrant of the Sudan United Mission wrote in 1925 about the Eggon hill 
agriculture:
The tribes, with incredible labour compelled these slopes to 
feed them...Since the violent rains wash the good soil off 
the slopes, the tribes proceeded to build stone walls which 
trapped the earth, so fanning naixow tenaces and step upon 
step up the hill side wherever there is any soil these tenaces 
go. Thousands and thousands of tons of rock and stone have 
been built into these in the course of years.. .The very tiniest 
pockets of soil are not despised.. .1 saw a boulder about the 
size of a cart. On its top there might be two bucketsful of
155 NAK SNP10/572p: Nasarawa Province, Keffi-Mada district, Assessment Report, 1913.
156 NAK SNP9/618: Re-Assessment Report on South Mada District, Lafla Division, 1922.
80
earth, but this had been turned over with a hoe and three
1 SIstalks of maize were growing m it.
The peoples of Akwanga also raised domestic animals like goats, sheep, pigs,
1 S1^chickens and dogs, but did not keep cattle and horses. Most families kept these 
animals and the numbers varied according to the wealth of a household.159 The domestic 
animals were stored wealth and were mostly used for religious ritual, payments for 
medicinal healing and marriages. Occasionally, such as when a family had a guest, a 
chicken or a goat was slaughtered.160 The dung of these animals was used to maintain 
the fertility of the compound farms. The Eggon, apart from using compost and 
household refuse relied greatly 011 animal manure as a source of fertilizer for the 
intensive hill agriculture. They attached great importance to their livestock, which were 
only killed or sold in extreme cases.161 However, there were limits to the number of 
livestock that the Eggon could efficiently maintain. For example, penned goats had to be 
fed year round and this involved long treks to the plains during the dry season for 
fodder. Grazing 011 the plain was a risky business. In addition, to take the goats to graze 
was to spread dung and urine 011 another man’s fields 01* the bush.
Oil palms flourished amongst the Mama and Eggon and were integral part of the 
agricultural system. In 1915, Mr. Mathews, the Assistant District Officer of Lafia
157 F.G. Farrant, “Lezin-Lafiya, Our Most Interesting Town,” The Lightbearer, xxi (1925), p.97.
158 NAK SNP K934/1913: Mada Assessment Report, 1912; NAK SNP 831/1923: Reassessment of Mama 
District, 1922.
159 Interview with Likita Abimiku and Isuwa Ambi at Endehu, 15 November 2003.
160 Ibid.
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Division observed: “the Mamas and Madas [sic] do take care of their palms.”162 The 
Eggon planted palm trees at the edge of the fields, which helped anchor the terraces, 
shaded the crops, broke the force of wind and rain, and supplied not only oil but more 
important palm kernels. Palm kernel was one of the major diets of the ‘hungry season,’ 
the period before the crops were harvested.
Another important economic activity in the area was hunting. This was a part 
time economic activity that was exclusively male oriented and earned out during the dry 
season as a supplement to agriculture. Hunting was organised on an individual or 
communal basis, using both simple and complex tools like sticks, bows and arrows, 
traps and nets. Individual hunts could be earned out either during the day or night, using 
dogs. The game usually caught in .individual hunts includes hares, squirrels, rats and 
rabbits. This game was either consumed by the individual or brought back home to be 
consumed with the family.163 Communal hunts involved the whole lineage or village and 
sometimes neighbouring villages. They were usually organised by a person who 
announced the date and location for the hunt and were launched by starting bush fires in 
the area designated for the hunt. Communal hunting was both an important economic 
and social activity amongst the various groups in Akwanga. For example, communal 
hunting among the Mada people was organised to commemorate the death of an elderly 
person and the game caught was given to the organiser.164 People from within and 
outside the village were invited to participate in the hunt, which was followed by the
162 NAK SNP 10/555p: Nasarawa Province, Nungu Independent District, Lafia Division, Assessment 
Report, 1915; SNP 9/831: Mama District, Lafia Division, Nasarawa Province, Re-assessment Report, 
1922.
163 Interview with Maiganga Zenya and Lumbo at Gwanje, 16 December 2003.
164 Ibid.
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Glukyu (death/funeral dance) that lasted five days for a man and four for a woman.165 
The hunt organiser usually provided food for his guests and this was followed by the 
consumption of malamkpa (local beer). Although women did not participate in 
communal hunting, they were responsible for the preparation of the snacks eaten in the 
bush and the food and beer consumed during the festival/ceremony that followed the 
hunt.
In addition to hunting, there were craftsmen, principally mat-makers, weavers and 
blacksmith. Crafts supplemented agriculture, rather than serving as an alternative. Such 
goods and services were exchanged for food, fodder, fertilizer and labour. As already 
mentioned, there was a considerable exchange amongst the communities of Akwanga 
with recognised markets and attended by Hausa traders who brought in salt and iron in 
exchange for foodstuffs, mats and pottery. Blacksmithing was an exclusively male 
activity. Iron smelting was a long process starting with the collection of iron ore dug out 
from under the ground. The ore was heated in the furnace using charcoal as fuel. The 
melted ore was removed from the furnace and taken to the blacksmith who transformed 
it into hoes, axes, knives and arrows.166 Most of the smelting was done during the dry 
season and involved most of the members of the household in one way or the other. 
Amongst the Eggon, women collected firewood, made it into charcoal and then 
transported it to the furnace where the smelting took place. The Eggon do not appear to 
have smelted their own ore but relied upon iron supplies from elsewhere, generally in 
form of discus-shaped ingots.167 These ingots served as money in the hills and were used
165 Ibid; Interview with Kasimu Nawani, Musa Waziri, Ahmadu Nasara and Amwe Inusa at Rinze, 6 
March 2004.
166 Interview with Arugben Oge, Kuje Kigbu and Ablika Gabi at Angbaku, 1 March 2004.
167 NAK SNP 617/1922: Assessment Report, Central Mada District, 1921.
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by local blacksmiths to manufacture hoes and other implements. It appears to have been 
concentrated in certain settlements in the rugged north eastern hills, possibly because of 
the proximity to the supply of timber along the Mada River for charcoal-making.
Beer making was carried out by each household or compound in Akwanga. A 
family’s wealth was measured to some extent by the frequency with which it brewed 
beer, and indeed there were some families who were too poor to brew beer at all, and 
had to cadge some from their wealthier neighbours.168 Women of a household generally 
did brewing and it was mostly made from guinea com. By giving a beer party, the 
people converted their stored surplus production, which could be earned forward to the 
next season, into prestige and on-going social (and possibly) obligations within and 
beyond their kin group.
LABOUR MOBILISATION
The organisation of labour in the process of production was based on an 
individual or a group of individuals working in co-operation. Individual labour used was 
mostly in part time activities (especially craft production). The use of group labour was 
dominant in agricultural activity. Amongst the Eggon, the household was the unit of 
residence, consumption and reproduction, but it was not synonymous with the unit of 
labour and production. Many labour-intensive tasks, such as planting, harvesting and 
terrace maintenance, were undertaken by communal labour groups called burdi, based 
on the extended family group and directed by the cindalqyo. Moreover, the cindakpo not 
only exercised considerable control over the labour of constituent households within the
168 Interview with Dawa Dandoka at Gbuje, 20 November 2003.
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extended family unit, but through claims to ritual authority and the redistribution of 
considerable produce of that labour. Arden-Clarke wrote in 1921:
Members of one [extended] family live in .. .neighbouring 
compounds, work on one farm under the direction of the head of 
the family and pool the produce of their farm gained by their joint 
labour. Each adult married member of the [extended] family 
usually has a small plot of ground of his own, the production of 
which is his own personal property. But the head of his family has 
first call on his time and labour.169
A young man was obliged to labour for his father and father-in-law. In return, a 
father was responsible for arranging and paying the bride-price for his son’s first wife.170 
Only through mam age was a young man transformed into an adult, with the right to 
erect his own household and granary. Marriage, however, bound a young man into 
further obligations to elder men at a time when he was about to move out of his father’s 
household to establish his own. This was because the obligations and ritual demands 
upon younger men were such that wealth and status only came with age and paternity, 
when men were in a position to exploit the labour of dependents.
There were other sources of labour, including voluntary work. This generally 
took place on the faims of people that were indisposed or ill. Also, people who needed 
grain or domestic animals like goats or sheep for marriage payments or rituals, could
169 NAK SNP 617/1922: Reassessment Report, Central Mada, 1922.
170 Interview with Amgben Oge, Kuje Kigbu and Ablika Gabi at Angbaku, 1 March 2004. This practice 
was common amongst the groups in Akwanga.
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171supply labour to anyone who has surplus of these items. Labour was also provided by 
either a suitor or son-in-law (using corporate labour group) to parents of his betrothed or 
wife. This was meant for the suitor to show his ability to provide food for his wife.172 
Division of labour was generally based on age and sex. The men cleared and cultivated 
the bush farms, hunted, built and thatched the huts and performed rituals. Women 
planted and cultivated fields and performed all domestic chores. The aged looked after 
homes and if  any household had sheep, they herded these with the young boys whose 
duty was to cut grass for the animals, while the young girls washed the pots and 
calabashes and fetched water for domestic use. All these production activities show that 
while some required only individual labour, some required complex co-operation.
CONCLUSION
Absence of sources means that the history of the peoples of Akwanga in the 
nineteenth century and before is difficult to reconstruct. The relationship that developed 
between the decentralised groups in the region 011 the one hand and the Hausa-Fulani 
state builders on the other was complex, characterised by both conflict and cooperation. 
To see the peoples of Akwanga simply as passive victims of depredation is wrong. 
During the course of slave raiding, some of the communities in Akwanga defended 
themselves effectively, while others paid tributes or co-operated with the predators in 
order to safeguard their existence. By resisting the Hausa-Fulani state builders, the 
peoples of Akwanga were able to forge their own history and create a distinct identity 
outside the sub-emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate. They maintained their political
171 Interview with Dawa Dandoka at Gbuje, 20 November 2003.
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independence and continued to resist alien domination until the British colonial forces 
subdued them in the second decade of the twentieth century. It is to the process of 
colonial conquest that we now turn in Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER TWO
COLONIAL CONTACT, CONQUEST AND RESISTANCE, 1907-1925
This chapter will examine the process of British penetration into Akwanga, 
which began in 1907. It begins by looking at the events leading up to the initial 
British contact and conquest of the area. It will also focus on the nature of the 
resistance to colonial subjugation of the peoples of the region. Long-standing 
resistance to the inclusion by sub-emirates of Keffi, Lafia and Jam a’a was 
subsequently extended to the British, who took the same routes as the slave raiders 
during their wars of conquest. The peoples of Akwanga perceived the arrival 
British invaders as representing continuity from earlier Hausa-Fulani predators. 
Although resistance was ultimately ineffective in the face of the Maxim gun and 
the power of the colonial state, it was not until the 1920s that the peoples of 
Akwanga were finally subdued.
THE CONQUEST OF THE SOKOTO CALIPHATE AND THE CREATION 
OF NORTHERN NIGERIA
Up to the end of the nineteenth century, the Royal Niger Company 
(hereafter RNC) was the sole agent of British administration in what later became 
northern Nigeria. The company came into being after British firms decided to 
present a common front against the commercial rivalry of the French and eliminate
competition between themselves in order to increase their profit. The amalgamated 
British firms were granted a Royal Charter in July 1886 with the “power to 
administer, make treaties, levy customs and trade in all territories in the basin of 
the Niger and its effluents.”1 The charter however, did not give British firms or the 
company monopoly over trade in the region, stating that nothing “in this our 
charter shall be deemed to authorise the company to set up or grant any monopoly 
of trade.”2 The RNC was given the responsibility for the maintenance of law and 
order in its area of influence and thus became involved in both trade and 
governance. This resulted in the company establishing courts and an armed 
constabulary in order to maintain law and order. The company also became 
responsible for the imposition of customs duties on both indigenous and foreign 
traders conducting business within the company’s jurisdiction. The RNC managed 
to send an envoy to Sokoto in 1885, but up to the time of the revocation of its 
charter and the declaration of the Northern Protectorate of Nigeria in 1900, it 
exercised little effective power away from the Niger and Benue rivers, and had not 
taken steps to establish any regular system of administration.3 Quoting Sir James 
Willcocks, Margery Perham wrote:
Unless the company meant to give up, it was impossible to 
see how they could have expected to carry on their duties 
as an administrative as well as a trading concern with the
1 Quoted by M. Perham (ed), The Native Economies o f  Nigeria (London, 1946), p.3.
2 Quoted by O. Awolowo, The People’s Republic (Ibadan, 1968), p. 10.
3 Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories Part III, West Africa: 
Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and Gambia (London, 1951), p.47.
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very small numbers of soldiers and European officials 
they employed.4
The restrictive nature of the company’s operations in the area encouraged 
the emir of Kontagora to conclude that the British were a species of fish and would 
die if they left the Niger.5 The RNC only put up a show when its position was 
threatened, to demonstrate that the company could represent British imperial 
interests. The attack by the company on Ilorin and Bida in 1897 clearly shows that 
it acted when its position was in danger. Attack on slavery in the emirates was 
ultimately associated with the British advance into northern Nigeria and Article 6 
of the company’s charter gave powers to suppress any form of slavery within their 
jurisdiction.6 This charter created a problem for the RNC as it did not want to 
antagonise the Caliphate. When the company came under severe criticism, it 
quickly attacked Bida and Ilorin as an anti-slavery measure. According to Flint: 
The motive of the war would be announced as the 
suppression of slavery and slave-raiding. With victory, the 
company would no longer be an obscure trading company 
which Englishmen only heard of by reading rather 
disturbing reports of allegations in Parliament. It would 
then not be so easy for Chamberlain to revoke the 
charter.. .public opinion would want to know why a
4 Perham, Native Administration, pp.33-34.
5 Ibid, p.34.
6 Lovejoy and Hogendom, Slow Death fo r  Slaveiy, p. 14.
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company which had recently ventured so much should 
now be brought up ignominiously.7
The military action against Ilorin and Bida was earned out as a public 
relations boost for the company and the campaign was given tremendous publicity. 
A correspondent for Times was on the spot to report to the British public while 
other newspapers organised contacts in order to get the news as soon as they 
happened.8 With increasing French and German imperial and commercial rivalry 
in the region, however, the British government became concerned about the ability 
of the RNC to protect its interests. The company was also ill equipped to satisfy 
the financial, administrative and military requirements which were needed to 
challenge the French or the Germans. The major threat came from Mr. Flegel, a 
German businessman. He persuaded the German government to take more interest 
in the Niger-Benue area which offered possibilities of communication with the 
new German colony of Kamerun.9 He took some Hausa businessmen from 
Nasarawa province to Germany and in April 1885, he returned with other five 
German companions to the Niger. The RNC, unable to persuade the Gennans to 
join the company, harassed them at Loko and they were frustrated from 
establishing any political stake in northern Nigeria. The RNC was later accused of 
breaching its charter as other firms complained of the company’s monopolistic 
practices. This, among other reasons, resulted in the revocation of the its charter
7 J.E. Flint, Goldie and the Making o f  Nigeria (London, 1960), 246-247.
8 Ibid.
9 J. Hargreaves, West Africa Partitioned: The Loaded Pause 1885-89 (London, 1974), p.98.
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with effect from 1 January 1900 and Her Majesty’s Government took over control 
of territories that were formally under the company’s jurisdiction.
Following the revocation of the Company’s charter in 1899, the British 
were determined to challenge German and French colonial intentions in the region 
by getting a firmer grip on the political and administrative affairs of the territory. 
The appointment of Fredrick Lugard as High Commissioner of northern Nigeria 
brought the British a great deal closer to the realisation of these goals. On 1 
January 1900, Lugard officially conducted the transfer ceremony from the RNC to 
the British government at Lokoja.10 As Lugard saw it, the proclamation meant the 
taking over of lands that the RNC had previously controlled. It should be noted 
that the RNC had made a number of treaties with emirs and chiefs, although 
according to Lord Hailey, these treaties did not give the company any definite 
rights over land.11 Lugard however, sent an Arabic translation of the proclamation 
to the Caliph informing him of the change of administration in the region based on 
the treaties previously signed with the RNC. The implication of the proclamation 
was that the people of northern Nigeria had to accept British sovereignty, which 
was interpreted by both the Caliph and the emirs as accepting midkin arna (rule of 
the infidels). As such, the Muslim communities in northern Nigeria saw it as a 
declaration of war. According to Adeleye, “its contents alone, particularly the 
breach of treaties implicit in it, the proclamation could hardly have been better 
framed to arouse the fear and hostility of its recipients.”12 Lugard knew that his
10 Public Record Office, Colonial Office (hereafter PRO CO) 446/9: Lugard to the Colonial Office, 
“Ceremony of Transfer from Royal Niger Company/’ 1900.
11 Hailey, Native Administration, p.89.
12 Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy, p.250.
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declaration of northern Nigeria as a British possession only existed on paper and 
he could not take any military action against the Caliphate and its emirates because 
of a lack of sufficient troops. Most of the troops were despatched to help in the 
Ashanti war in the Gold Coast in May 1900 and Lugard had to wait for their return 
before he could take any action.13 The return of the troops in December paved the 
way for the wars of conquest in northern Nigeria that began with the fall of Bida 
and Kontagora in 1901.14 The reasons given by Lugard for the subjugation of Bida 
and Kontogora was that the “two chiefs acting in combination have during this 
year raided an enormous number of villages for slaves, laying waste the country 
with fire and sword, so that at present great areas are almost depopulated.”15 
However, the occupation of these emirates was part of a general British 
programme of gradual advance towards Sokoto, just as the occupation of 
Adamawa, Bauchi and Gombe was a prelude to the British conquest of Bomo.
The excuse given by Lugard for the invasion of Kano and Sokoto was also 
centred on slavery and slave raids. The death in 1902 of Abdurrahan, the Sultan of 
Sokoto, gave Lugard the opportunity to quickly advance to Sokoto because the 
central Caliphate was thrown into confusion. Earlier in March 1902, Lugard wrote 
to Abdurrahman about the British expedition to Bauchi and the deposition of the 
emirs of Bida and Kontagora to, which the Sultan replied that he did not wish that 
anyone from among the British should live with him, and that between him and 
them (the British) there could be nothing but war as commanded by God
13 PRO CO 446/10: Lugard to the Colonial Office, June 1900.
14 PRO CO 446/14: Lugard to Colonial Office, March 1901; PRO CO 446/16: Wallace to Colonial 
Office, September 1901.
15 PRO CO 446/14: Lugard to the Colonial Office, “Bida and Kontagora,” March 1901.
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Almighty.16 This was interpreted by Lugard as a threat of war and he believed that 
the conflict was inevitable and any delay would make it more serious. Before the 
British could advance to Sokoto, it was important that Kano had to be subdued 
first and a perfect excuse presented itself to Lugard in October 1902 via the killing 
of Captain Gorge William Moloney, the Resident of Nasarawa province, by 
Magaji Dan Yamusa of Keffi.17 Magaji was annoyed about the British intervening 
in his slave raids on the neighbouring communities, including Akwanga. Punitive 
action was taken against Keffi, which resulted in the destruction of lives and 
property, while the Magaji fled to Kano and was given a hero’s welcome by Aliyu, 
the emir. A bounty of £40 was placed on his head and while at Kano, the emir 
refused to hand over the Magaji to the Lugard despite repeated demands to do so.18 
Lugard quickly used the opportunity to invade Kano while the emir was at Sokoto 
paying homage to the new Sultan, Attahiru. Lugard sent a proclamation to Kano in 
Hausa assuring the people that the British had no quarrel with any one, except 
Magaji Dan Yamusa and those who had welcomed him to Kano. They would not 
attack anyone except those who chose to fight.19 All friends of Dan Yamusa were 
declared enemies of British Government and any one who captured him would
70receive a reward of £30 in cash or kind.
16 H.F. Backwell (ed), The Occupation ofHausaland 1900-1904: Being a Translation o f  Arabic 
Letters Found in the House o f  the Waziri o f  Sokoto, Buhari in 1903 (London, 1927), pp.13-14; 
Perham, Native Administration, p.40; Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy, p.343.
17 Rhodes House Library (hereafter R.H) MSS. Afri. S. 141: Umaisha (Usman), Account of the war 
of the Magaji of Keffi and Captain Maloney, Resident, Keffi (with typed translation and Notes on 
the Narrative, by M.H. Varvill); Interview at Andaha with Malam Yakubu Alhaji Yusuf, 10 
November 2003; Interview at Gudi with Adamu Salihu, 15 March 2004.
18 R.H. B.E, S.64: R. Popham-Lobb to mother, October 1902.
19 PRO CO 446/30: Lugard to the Colonial Office, January 1903; PRO CO 446/31: Lugard to 
Colonial Office, “Report on Kano-Sokoto expedition,” 1903.
20 Ibid,
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Figure 2.1: The grave o f  Captain Moloney at Keffi
The military action against Kano by Lugard was criticised by a section o f  
the British media. A correspondent o f the Manchester Guardian in northern 
Nigeria wrote: “there is I fear, no doubt whatever that the explanations o f the 
government concerning the destination and objects o f the military preparations
• • • 9 1now going on are more less in the nature o f a blind.” The reporter also argued 
that until the British, “have a man like Sir William Macgregor, who believes in 
peace, appointed to rule Lagos and Northern Nigeria as a colony...sterility, 
retrogression, and bloodshed will mark our rule in Northern Nigeria.”22 However, 
the fall o f Kano in 1903 was followed by another British victory in Sokoto, the 
heart o f the Caliphate. After the subjugation o f the Sokoto Caliphate and 
occupation o f Bomo, the British then focused their attention on the numerous 
“pagan” communities o f central Nigeria.
21 Manchester Guardian, 24 December 1902, p.5.
22 Ibid.
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COLONIAL ENCOUNTER IN AKWANGA
In 1900, after Lugard declared northern Nigeria as a British Protectorate, a 
Resident, Mr. Burdon was appointed for Nasarawa province and he immediately 
commenced the exploration of the area. Nasarawa province was at first called 
Lower Benue province, which consisted of all “the Munshi [Tiv] districts north of 
the Benue and south of the same westward from Katsina Ala River together with 
that portion of Zaria country lying south of latitude 10°.”23 The headquarters of the 
province was initially established at Akwanaja in order to secure the trade routes 
being disrupted by the Tiv people.24 They became notorious for disrupting trade 
along the river Benue and at had various times threatened to attack the RNC’s 
station at Abinsi. hi 1899, some Tiv killed the crew of a British canoe and also 
attacked a telegraph construction company near Ibi, which affected the 
construction of the Akwanaja to Ibi line. A punitive expedition was set out in July 
1900 to “subdue the Munchi who had been hindering the passage of caravans to 
and from Nasarawa and Keffi” and also “as a reprisals for the destruction of the 
telegraph line.”25 The expedition only succeeded in causing superficial damage 
and loss to the Tiv, and did not bring the security situation under control. In 1901, 
another expedition was earned out against the Tiv living close to the banks of the 
Benue, who were accused of harassing the Hausa traders and European shipping 
on the river.26 This expedition, like the previous one, yielded no result.
2j Northern Nigeria Gazette, Government Notice, No 27 (August, 1900), p. 126.
24 Sciortino, Nasarawa Province, p.20.
25 PRO CO 446/10: Lugard to Colonial Office, ‘Munchi Expedition,’ 1900.
26 Annual Reports o f  Northern Nigeria, 1901.
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In January 1902, after the emir of Nasarawa made a formal submission to 
the British, the provincial headquarters was moved from Akwanaja to Nasarawa 
town and the name of the province was changed to Nasarawa.27 The headquarters 
of the province was moved to Keffi after the British occupation of the area in July 
1902. The occupation of Keffi was followed by a formal submission by the emirs 
of Lafia and Jama’a in March 1903. After the occupation of the sub-emirates, the 
British began to set up administrative structures by appointing political officers to 
manage the affairs of the region. In October 1904, Mr. Stanley, an Assistant 
Resident, was posted to Jama’a while Mr, Gill was put incharge of Lafia in
9 RJanuary 1905. At the early stage of British rule m Nasarawa province, the 
government was occupied with problems in the emirates and therefore ignored the 
conquest of the decentralised societies of AJkwanga.29 Before the First World War, 
British colonial administration in the area between Lafia and the Jos escarpment 
was slight. However, military expeditions were earned out in order to keep trade 
routes open. For instance, in 1903, the Resident of Nasarawa, Mr. Granville 
reported to Lugard that the Eggon people were disturbing the Jama’a caravan trade 
and thereby hampering the movement of traders in the area. He requested for 
troops to be sent in order to undertake a campaign against the “hill pagans.”31 This 
was the first reported contact between the peoples of Akwanga and the British.
27 Sciortino, Nasarawa Province, p.20. The Tiv people in the Lower and Upper Benue provinces 
were transferred to the newly created Muri province.
28 NAK SNP 7/2193: Nasarawa Province, Summary o f Events, 1911.
29 Ames, Plateau Province, p.37.
30 NAK SNP 15/53: Nasarawa Province, Report by Mr. Granville, 1903; SNP 15/47: Nasarawa 
Province, general, 1903.
31 Ibid.
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The expedition did not achieve the desired goal and Mr. Granville reported to 
Lugard that the “the hill Mada [sic] are at present impossible to deal with.”32
A semblance of colonial administrative structures in the emirates of 
Nasarawa province only began to emerge by 1905. However, the jurisdiction of 
the emirs of Keffi, Lafia and Jama’a was extended to the peoples of Akwanga 
when Lugard visited Nasarawa province in 1905, even before the region was 
brought under British rule. The subsequent naming of the districts in Akwanga was 
associated with the nature of the British penetration into the area; the Mada people 
were grouped under the North Mada district because the British came to the area 
from the north (Jama’a) while the Eggon were subdued from the South (Lafia) and 
were therefore called South Mada.33 It was from these emirates that the British 
advanced into Akwanga. The attempt to impose direct administrative control was 
regarded by local people as an extension of Hausa-Fulani domination, which they 
had been resisting for almost a century. The British presence at this early stage was 
almost nonexistent, although there were repeated demands by junior colonial 
officers to their superiors for troops to be sent for operations against the peoples in 
the backwaters of Keffi and Jama’a, who, according to Dorward, they considered 
as “murderous truculent savages, to be brought under British authority by military 
force.”34 The refusal by their superiors to provide adequate troops for the task - the 
West African Frontier Force being engaged on more pressing punitive patrols 
elsewhere - was a constant cause of complaint.35 It was the speculative mining
321bid.
33 NAK SNP 17/ 11263: Notes on Akwanga Division by Captain Masterton Smith, 1928.
34 Dorward, “Ritual Warfare”, p .87.
35 Ibid.
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boom following the discovery of tin that led to the opening up of Akwanga.36 The 
road to the tin mines in Jos via Jama’a was opened in March 1907 and in 
November the British began the subjugation of the peoples in the hinges of Keffi 
and Jama’a. The peoples of Akwanga were the last groups in Nasarawa province 
to be brought under the “control by government and it was not until 1907/1908 
that military force subdued the tribesmen of the Mada hills for the first time.”37 
From 1907, the British directed their energies to subduing and opening the 
societies of Akwanga.38
British penetration into the area took place from Keffi, Lafia and Jama’a. 
The Hausa-Fulani allied themselves with the British and were employed as 
soldiers, using the same routes of access into Akwanga as the slave raiders took in 
the nineteenth century. After the occupation of the sub-emirates, the Hausa-Fulani 
realised the advantages to be gained from cooperating with the British and 
therefore gave the little intelligence they had about the warlike nature of the
peoples of Akwanga and their settlements, which became vital in the British
• 10penetration of the area. One of the major reasons for the use of Hausa soldiers in 
the conquest of the area (apart from their earlier contact with the British) was the 
assumption that they were the best fighting men in West Africa. By the late 
nineteenth century, their fame had spread across the continent. The word “Hausa” 
subsequently came to mean soldier in different parts of Nigeria and West Africa
36 Freund, Labour and Capital, pp.35-45.
37 Ames, Plateau Province, 279.
38 Sciortino, Nasarawa Province, 20.
39 Interview at Rinze with Kasimu Nawani, Alimadu Nasara, Amwe Inusa Jatau, and Adamu 
Yakubu, 3 March 2004.
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and they were described as “short, sturdy-looking men, and excellent marchers.”40 
Although British colonial administration did begin in Akwanga by 1911, a 
series of patrols was necessary to achieve this, culminating in the police patrol of 
1925 which finally succeeded in bringing the area under total control. Most of the 
patrols were in connection with the collection of taxes and the maintenance and 
imposition of law and order. The British were mistaken in their belief that all the 
communities in the region were under the sub-emirates and were used to paying 
taxes or tributes. Colonial conquest was earned out simultaneously with the 
imposition of taxes. This was seen as a token of submission by the conquered 
people and, importantly, the revenue generated was to be used in financing the 
newly created administrative structures. Before the introduction of British 
currency in Akwanga in the 1920s, taxes were paid in kind. Most of the items 
taken in tax included livestock, grain, farm implements and other valuable items, 
which were sold on the spot to Hausa traders who followed the tax collectors.41 
The payment of taxes with these items became a problem as the local peoples were 
unwilling to part with their surpluses and this meant that the conquest and the 
imposition of taxes were resisted.
In 1907, a British military patrol visited some Eggon villages and a tax of 
£94.0s.6d was imposed on the district42 The object of the patrol, according to Mr. 
Campbell Eons, an Assistant Resident, was to enable him to reassure friendly 
villagers and at the same time, “open up any country that was disposed to be
40 S. Vandeleur, Campaigning on the Upper Nile and Niger (London, 1898), p.170,
41 Interview at Gudi with Adamu Salihu and Alhaji Idirisu, 15 March 2004.
42 NAK SNP9/618: Re-Assessment Report on South Mada District, Lafia Division, 1922; NAK Jos 
Prof 488 Volume II: The Eggon Tribal Area, Summary of intelligence Report on, 1935.
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friendly.”43 The patrol lasted 32 days and during this time 56 villages were 
visited.44 Such British patrol are remembered by present-day informants as 
excessive killings, looting involving and confiscation of their goats, chickens, food 
and other valuables.45 The imposition of taxes after the destruction and looting of 
their means of livelihood left the people in a desperate situation and resentful of 
British rule.46 Despite their defeat, local people continued to frustrate the colonial 
administration by refusing to pay taxes or by deserting their villages during 
periods of tax assessment and collection.47
The patrol did not limit its mission to the region of the Eggon people, but 
proceeded to the Nungu and Mama areas. The composition of the patrol was 
further strengthened by the arrival of Sergeant Watts who joined it at Alogani on 
17 December and the patrol marched to Wamba and Mama on the 26 December 
1907. The village of Mogu was visited first and sections of the people opposed it
• * ■ dRby firing several arrows. The patrol responded by killing eight of the villagers. 
The fiercest resistance to the patrol was met at Kanja, where over 25 people were 
killed in the fighting.49 Knowledge of the Kanja killings quickly spread to 
neighbouring villages and on reaching Okombou and Unju on 6 January 1908, the 
patrol discovered that the villagers were better prepared to engage them in a fight. 
In the confrontation that ensued, the two villages were destroyed and ten people 
were killed. As in the case of the Eggon people, the destruction of lives and
43 NAK SNP7/5449: Mada Patrol, Report on, 1908.
44 Ibid.
45 Interviews with Likita Abimiku, Isuwa Anibi and Yakubu Abimikn at Endehu, 1 SNovember 
2003.
46 Ibid.
47 NAK 7/4641: Mada Patrol, 1908.
48 Ibid
49 Ibid.
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properties as a direct result of the military expedition only created more hatred for 
the British. They started on a wrong footing by enforcing their authority with the 
use of force, “instead of conference, they used conflict.”50 As observed by Morel, 
the consequence of any punitive expedition, no matter what the motives were “is 
ninety times out of every hundred, reactionary, sterile, and morally destructive.”51 
Although Morel and other liberals argued that British control of northern Nigeria 
could have been achieved through diplomacy rather than by the use of force, 
Lugard wanted to free the government from treaties with the local peoples.52
Another military patrol was set out to subdue the northern and eastern parts 
of the Akwanga in 1909. Leaving Keffi on 1 December, it comprised Dr. Costello 
and Sergeant Channel of the 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment, with 93 troops, one 
Maxim gun and 144 transport earners. Lt. Evart joined them at Jama’a on 5 
December. The patrol began its operation in Jama’a division and arrived at Yashi 
in Mama district on 10 January 1910. All the villages visited in Wamba and Mama 
districts resisted the patrol and on 2 February 1910, when they reached Gwanje, 
they discovered that the first part of the village was deserted. Gwanje people had 
concealed themselves in high trees, which gave them good cover.54 Their previous 
experience of victory over the sub-emirate of Keffi had given them the courage to 
resist the British patrol.55 They made the unfortunate mistake, however, of 
confusing the Maxim gun with local guns used by the slave raiders.56 Despite the
30 Interview with Philip M ai’angwa at Wamba, 18 May 2003.
51 E.D. Morel, Affairs o f  West Africa (London, 1902), p. 106.
32 Perham, Native Administration, 43.
33 SNP7/2931/1910: Patrols to Attakka, Kagoro, Ninzam and Mada; Report on.
34 Ibid.
35 Interview with Lumbo, Sidi Tide at Gwanje, 17 November 2003.
56 Ibid.
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disparity in weapons technology, the local people had the advantage of fighting on 
their home ground and during their encounter with the British, “managed to make 
themselves exceedingly troublesome.”57 During the battle that ensued, two soldiers 
were killed and three wounded, while five Gwanje people were killed (although 
my informants insisted that only three people were killed) and the village was 
burnt down.58 When they realised the superiority of British weaponry, they 
admitted that it was not possible to engage in fighting and tried to run away.59 
Despite these early military operations, the British were unable effectively 
establish law and order in the region. The major cause of ongoing trouble between 
the British and the peoples of Akwanga was taxation, which was partly due to the 
maimer in which it was collected.60
Resistance to the British presence in Akwanga region resulted in the most 
brutal killings and destruction of lives and properties in Nasarawa province 
between 1912 and 1917. During 1912, there were two patrols carried out in the 
division, the first to Gohon Kurmi in the North Mada district.61 The circumstances 
that led to the patrol started in the neighbourhood of Gohon Kurmi in January 
1912, when it was reported to a political officer that the people o f the village had 
murdered a man from Ancha in an ambush after drinking beer.62 The 
circumstances that led to the murder were not clear, but it was reported that an 
Ancha man had been invited to help some of the villagers harvest their crops,
57 SNP7/2931: Patrols to Attakka, Kagoro, Ninzam and Mada; Report on, 1910.
58 Ibid; Interview with Sidi Tide and Tache Naluku at Gwanje Sarki, 1 December 2003.
59 Ibid.
60 This is further discussed in chapter five.
61 NAK SNP7/7359/1912: Nasarawa Province Annual Report 1912 by H.D. Lanymore.
62 NAK SNP7/50/1912: Nasarawa Province, Bohon [sic] Kurmi Patrol.
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which was a normal practice between the two villages.63 It seems that there was a 
misunderstanding during the “refreshment” after the harvest and the people 
decided to resolve it outside the village under the influence of alcohol, which led 
to the fatality. The village head of Gohon Kurmi was immediately ordered to 
surrender those involved in the murder, but this instruction was ignored, hi an 
attempt to effect the arrest of the culprits, Lt. Knapp and one of the escorts, Bako 
Lafia were wounded.64 Gohon Kurmi was burned down and one villager was killed 
while three were wounded. The refusal to hand over the culprits provoked the 
wrath of the British, hi July 1912, six months after the incident, the Secretary of 
the Northern Provinces sanctioned a patrol to Gohon Kurmi. The patrol 
encompassed a company of the l sl Northern Nigeria Regiment under Captain 
Green. On reaching the village, the patrol discovered that it was deserted. Parties 
were sent to search for the villagers in the surrounding forest and in the process the 
patrol came under attack and the escorts opened fire and killed about ten people 
and drove the rest out of the forest. The village was razed to the ground and the 
villagers crops rooted out.65 Police operations at Gohon Kurmi lasted until 4 
October and the villagers were left without food and shelter. The inhuman way the 
operation was carried out is still remembered today. Reaction to any question 
about the colonial period was the British destruction of their village and the 
killings that accompanied it. They maintained that there was no justification for 
such killings and for the looting and destruction of the whole village.66 Villagers
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Musa et al, group interview at Goho, 6 June 2003.
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returned from hiding and discovered that they had lost everything. Worse still, the 
uprooting of the crops resulted in some villagers’ deaths because of lack of food.67 
The conduct of the colonial troops was appalling and in his report to the Secretary 
of the Northern Provinces, the Resident of Nasarawa wrote: “so much hardship to 
innocent people has I believe, been caused by this prompt intervention by troops, 
that I would personally vote against it every time.”68 The second patrol in 1912 
was to avenge the death of a mining engineer, Mr. Campbell, who was killed near 
Gako in Wulko. One of the reasons given by colonial officials for Campbell’s 
murder was local suspicion that the white-flagged beacons placed near farms by 
mining prospectors. The local people believed that the white flags would delay the 
fall of rains, which was badly needed “at the time to save the newly sown fields of 
guinea com.”69 Although the prospectors received warnings by the elders, 
Campbell ignored them and continued to put up his flags. In the process, he was 
shot down with arrows and cut to pieces where he lay.70 The killing of Campbell 
was perhaps more to do with the way he conducted himself in the area. Mr. 
Campbell was a veteran mining engineer who had already become notorious for 
his high-handed behaviour at Ririwain Kano.71 He conducted his prospecting by 
uprooting peoples’ crops. When he began the destruction of the crops, the village 
elders warned him of the potential consequences, but he chose to ignore them and 
continued his prospecting.72 One of the villagers, Alaku Awazi, was very angry at
67 Ibid.
68 NAK SNP7/50: Nasarawa Province, Bohon Kurmi Patrol, 1912.
69 PRO CO 446/105: Temple to the Colonial Office, Murder of Mr. Campbell, July 1912.
70 SNP7/410: Provincial Administration, Nasarawa Province, 1912; SNP7/7359: Nasarawa 
Province, Annual Report 1912, 2 Volumes.
71 NAK SNP15: Annual Report, Kano Province, 1909-1910.
72 Mr. M. Namo, et al, group interview at Wulko, 29 November 2003.
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the destruction o f his dorowa (locust beans) and fired the first arrow, while 
Kuggah Motso was said to have been responsible for cutting Campbell into 
pieces.73 It should be noted that the people o f Wulko experienced bad harvests the 
previous year and the 1912 rainy season was not good either, perhaps explaining 
why uprooting o f the crops provoked such a reaction.74 The British response to the 
killing was to punish severely the people o f the district. Captain Lawrence, the 
Resident o f Nasarawa, instructed the District Officer o f Akwanga that the “entire 
district must learn once and for all that the white man shall be regarded as sacred. 
To tie a European up, and murder him cannot be permitted to pass without the 
severest punishment.”75
Figure 2.2: The grave o f Mr. Campbell at Gako, near Wulko
73 Ibid.
74 NAK SNP 2726: Lt. Governor Charles Temple to the Colonial Office, 1912.
75 NAK SNP7/2812: Mada Patrol, 1912.
106
This instruction gave the soldiers the licence to kill, to loot and to destroy 
villages. The 1912 patrol to Wulko left Wamba and arrived at Gako on 22 May 
1912, and the villages that were implicated in the murder were destroyed. 
Villagers of Guduba, who tried to protect Campbell, were rewarded £30 for their 
action.76 The defences used by the Wulko people was described by Captain 
Hopkins, the commanding officer of the patrol: “the enemy placed great reliance 
on their fortification which were constructed with considerable skill. Stone walls 
topped with thorn bushes recessed to stop enfilade fire, and with cunningly 
concealed entrances, also thick thorn hedges with stone walls behind them were 
used by the enemy.”77 Despite their organised defences, they had no chance to 
withstand the firepower unleashed on them by the British troops. Colonial records 
document some of the atrocities and looting committed by the troops. For 
example, after the destruction of the villages, about 600 bundles of guinea com 
were taken to Wamba and were rationed to all soldiers and camp followers.78 
Confiscation of food coming on top of the drought the villagers experienced the 
previous year resulted in the localised famine at Wulko in 1913.79
The 1912 patrol was the first major operation in Nasarawa province that 
recorded so many casualties on the side of the local people and the atrocities 
committed by the troops provoked condemnation by politicians and some sections 
of the British public. A Reuters corespondent in northern Nigeria reported the 
military patrol in the British press and the Secretary of State for the Colonies came
76 PRO CO 446/105: Temple to the Colonial Office, Murder of Mr. Campbell, July 1912
77 PRO CO 446/106: Temple to the Colonial Office, Murder of Mr. Campbell, Mada Hills Punitive 
Patrol, September 1912.
78 NAK SNP7/281: Mada Patrol, 1912.
79 NAK 10/339p: Resident Nasarawa to Secretary, Northern Province, Mada District Famine, 1913.
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under pressure to explain the military operation at Wulko. Mr. Travers Buxton, 
the secretary of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, wrote to the 
Colonial Office that his committee was worried about newspaper reports of the 
consequences of the measures taken by the Resident of Nasarawa that all “the 
villages implicated were destroyed [and] a large number of natives were killed.”81 
He wanted the Colonial Office to give his committee “further particulars as to this 
unfortunate occurrence, which is reported to have led to so heavy -  and it may be 
indiscriminate — a punishment of the natives of the country over an apparently 
wide area.” Mr. Harvey -  Member of Parliament - raised the issue in the House 
of Commons on 25 July 1912, stating his concern about the report of the loss of 
lives and the destruction of property.83 Mr. Temple, the Acting Governor of 
northern Nigeria, in a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, defended the 
action of the troops: “it can hardly be said that there was any unnecessary 
bloodshed and such natives as were killed were shot by the troops purely in self 
defence” although he admitted that the incident would have been avoided if 
Campbell, had been “discreet and listened to the warnings that were given to
Q A
him.” There were conflicting figures regarding the number of casualties, as the 
report by Captain Hopkins claimed that only nine people were killed and 170 
injured, while Mr. Mair stated in his report that 131 people were killed.85 The
80 Times, 19 June 1912, p .5.
81 PRO CO 446/108: Murder of Mr. Campbell, July 1912.
82 Ibid.
83 NAK SNP7/2726: Campbell D.A. Prospector Death of, 1912.
84 PRO CO 446/106: Temple to the Colonial Office, Murder of Mr. Campbell, Mada Hills Punitive 
Patrol, September 1912.
85 NAK SNP7/2726: Campbell D.A. Prospector Death of, 1912.
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patrol on the other hand had ten soldiers wounded.86 However, in a private letter 
from Mr. Lewis Vernon, the Secretary for State for Colonies to Mr. Harvey, he 
stated that during the expedition, there “were 125 casualties amongst the natives
on
and several villages of grass huts had to be burnt.” hi his response to the figures 
given by Mr. Lewis, a senior official in the Colonial Office, who was asked to 
comment on the letter wrote: “you put the number at 125. This was the number in 
the main engagement, but the total number throughout the operation was 179.”88
Despite the conflicting figures of the casualties involved, it was clear that 
the troops used excessive force in handling the matter. Colonial correspondence 
was silent about the massacre of women and children during the patrol, which is 
still remembered by the local people. According to my informants, a group of 
women and children who hid in a large cave in the Wulko hills were killed when
Q Qexplosives were thrown into the cave. Seeing their families killed and their 
homes and means of livelihood destroyed by the troops traumatised people that 
survived the patrol.90 Similarly, in his description of the Wulko patrol based on a 
series of interviews conducted in 1974, Dorward wrote:
The soldiers started setting houses ablaze and shooting all 
over. They started shooting until they came to a neighbouring 
village called Endehu, who were not involved. Soldiers 
pursued the Eggon even across to Wowen. When the Eggon
86 Ibid.
87 PRO CO 446/106: Temple to the Colonial Office, Murder of Mr. Campbell, Mada Hills Pimitive 
Patrol, September 1912.
88 Ibid.
89 Mr. M. Namo, et al, group interview at Wulko, 29 November 2003.
90 Ibid.
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discovered so many were being killed, they ran inside a deep 
cave. They discovered they could not withstand the guns.
They hid in the cave for some time. No one knows how, but 
the soldiers found them and started shooting inside and killed 
all but one woman, named Mashi Ekuembi. She was the only 
survivor from that place, she with her baby on her back. But 
because of seeing so much death, even this woman and her 
baby died of illness.91
The publicity and controversies that trailed the punitive expedition in 
Wulko meant that the colonial administration in Akwanga adopted a policy of 
avoiding “extreme measures” against the local people.92 This “softly softly” 
approach meant that the subsequent tax assessment of Eggon villages was 
impossible because the British avoided the threat or use of force. Therefore a 
“nominal tribute” for 1913 was imposed on the district. The Eggon made no 
attempt to pay their tax for 1913 and in order to enforce its payment, a military 
patrol was sanctioned in May 1914. The patrol had barely begun, when the troops 
were ordered to withdraw following the outbreak of the First World War and 
therefore, the 1913 taxes were never collected. The withdrawal of the troops was 
interpreted by the local people as the termination of British rule in the area and 
rumours quickly spread. There was a breakdown of law and order as the Eggon 
people took the laws into their own hands. Murders and robbery of Hausa traders
91 Dorward, “Ritual Warfare,” p.92.
92 PRO CO 959/2: Captain H.L Norton Traill Correspondence, 1917.
93 Ibid; NAK SNP10/30p/1917: Mada Patrol, 1917.
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were constantly reported, blit the colonial administration could not deal with the 
situation because of the lack of troops as they were engaged either in Cameroon or 
in the East African campaign. The security situation deteriorated further and it 
became necessary for the colonial administration to take action, hi July 1915, a 
small military patrol under Captain Waters and 50 troops with a machine gun was 
sanctioned.94 Despite the military patrol, the Eggon made no effort to pay their 
taxes. It was reported that the “fighting men of a number of towns had bonded 
themselves together with a great oath in never to pay tribute, so long as two Madas 
[sic] were left in the world.”95 As already mentioned, taxes were collected by the 
colonial administration were in grain, livestock and other valuable items. The only 
stored wealth of the Eggon were sheep and goats, so the Eggon were forced to pay 
taxes in livestock, which they resented. Parting with their livestock meant 
removing the source of fertilizer in the agricultural production, which affected the 
intensive hill agriculture.96 They resolved that if the colonial administration 
wanted them to pay their taxes, “they would have to wait for their children to grow 
up, for it would never be paid by the existing generation of Madas [sic].”97 The 
failure of the 1915 patrol further threw the Eggon district into chaos, as the troops 
were unable to restore law and order.
After the return of the WAFF from the Cameroon campaign, a military 
patrol was sanctioned in 1916 under Mr. Kirkpatrick, with 100 troops and a 
machine gun. Although the patrol succeeded in collecting the 1915 tax, it was
94 PRO CO 959/2: Captain H.L. Norton Traill Correspondence, 1917.
95 Ibid.
96 Interview with Baba Maluku and Abdul Ebuga at Nasarawa Eggon, 10 June 2003.
97 PRO CO 959/2: Captain H.L. Norton Traill Correspondence, 1917.
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unable to restore law and order. Before the troops even returned to Wamba, the 
divisional headquarter, there were reported murders of Hausa traders and two 
government messengers by the Eggon. A big caravan from Lafia to Ungwashem 
was attacked and three men killed and two of the dead people belonged to the 
Lafia royal family.98 Kirkpatrick regarded the raids by the Eggon as a “deliberate 
challenge to the administration” and therefore requested for another military patrol 
against them, which was sanctioned in 1917." On 13 February 1917, a police 
escort under the command of Lt. Roe left Bakyeno Kassa with 25 troops and were 
met at Alizaga by Lt. Whitehead and Dr. Sharp, the Medical Officer.100 When the 
patrol reached Alogani on 18 February, they were informed about an organised 
group of people determined to fight. The villages of Agwagi, Angwaku and 
Bakenu Bissa had fought a police patrol in 1916 and had refused to pay the 1917 
tax. The success of the 1916 tax resistance gave the local people the courage to 
engage the patrol when it visited the area in 1917.101 The colonial records similarly 
reported that the villagers had decided to engage the patrol because of their 
experience with the previous patrol in which they only lost two men, “less than 
casualties to be expected in an ordinary fight following an ordinary beer drink.”102 
When the troops were a thousand yards away from Awgwingi hill, their arrival 
was announced by the blowing of homs and by shouting. It was reported that due 
to the numbers of people (over a thousand) and the anticipated nature of resistance
98 NAK SNP10/30p/1917: Mada Patrol, 1917; PRO CO 959/2: Captain H.L. Norton Traill 
Correspondence, 1917.
99 PRO CO 959/2: Captain H.L. Norton Traill Correspondence, 1917.
m Ibid.
m  Ibid.
102 NAK SNP 10/3Op: Mada Patrol, 1917.
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to the patrol, the troops were compelled to withdraw, pending the arrival of 
reinforcements.103 Unable to contend with the opposition, the commanding officer 
informed Norton Traill, the District Officer of Lafia, that “owing to the faulty 
ammunition supplied to him, and the paucity in numbers of the troops at his 
disposal that he did not consider himself justified in attempting to take the position 
in the face of such a strong and organised opposition.”104 He was sure that if  he 
could not quell the resistance, the opposition might spread into other areas. A 
military reinforcement was subsequently despatched to the area to strengthen the 
patrol. A second company and a machine gun arrived from Lokoja, but was still 
unable to penetrate the Eggon hills. Further reinforcements, a mountain gun and a 
detachment of troops from Kano were brought to the spot.105 It was only under the 
cover of the mountain gun that the patrol was able to enter the hills.
The nature of resistance to the patrol was well organised and it is 
remembered that the people built defensive stone walls and held them with great 
tenacity. Also, peoples’ experiences of their previous defeats made them seek 
supernatural assistance. During the military encounter, the local people (as the 
present-day elders remembered) were inspired by the head of the ashim cult to 
resist the British authority.106 The and’ashim (head of the cult) in consultation with 
the mo ’dako ashim (elders) declared war on the British by blowing the buffalo 
horn (eku). Describing the instructions given by the and’ashim, Norton Traill, 
wrote: “after a while the noise died away and there was a perfect silence while the
103 Ibid,
!04 Ibid
!05 NAK Jos Prof 208/1918 Volume II: Gazetteer Plateau Province, 1918.
106 Group interview at Angbaku with Kuje Kigbu, Ablika Gabi and Tsaku Musa, 1 March 2004.
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‘juju’ man made his announcements...He gave it that ‘if  the Madas had gone to 
the “white man,” they would have been defeated, but that as it was the other way
107about the victory would be the Madas.’” Oaths were taken and the people 
fought side by side until the and'ashim was killed and they became demoralised. 
According to Norton Traill: “the Mada’s [sic] losses must have been very 
considerable but I believe that it was a lucky shell which landed right on the top of 
the Head juju man and blew him and his satellites to pieces which finally decided
1 ORthe issue.” The patrol then moved to Lezin Lafia. All the villages in the area 
were subsequently visited and the ringleaders were arrested, tried and later 
hanged.109 After a formal submission was made by the Eggon people, the Wamba 
Company remained in the hills under Mr. Mathews for some months after the 
Lokoja company and the gun detachment left the province.110 ha defence of the 
senseless killing of the Eggon people, the colonial administration used the same 
line of apology as it did for the Jengre massacre in Jos Plateau:
I regret that this loss of lives should have occurred, at the 
same time I do not see how it could have been avoided. I gave 
the natives every opportunity to meet in a friendly manner.. .it 
is evident that they had been for so many years accustomed to 
do as they pleased, having never been conquered by the 
Fulanes, that they had come to consider themselves
107 PRO CO 959/2: Captain H.L Norton Traill Correspondence, 1917; NAK SNP10/30p/1917: 
Mada Patrol 1917.
108 NAK SNP9/2946/1924: Nasarawa Province, Unsettled Districts.
109 NAK Jos Prof 208/1918 Volume II: Gazetteer Plateau Province, 1918.
110 Ames, Plateau Province, pp.21-22.
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invincible.. .they had 110 idea at all of the power of the white
man.111
The police patrol of 1925 was the last major military operation in 
Akwanga, finally bringing the Mama people under effective British rule. Arden- 
Clarke, who arrived in Akwanga in 1922, was responsible for organising the 
patrol. Despite the beginning of British administration in Akwanga by 1911, a 
shortage of European officers meant that Mama remained without an effective 
British presence. Another reason for lack of supervision in the area was the 
location of the district, which added substantially to the difficulty of establishing 
colonial control. The area’s hilly nature and the lack of roads and bridges across 
rivers made tours by colonial officials practically impossible, especially during the 
rainy season. With an increased number of colonial officials and less police 
engagements in other parts of the division by 1920s, attention began to be focused 
on the Mama people. Mama people were known for resisting the British by 
deserting their villages whenever a colonial officer managed to visit the area. 
Therefore, the aim of the patrol was to establish a British presence in the district to 
allow taxes to be easily collected and labour recruited for the construction of the 
infrastructure necessary for colonial rule. Arden-Clarke’s biographer, Rooney 
argued that the Mama patrol was carried out in order to impose law and order in an 
area where lawlessness had become a way of life.112 He maintained that the local 
people had an evil reputation and had become synonymous with “blood-evil-
111 NAK SNP 15/1 Acc. 40 on the report of Mr. Temple, Resident Bauchi, 1910.
112 Rooney Arden-Clarke, p.26.
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death.”113 Arden-Clarke painted an exotic picture of the “barbarians” that needed 
to understand colonial law and order, describing them as “great bushy savages, 
magnificent physical specimens, bulging with muscle, stark naked all of them 
except for grass strings round their waist.”114 He went on: “I wish you could see 
these people - I’m getting fairly used to them now, but when I first came here, 
even after my experience with other tribes...they struck me as the woolliest types 
of stark savagery that I should ever be likely to see.”115 The patrol to Mama 
consisted of 40 police escorts under Mr. Clinton, the local police commissioner 
and one medical doctor. They assembled at Arum on 6 May 1925 and after a series 
of patrols, over 27 Mama villages were visited and most of them destroyed. Arden- 
Clarke reflected on the hideous way the patrol was carried out and wrote: “I 
always loathe this part of the job. It seems such a senseless wasteful bit of 
destruction.”116 The operation came to an end on 23 August 1925.
Colonial rule in Akwanga was established and sustained by force. The 
major decider in the military contest was the Maxim gun. The independent nature 
and warlike attitudes of the peoples of Akwanga, who resisted the Hausa-Fulani 
depredations, was extended to the British. However, what marked the difference 
between the conquest of the peoples of Akwanga and some communities in central 
Nigeria was that the British followed the use of force to the latter in Akwanga, 
while adopting peaceful penetration in other areas. For example, the British 
abandoned the use of force in the conquest of the Tiv people and penetrated into
113 ibid.
114 Arden-Clarke’s letter to parents 25 February 1925.
115 Arden-Clarke’s letter to parents 9 March 1925.
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the area by peaceful means. The Tiv were the largest of the non-Muslim groups 
that resisted British conquest in central Nigeria. Like the peoples of Akwanga, 
they had no central authority and therefore the defeat of one clan did not mean 
anything to the group as a whole. As already mentioned, there were clashes 
between the WAFF and the Tiv, but after 1906, there was a change in British 
tactics. The colonial administration resorted to peaceful penetration into Tivland 
and Captain Gordon, Resident of Muri province was responsible for bringing the 
Tiv people under the British rule without engaging in military confrontation.117 
There was no opposition to the British once Gordon had succeeded in convincing 
the compound heads that the British had come with the message of peace and were 
interested in trade. Only after he had convinced the patriarchs that he meant no 
harm and had secured his consent did Gordon moved ahead. Therefore, the British 
after 1907 established its rule amongst the Tiv by peaceful means while at the 
same time started a war conquest in Akwanga. The section below discusses how 
the peoples of Akwanga responded to the British conquest of the area.
THE RESPONSE TO COLONIAL CONQUEST IN AKWANGA
Despite the military superiority of the European intruders and the brutality 
with which the invasion was earned out in some areas, the people in their various 
ways rejected the alien domination outright, or allied with the invaders and later 
rose against them. With the intrusion of colonial powers, Africans were faced with 
a choice of how to respond. Many African communities opposed the imposition of 
colonial rule from its inception. However, whenever this opposition gained
117 T. Tseror, “British Occupation of Tivland,” Mcindyeng, 2 (2002), pp.40-44.
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momentum, the superiority of European military technology prevented any long­
term success. Local resistance movements had some advantages in these conflicts, 
including the strategic value of fighting on their own soil and the mastering of the 
terrain, but they could not ultimately overcome the Maxim gun. Against the 
background of European military strength during the period of colonial 
subjugation, local people were left to decide whether to engage the colonial forces 
in a fight 01* negotiate in order to preserve their independence. African societies 
were often divided in their approach towards the colonial invaders in deciding 
whether to resist or accommodate them. For example, within the Solcoto Caliphate 
itself, each emir made his own decision to either resist or accommodate the British. 
Resistance to colonial rule in northern Nigeria was more prolonged among the 
communities in central Nigeria, who had had no previous experience of external 
rule. After the British occupied most parts of central Nigeria, resistance was 
muted, but the demand for tax and labour resulted in local revolts. However, these 
lacked enough organisation to threaten the grip of the British.
Colonial wars of conquest were mostly small wars because the availability 
of equipment and manpower were usually limited. In a handbook published by the 
British War Ministry, colonial wars of conquest were regarded as an expedition, 
“against savages and semi-civilized races by disciplined soldiers.”118 Therefore, 
wars of conquest were considered to be wars to spread civilization to a people that 
lacked western values. The firepower unleashed on the local people was
118 Quoted by J.M. Mackenzie (ed), Popular Imperialism and the Military 1850-1950 (Manchester, 
1992), p. 7.
118
considered legitimate in the face of an enemy who did not seem to understand the 
cultural code of a civilized method of warfare.
Resistance to colonial rule by African societies has generated a heated 
debate as to the role of the local people in accommodating or rejecting alien 
domination. A pioneering work by Terence Ranger on resistance to colonial rule in 
East and Central Africa, published in the late 1960s, explored the connection 
between resistance to the imposition of colonial rale -  “primary resistance” -  and 
modem nationalist movements -  “secondary resistance” ~.119 Thus, the concept of
* * * 190resistance became the historical dimension of African nationalism. Although 
early resistance movements in parts of Africa were a source of inspiration to some 
of the liberation struggles taking place in the 1960s and 1970s, Ranger raised a 
doubt whether this connection represented more than a “continuity of
191resistance”. For example, he argued that the Shona struggle for independence 
did not represent a “return to the values of the society engaged in the 1896 rising” 
and that the current struggle could not be informed by continuing Shona or 
Ndebele cultural forms.122 Ranger wondered whether the debate about continuity 
or discontinuity of manifestations of resistance should not be transcended by
119 T. Ranger, “Connexions between ‘Primary Resistance Movements’ and Modern Mass 
Nationalism in East and Central Africa” JAH, 9(1968), 437-52.
120 L. Vail and L. White, ‘Forms of Resistance: Song and Perceptions of Power in Colonial 
Mozambique, in D. Crammey (ed.), Banditiy, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa (London, 
1986), 193.
121 T. Ranger, ‘Resistance in Africa: From Nationalist Revolt to Agrarian Protest, in G.Y. Okihiro 
(ed.), In Resistance: Studies in African, Caribbean, and Afi'o-American PH story (Amherst, 1986), 
49.
122 T. Ranger, “The People in African Resistance: A Review,” Journal o f  Southern Afi'ican Studies, 
4 (1977), 130.
119
periodization of African history involving a series of qualitative 
transformations.123
A critique emerged in the late 1970s, questioning the link between primary 
resistance and nationalist struggle. The linkage between primary resistance to 
colonial rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the modem 
nationalist movements of the 1950s and 1960s was regarded as “extremely elitist, a 
bias comtemporary African historians share with their Eurocentric 
predecessors.”124 In other words, the earlier resistance thesis was criticised for 
being narrowly focused on elite politics; for the near exclusion of women and 
peasants; and for an undifferentiated view of these latter groups when they 
appeared at all. Thus, Marxist paradigms inspired a shift away from the search for 
the roots of nationalism to the search for the causes of underdevelopment. Part of 
what drove this critique was a concern with class and class identities. Scholars 
sought to identify the "faceless masses" and in so doing, they asked whether one 
could speak of primary resisters and nationalist leaders in the same breath. Class 
divisions, based on people's relation to pre-colonial and colonial modes of 
production, held out the possibility that initial resistance and nationalist struggle 
composed historically distinct and separate processes. The concern with economic 
differentiation in African societies drove a new generation of scholarship through 
the 1980s. While casting doubt on the connection between primary and nationalist 
resistance, this generation did not drop the resistance paradigm but rather drew on
123 Ibid, 145-6.
124 A. Isaacman and B. Isaacman, “Resistance and Collaboration in Southern and Central Africa,” 
IJAHS, 10(1977), 39.
120
materialist perspectives to locate indigenous resistance within the broader 
framework of class struggle.
The concept of resistance is difficult to define as some scholars viewed 
certain actions, like theft, migration, fighting and desertion as different forms of 
resistance. Crummy observed that resistance could be mute with stealth being one 
of its principal characteristics while, Isaacman portrayed, for example, the 
withholding of labour for cotton production by Mozambican peasants as an act of 
resistance.125 Other scholars objected to the extension of the concept of resistance 
to cover different forms of action to the point of including “everything from foot 
dragging and dissimulation to social banditry, arson, poaching, theft, avoidance of 
conscription, desertion, migration and riot.”126 However, Van Walraven and 
Abbink employed the concept of resistance to signify:
Intensions and concrete actions taken to oppose others and 
refuse to accept their ideas, actions or positions for a variety 
of reasons, the most common being the perception of the 
position, claims or actions taken by others as unjust, 
illegitimate or intolerable attempts at domination. The 
concrete acts of resistance involved may or may not be acts 
of physical violence and extended also to other spheres of 
human behaviour.127
125 D. Crummey, “Introduction: The Great Beast,” in Crammey, Banditiy Rebellion, 10; Isaacman 
et al, “Resistance and Collaboration”, 11.
126 Vail and White, “Forms of Resistance,” 195.
127 Jon Abbink et al, Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African Histoiy (Leiden, 2003), 
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Generally, the response to European domination in Africa until recently has 
been categorised into two types, collaboration and resistance. The categorisation of 
the response to colonial domination into resistance and collaboration seems 
inadequate to explain the phenomenon. Both resistance and collaboration by 
Africans to the colonial invaders can be seen as the pursuance of interests and not 
as irrational instinctive reactions. The complicated nature of inter-play between 
African and European interests was “far more subtle than the arbitrary division 
into progressive collaborators and reactionary resistors.”128 John Lonsdale argues 
that in order to “understand the contrary human intentions one needs first to grasp 
an underlying process. But the process is, again, a dual one, the building of states 
and articulations, or contradictory junction, of pre-capitalist and capitalist modes 
of production.”129 He asserts that virtually all Africans negotiated working 
accommodations with Europeans imtil Europeans made it impossible, and that 
those who fought fiercely like Samory did so only as a last resort when their 
European allies betrayed them.130
Collaboration during the colonial period was difficult to define and it did 
not represent consistent loyalty, as the allegiance of groups and individuals shifted 
as the value of the alliance with the colonial state changed.131 Therefore, 
collaboration could be described as a “convergence of interests between colonial
132states and individual groups or classes of colonized society.” At the time of
128 R. Collins (ed), Historical Problems o f  Imperial Africa (Revised edition: Princeton, 2000), 
pp.57-58.
129 J. Lonsdale, “The European Scramble and Conquest in African History,” in R. Oliver and G.N. 
Sanderson (eds), The Cambridge Histoiy o f  Africa Vol.6 (Cambridge, 1985), p.728.
130 Ibid, p.731.
131 W. Beinart and C. Bundy, Hidden Struggles in Rural South Afi'ica (London, 1987), pp.28-9.
132 J. Osterhammel, Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (Princeton, 1997), p.64.
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colonial conquest, the British had to rely 011 the indigenous people for troops and 
earners who were essential to the conquest. After colonial subjugation, 
collaboration was also needed for the smooth running of the political structures 
that were established for administration. Direct administration by the British could 
not be earned out from London due to lack of adequate manpower and resources. 
In other words, during and after the period of the conquest, collaboration became 
necessary, as domination could not have been achieved through direct intervention 
from London.
The colonial subjugation of the peoples of Akwanga was resisted from the 
start. The questions that need to be answered include: was resistance general or 
exceptional among the local people in the area? Why did the resistance last until 
1925? Although resistance was widespread in the whole of the division, it was 
most intensive among the Eggon people in the southern part of the region. As 
noted earlier, the two major military confrontations between the British and local 
people in Nasarawa province were with the Eggon in 1912 and 1917. The peoples 
of the area had had a long tradition of resistance against the slave raiders from 
Zaria, Bauchi and the sub-emirates of Keffi, Lafia and Jama’a who were kept at 
bay. The British, with superior weaponry and resources were able to impose their 
control over the people. Despite the use of these sophisticated weapons, the British 
found it difficult to establish effectively their rule until after the 1917 patrol, by
133which, for the first time in their history, the Eggon people were really subdued. 
However, after these defeats, the local people continued to frustrate the colonial 
administration and, in 1925, during the Mama patrol, Arden-Clarke wrote: “I shall
133 NAK SNP9/618: Re-Assessment Report on South Mada District, Lafia Division, 1922.
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of course go on walloping them until they surrender.”134 The resistance resulted in 
the meting out of brutal treatment by the colonial forces. It should be noted that 
after the 1912 and 1917 patrols, the area became a political hotspot in 
parliamentary debates at Westminster and the colonial administrators were closely 
watched. Arden-Clarke in a letter to his parents commented:
The powers that be are so frightened of questions in 
parliament when some idiot gets up and says he has heard of 
brutal treatment meted out to some poor helpless natives - 
the ‘poor helpless native3 being a bunch of Mada with 
sheaves o f poisoned arrows and bristling with swords and 
spears, spending his energies in getting his fellow ‘helpless 
natives’ to drive out the white man.135
Local settlement patterns contributed to the prolonged nature of colonial 
conquest of Akwanga region. The fortress-lilce hill settlements of the Eggon were 
militarily significant and they presented a great problem for the British, who had 
difficulty in penetrating the hills. As already discussed, the British had to use 
reinforcements and artillery to be able to break the resistance of the Eggon people 
in 1917. Furthermore, the people had no single authority around which power was 
centred and they lived independently as clans and lineages in villages. This meant 
that the British had to fight from village to village and in some instances from
lj4 Arden-Clark’s letter to parents 24 March 1925.
135 Ibid, 6 June 1922.
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house to house in order to subdue the local people, who did not recognise any 
authority outside their own households.
Another reason for the long resistance to British rule by the peoples of 
Akwanga was the fact that attention was focused on more “profitable,” bigger and 
organised polities rather than on areas with a small resource base. In other words, 
the British conquered major areas first and later gave attention to smaller 
communities like those of Akwanga. The case of Mama district clearly showed 
that despite the establishment of colonial rule in the area, there was not much 
British supervision due to the lack of personnel. The police patrol of 1925 was an 
attempt by the British to re-establish their presence among the communities in the 
area.
The British had local collaborators who were later utilised in the 
administration of the newly acquired territories. The penetration of the British into 
Akwanga as noted earlier was carried out from three centres and the people of the 
sub-emirates allied themselves with the British. They gave out information about 
the peoples of Akwanga and they were also used as soldiers and guides during the 
conquest of the area. They therefore became the allies of the British in their wars 
of conquest and were rewarded for such. For example, Bashayi, the first District 
Head of Central Mada and later of South Mada, was originally a Fulani from 
Keffi. Also, within the communities of Akwanga, the British had to rely on their 
local collaborators to achieve their aims. British penetration into the north of the 
division was through Jama’a and Nunku village was one o f the first in the northern 
part of the division to come into contact with the British. The villagers did not
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resist colonial conquest and as a result, the first District Head of North Mada was 
appointed from the Nunku clan. The British further used the Nunku people as 
sources of intelligence and also as guides in their wars with other Mada villages.136 
The marriage of convenience between the Nunku clan and the British in the
administration of North Mada district made other Mada clans consider them as
mane ban tsu “people of death,” due to the reign of terror unleashed by the ruling 
elites in the performance of their duties.137
One of the advantages of collaboration for the British was that it 
minimised their own administrative responsibilities in the early stages of colonial 
rule. The collaborators enjoyed certain privileges from the colonial administration. 
They were given leadership positions and, during military operations, their houses 
and families were spared. The conditions of those that were friendly towards the 
British and those that were not has been summarised by Arden-Clarke, in the 
village of Arum in 1925:
We settled down and smashed to pieces all the compounds in 
the village except those of people I know to be really friendly 
and doing their best to help me. As far as I am concerned 
there is no such thing as neutrality; a man is either an active 
friend of the administration or he is an enemy. If an enemy,
his compound is levelled to the ground and the grass roof
burnt.138
136 Interview with Bala Maishai at Kanbar, 14 November 2003.
137 Ibid.
138 Arden-Clarke’s letter to parents 24 March 1925.
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The severity of the punishments meted out to those that were not 
sympathetic to the colonial administration were carried out in order to instil fear* in 
them and also to demonstrate to them that, if  they abandoned any form of 
resistance, their security would be guaranteed. Within the colonial circle, some 
officials expressed reservations about the extreme measures taken during military 
patrols. According to Arden-Clarke, “It’s rather a piteous sight watching a village 
being knocked to pieces and I wish there was some other way but unfortunately 
there isn’t.”139 It is untrue to suggest, as Arden-Clarke did, that there was no other 
option open to the colonial government in the method of handling such rebellions. 
The colonial administration refused to acknowledge the root causes of the peoples’ 
grievances. They assumed that by terrorising the people, they would have a change 
of heart. It was the general consensus among the people interviewed that if only 
the colonialists had been diplomatic and had addressed their problems, they would 
not have found it necessary to continue with their resistance.
CONCLUSION
The fiercely independent attitudes of the peoples of Akwanga, who had 
long fought off incursions by Hausa-Fulani raiders and state-builders in the 
nineteenth century, were extended to the British when they arrived in the region at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. Resistance against the British conquest was 
seen as a continuation of nineteenth-century struggles to preserve local 
independence from the emirates of the Solcoto Caliphate. Apart from a few 
European officers, the bulk of the soldiers used for the conquest of Akwanga were
139 Ibid.
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Hausa-Fulani. Colonial forces followed the same routes used by the slave raiders. 
Despite the resistance, the superiority of European arms decided the war in favour 
of the British. However, after the subjugation of the region, the British were faced 
with the problem of controlling and administering local peoples. The British had to 
establish structures which were necessary for the overall supervision of the 
conquered territories. The chapter that follows examines the establishment and 
functions of these administrative institutions.
128
CHAPTER THREE
INDIRECT RULE AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIVE ADMINISTRATION, 
1913-1936
This chapter examines the development of the indirect rule system and native 
administration in Akwanga. It places emphasis 011 the administrative policies pursued 
by Lugard, Clifford, Palmer and Cameron, who became Governors of Nigeria and 
how such policies changed the socio-political structures of the region. An integral 
part of the indirect rule system was taxation, and the assessment and collection of 
taxes required the stationing of colonial agents. Lugard began to implement the 
indirect rule system in Akwanga by extending the jurisdiction of the emirs of Keffl, 
Lafia and Jama’a to the peoples of the area in 1905. However, the jurisdiction of the 
emirs was terminated in 1913 and five districts were created, marking the beginning 
of the operation of native administration. The attempt to find an acceptable system of 
administration resulted in a series of organisations and reorganisations, which 
transformed the pre-existing social, political and geographical boundaries of the 
peoples of Akwanga.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIRECT RULE SYSTEM
After the military subjugation of the “tribal” peoples of central Nigeria, the 
main problem faced by the British was how to make colonial rule function in areas 
without any central authority. The system of indirect rule was introduced in part to 
alleviate the shortage of European staff in northern Nigeria. Local chiefs were
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therefore allowed to rule under the supervision of the British. Areas without chiefs, 
like the communities in Akwanga, had District Heads arbitrarily appointed for them. 
The Native Administration formed the basis of the state apparatus that was used for 
the recruitment of labour, collecting taxes and maintaining law and order. Lugard 
saw the Native Administration as the people’s contribution towards their own 
development.
With the development of indirect rule, Lugard tried to draw together 
different ideas into a comprehensive theory of colonial policy that could be applied 
to the African colonies. In describing the system of colonial administration in 
northern Nigeria, he argued that the “British role here is to bring to the country all 
the gains of civilisation by applied science (whether in the development of material 
resources, or the eradication of disease, etc) with as little interference as possible 
with native customs and modes of thought.”1 Indirect rule was originally intended by 
Lugard to be a flexible and adaptable approach for local government, with a central, 
colonial administration of British officials for general government. Preserving 
traditional authorities, according to him, would provide continuity with the past and 
into the future. This was due to the fact that European officials would come and go, 
but indigenous officials would remain. Furthermore, the system of indirect rule was 
designed to demonstrate the degree of British non-involvement in the pre-existing 
political organisation. Co-operation of the indigenous rulers was sought after (in 
places where they existed) and, in the areas where they were lacking, chiefs were 
appointed and given powers which had no traditional basis.
The arguments advanced by Lugard for the introduction of indirect rule 
should not be taken at face value. There was more to it than the superficial
1 F. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Third Edition: London, 1926), p. 196.
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assumption that the people were allowed to rule themselves. Firstly, the size of 
northern Nigeria, coupled with the difficulties of communication and means of 
transportation, made direct British rule practically impossible. The expenditure 
necessary to maintain such a huge amount of personnel would have been considered 
by the British government to be quite disproportionate to the prospects that the 
region held, which was contrary to the idea of colonies being self-sustaining. The 
experience of the Royal Niger Company has shown that despite the company’s 
limited administrative influence in northern Nigeria, its expenditure on the region 
was supplemented from the profits accrued from the palm oil trade in the Niger 
Delta.2 Secondly, direct British administration would have been impossible because 
it was difficult to attract British people of the right type and education in large 
numbers for services in Nigeria. Until the 1930s, the majority of colonial officials 
recruited to work in Nigeria had no any formal qualification, so Lugard had to look 
locally for the manpower that was necessary to administer the new conquered 
territories.
In administering British rule in northern Nigeria, Lugard clearly spelt out 
how the region should be organised. He divided the region into provinces and 
divisions and defined the roles of the colonial officials involved in the operation of 
the indirect rule system. Northern Nigeria as a whole was under a single Governor, 
while each province was an individual entity under the control of a Resident. The 
duty of the Resident, according to Lugard, was “to carry out loyally, the policy of the 
Governor and not to inaugurate policies of his own.”3 The Resident was the senior 
government official in the province and represented the Governor in all
2 Hargreaves, West Africa Partitioned, pp.93-126.
3 F. Lugard, Political Memoranda: Revision o f Instructions to Political Officers on Subjects Chiefly 
Political and Administrative, 1913-1918, with a new introduction by A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (Third 
Edition: London, 1970), p. 10.
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administrative matters. The provinces were organised into administrative divisions 
with a District Officer (DO) or Assistant District Officer (ADO) in charge of each. 
The District Officers were answerable to the Residents and the actual day-to-day 
administration of the area under the Resident was entrusted to the hands of the local 
rulers who were supervised by the District Officers. The constant supervision of the 
local rulers by the colonial officials resulted in the policy being regarded by Crowder 
as “interventionist indirect rule.”4 The operation of the indirect rule system was 
based on cooperation between the colonial officials and the local rulers. These local 
rulers became the Native Authorities of their respective areas and were an integral 
part of the consolidation and sustenance of British rule in northern Nigeria. In 
accordance with the new Lugardian system, local rulers were sworn into office by 
appointment and were graded with a variable salary. This, according to him, would 
undermine the autocratic and exploitative nature of the ruling class. In his words, 
“the ruling class are no longer either demi-gods or parasites preying 011 the 
community, they must work for the stipend and position they enjoy.”5 The basis for 
the appointment of the local rulers was loyalty to the new colonial state, and their 
recognition by the government was based 011 dictated terms and conditions given to 
them.
I11 Akwanga, the communities had not evolved a ruling class (like those of 
the northern emirates) to which the British could give colonial authority. The 
independent nature of the groups in the area meant that the British would have had to 
maintain more than one chief to administer a territory with a population smaller than 
any of the emirates, which were being effectively ruled by a single emir. From 1900 
to 1919, the emirate model of indirect rule was applied throughout northern Nigeria,
4 M. Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule (London, 1968), p.217.
5 Lugard, Dual Mandate, pp.203-204.
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but the system proved unworkable with the traditions of the peoples of central 
Nigeria and was reconsidered in the period 1919 to 1936. The development of 
Native Authorities in northern Nigeria can be analysed in four phases. According to 
Ballard, there were four major attempts by the successive Governors of Nigeria to 
make Native Authorities acceptable to the pagan societies based on the system of 
indirect rule.6 The first phase was the creation of paramount chiefs in areas in which 
they did not exist. Although, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the villages of Nunku and 
Ungwasheru began to evolve an embryonic central political structure in the late 
nineteenth century, most of the communities in Akwanga did not go beyond the level 
of the clan or village group administration.
Lugard’s comprehensive scheme of tax reform had profound consequences 
for the implementation of the indirect rule system. The assessment and collection of 
taxes required the existence of a clearly defined territorial administration. Lugard 
toured the Northern Provinces during 1904-5 and he laid down uniform 
administrative structures, defining jurisdiction in terms of taxation and approving 
divisional boundaries. The arrangement called for a paramount chief in each 
province, with subsidiary chiefs or District Heads in their divisions. During Lugard’s 
tour of Nasarawa province, he approved the creation of Lafia, Keffi and Jama’a 
divisions and gave the emirs jurisdiction over the peoples of Akwanga, who were 
hitherto independent of these sub-emirates.7 The Eggon, for example, were included 
in the Assaikio district of the Lafia emirate, but the power of the emir was negligible 
and any power that existed was created and backed by the British administration.8 
However, the jurisdiction of the emir of Lafia over the Eggon ended in 1911 and
6 J.A. Baliard, ‘Pagan Administration’ and Political Development in Northern Nigeria,” Savanna, 1 
(Zaria, 1972), pp. 1-14.
7 Ibid.
8 NAIC SNP 9/830: Mada District, Plateau Province - Administration of, 1922,
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therefore the Eggon were separated from the rest of the Assaikio district and were 
administered directly through the Divisional Officer of Lafia.9
After Lugard’s brief departure from Nigeria in 1906, the pressure for the 
application of the indirect rule system in northern Nigeria was relaxed by his 
successor, Sir Percy Girouard. However, on Lugard’s return in 1912, with the 
mandate of amalgamating northern and southern Nigeria, his major concern was to 
unify the divergent administrative policies in these regions. Whereas the northern 
administration had “a native policy whose aim was primarily administrative,” 
southern policy was “commercial and directed primarily to the development of 
resources and hade.”10 Lugard saw the decentralised societies of both north and 
south as “tribes in the lowest stage of primitive savagery, without any central 
organisation” and “the first step is to endeavour to find a man of influence as chief, 
and to group under him as many villages and districts as possible.”11
Finding men of influence amongst the decentralized communities in both 
southern and northern Nigeria to be appointed as leaders of the Native Authorities 
became problematic. In southern Nigeria, for example, the colonial officials had 
never been able to make indirect rule work. The native administration system was 
destined to fail in the south even before it became operational because of the 
contempt Lugard had for the administrative arrangement of the region. Lugard 
looked at the government of the south with something close to disgust, which was 
“unnatural for an administrator bred in the Northern emirates.”12 In addition, 
Lugard’s earlier encounter with the southern administration in the early phase of 
British rale left much to be desired. The northern and southern administration had
9 Ibid.
!0 Lugard’s constitutional proposal, 1913, A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (ed), Lugard and the Amalgamation o f
Nigeria: A Documentary Record (London, 1968), p,225. 
n Lugard, Political Memo, pp. 193-198.
12 Kirk-Greene, Lugard and the Amalgamation, p. 14.
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quarrelled over boundary questions and railway policy as well as over the division of 
customs revenue collected by the southern administration on goods which later 
found their way into northern Nigeria. In order to make indirect rule function in the 
southern Nigeria, Lugard subjected the region, “to a searching examination by the 
standards of northern administration,” and “decided that what was needed was the 
creation of an administration.”13 The programme of remodelling the local political 
administration in the south was the attempt to establish the Native Authority with a 
single chief in different parts of the region with their native treasuries and prisons. 
The attempt at implementing indirect rule based on the Native Authority system to 
the decentralised peoples of southern Nigeria failed. The major difficulty that the 
British encountered was finding local people with authority that was acceptable to 
the communities. The newly created chiefly offices had no traditional basis and the 
power bestowed on the chiefs was invented and backed by the colonial 
administration. According to Afigbo, the Native Authorities created did not have 
traditional basis and some of these chiefs appointed were strangers to the 
communities which they were imposed as Native Authorities.14 This was one of the 
major reasons that resulted in the failure of the indirect rule system in the region. 
Afigbo argued that the indirect rule system would have succeeded in the south if the 
British had learned that chiefly rule was not possible in eveiy society and also, if the 
local people recognised that their “traditional system of democratic village republics
• 15needed substantial modification.”
Like in southern Nigeria, the British administration in Akwanga had a 
difficult task in finding men of influence amongst the local peoples to be appointed
13 Perham, Native Administration, pp. 61; Kirk-Greene, Lugard and the Amalgamation, p.14.
14 A.E. Afigbo The Warrant Chiefs: Indirect Ride in South Eastern Nigeria, 1891-1929 (Harlow, 
1972), pp. 118-161.
15 Ibid, 305.
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as District Heads and colonial officials almost inevitably fell back upon the practice 
of direct administration or the use of an alien District Head. Although an Assistant 
Resident was appointed for Akwanga in 1911, British administrative presence was 
hardly established in the region. The jurisdiction of the emirs of Keffi and Jama’a 
over the Mada and some of the Eggon villages continued until 1913, when it was 
ended on the instructions of Mr. Temple (Lugard’s Deputy) when he visited 
Nasarawa province. This was made possible by the transfer of troops from Keffi to 
Wamba and the removal of the Lafia Divisional Headquarters from Lafia town to 
Wamba in 1912.16 Temple’s approval was immediately followed by the creation of 
five districts: South Mada, North Mada, Central Mada, Mama and Nungu districts.17 
The North Mada were “put under a chief of their own nationality, who was given a 
council to aid him, Cent ml Madas were put under Isiyaku Bashayi, a son of the 
Royal Family of Keffi” and South Mada was administered directly by the Divisional 
Officer of Lafia.18 Mama district did not have its own District Head, but was under a 
group of important village heads of the area while Nungu district had its own District 
Head. The stationing of these District Heads as agents of colonial administr ation was 
essential for the consolidation and sustenance of colonial rule in the region. They 
were given new status and power, and became the most important people in their 
respective districts. Village heads in their respective districts assisted the District 
Heads. They were nominated by the elders of their respect villages to the District 
Head for approval.19
Thus, by 1913, the emirate model of indirect rule became functional in 
Akwanga. In the spirit of the indirect rule system, the District Heads were supposed
16 NAK SNP 9/830: Mada District, Plateau Province - Administration of, 1922.
17 Ibid.
18 PRO CO 959/2: Captain H.L. Norton Traill Correspondence, 1917.
19 Interview with the late Ali Anfani at Akwanga, 20 March 2003.
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to be local people rather than outsiders. However, as already mentioned, Bashayi, 
who was Fulani from Keffi, was appointed as the District Head of Central Mada.20 
The colonial administration hoped that his appointment would bring some 
experience in native administration to Akwanga:
The ostensible rason d ’etre for the appointment to this alien District 
Head Bashayi, was that being a man of superior intellect, accustomed 
to British Administration and cognizant of its aims, he would 
inculcate this knowledge among the village heads, train them in 
administrative matters and build up their authority, so that in a few 
years time they would be able to assume the administration of the 
tribe by themselves.21
Bashayi began to settle into his new office by encouraging Hausa-Fulani to 
settle in Akwanga. According to Jibren Mu’azu, the present-day sarkin Hausawa of 
Akwanga, “it was Bashayi who encouraged my grandfather to settle in Akwanga. 
Bashayi needed people around him who understood the importance of being royal 
and because Hausawa were obedient to the authority established over them, he 
persuaded them to settle with him and help administer the area.”22 The number of 
Hausa that settled in Akwanga, especially at the Central Mada district in the early 
stage of Bashayi’s rule, is not clear from oral information and colonial records, but 
the number increased during the construction of the Eastern railway line that passed 
through Gudi from 1923 to 1927. In 1922 there were 185 Hausa people in Akwanga 
town and also a number of others in Gudi.23 Those that settled at Gudi were mostly
20 Bashayi was the son of an Eggon concubine.
21 NAK SNP 9/830: Mada District, Plateau Province, Administration of, 1922.
22 Interview with Jibrem Mu’azu at Akwanga, 4 May 2004.
23 NAIC SNP 9/617: Central Mada District, Lafia Division, Nasarawa Province, 1922.
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labourers employed in the construction of the railway line.24 Bashayi’s office was in 
Akwanga town and he employed Hausa immigrants as his jakadu (ambassadors), 
who administered the villages under his jurisdiction. The jakadu were stationed at 
Kurmin Tagwaye, Gaji, Alushi, Gudi and Gwadi and they served as tax collectors 
and judges, thereby undermining the authority of the newly constituted village heads 
and elders who were supposed to assist Bashayi in running the district. Despite the 
appointment of an alien District Head and the illegal employment of the jakadu to 
assist Bashayi, the colonial administration allowed the practice to continue 
undisturbed.
Figure 3.1:The late Alhaji Mohammadu Kore, the first chief of Wamba
In the South Mada district, the Divisional Officer of Lafia supervised the 
administration of the district through the village heads and mo ’dako ashim (elders). 
The lack of consensus among the Eggon elders meant that it was impossible to
24 Interview with Ahmadu Salihu at Gudi, 22 March 2004. In addition to the Hausa immigrants, the 
Tiv, Yoruba and Igbo labourers in the Eastern railway began to settle in Akwanga.
25 NAK Jos Prof 58/1927: Akwanga Division Report on for year 1926.
26 NAK SNP 9/830: Mada District, Plateau Province - Administration of, 1922.
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appoint a District Head amongst them.27 The Mada had Zumbi, who the emir of 
Jama’a styled as sarkin Nunku appointed as the District Head of North Mada with 
the banlunkii (elders) to assist him in the administration of the district. This was the 
first time that the whole of the Mada villages had come under a central authority. 
Thus, by 1913, the machinery for native administration was put in place. The staff 
needed to run other departments of the native administration, such as the native 
treasury (established in 1914), prisons and police, had to be employed from outside 
Akwanga. The lack of colonial education and administrative skills amongst the local 
peoples meant that immigrants occupied senior positions in the central 
administration office in Wamba, while locals were employed mostly as cleaners and 
messengers. The dominance of the immigrant group at the divisional headquarters 
created friction with the local staff. This friction, as observed by the District Officer, 
“is an uneasy combination of ‘strangers’ and locals” which resulted in jealousy.28 
This created a great deal of tension and suspicion between the immigrants and the 
local staff and thus, made it difficult for the District Officer to run the administration
29smoothly.
Although there are no available figures for the number of immigrants at the 
early period of the native administration, by 1932, out of the three district scribes, 
two were immigrants, as were all the three court scribes and the joint district and 
court scribe for Mama district.30 Other immigrants included the ma'aji (treasurer) 
who was from Zaria, the head of the government police who was from Bauchi, the 
gaoler of the NA prison who was from Yola and the staff of the public works
27 NAK Jos Prof 488, Volume II: The Eggon Tribal Area, Summary of Intelligence Report on, 1935.
28 NAK Jos Prof 5422: Southern Division, Half Yearly and Annual Report 1943-44.
29 As quoted in NAK Jos Prof 5422: Southern Division, Half Yearly and Annual Report 1943-44.
30 NAK Jos Prof 44: Southern Division, Report on for 1932.
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department who were all immigrants.31 Generally, the creation of chiefs where they 
did not exist was extended to other decentralised societies after the amalgamation of 
northern and southern Nigeria in 1914.
After the final departure of Lugard from Nigeria in 1918, his policy of native 
administration amongst the decentralised societies was challenged and reinterpreted. 
Sir Hugh Clifford, Lugard’s successor as Governor, attempted to correct what he 
considered to be the shortcomings of indirect rule. This included, for example, the 
creation of chiefs where they had not existed before the coming of the British. He 
proposed the creation of bigger chiefdoms (through the amalgamation of the various 
chiefs) under a chairman and ordered the revision of the criteria for the creation of 
chiefs where none existed previously.32 Clifford’s major concern was to open up all 
Nigeria to development and to end what he saw as the isolation of the Northern 
Provinces from external modernising influences. Although he considered the emirate 
model of indirect rule suitable for the emirates, he disagreed with its application to 
the decentralised societies. He proposed to allow the provinces to pursue a variety of
« • « » » » I .Native Administration policies under central direction from Lagos. In a memo 
circulated to all northern officers in the colonial service, Clifford proposed:
I think we should abandon once and for all the expectation of ever 
converting...primitive tribal systems (such as they are) into any sort 
of semblance to the Native Administrations of the Muhammadan 
Emirates, and should content ourselves with making of the former 
only such as experience may show to be at once safe and expedient, 
while causing the people to feel, individually and collectively that
31 Ibid.
32 ibid.
33 PRO CO 583/80: Clifford to Milner, December 1919.
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the district officer is the real, de facto ruler of their country, and 
their sure Court of Appeal and refuge when in trouble.34
The Colonial Office rejected the major changes in the operation of indirect rule 
system that Clifford proposed. In a memo by the Colonial Office:
We should tell Clifford politely but firmly, that we did not send 
him to Nigeria to upset everything which his predecessor had 
done...his attacks on the policy of his predecessor and on the 
administration of Northern Nigeria are entirely contrary to the 
wishes of the Secretary of State, who frilly approves the general 
lines of that policy and has no intention of allowing it to be 
reversed [therefore], the Lugardian system in its main principle be 
upheld.35
However, the Colonial Office modified Clifford’s recommendations, which were 
embodied in the 1922 constitution (“the Clifford constitution”). While administration 
in the north was left untouched, a new legislative council was established for the 
southern regions. The Colonial Office also approved changes regarding the direct 
administration by colonial officials, which made way for the re-organisation exercise 
carried out in the Northern Provinces in 1922. In Akwanga, a major re-organisation 
was proposed in order to end the direct administration of Eggon by the Divisional 
Officer of Lafia. The proposal was put forward by Arden-Clarke (an Assistant 
District Officer) in 1922. He went further by attempting the creation of an 
independent “pagan” emirate with Bashayi as the emir. His first tour in the division
34 NAK SNP7/4046 Vol. 1: Minutes, Clifford to Political Officers, June 1920.
35 PRO CO 583/80: Memo, Colonial Office to Clifford, 1920.
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resulted in the proposed re-organisation and he described the scheme in a letter to his 
parents:
This Division is divided into two halves, one half consisting of the 
Emir of Lafia and his territories, the other half of five independent 
districts, three Mada districts, North, Central and South, the Mama 
district and the Nungu district. My scheme roughly is to turn the 
three Mada districts at present divided by no proper geographical or 
ethnological boundary into two districts following a clearly defined 
boundary separating the two big Mada clans. Each of these distr icts 
will have its own paramount chief as District Head and both 
districts will be under a man called Bashai - a very sound fellow.
The Nungu District is also to be brought under his control and later 
011 the Mada, when we have educated them a little. Then we will 
form a small independent emirate consisting of four tribes as clans, 
each with their own District Head, who is going to be responsible to
3G
US.
The scheme was to create an independent “pagan emirate” with the Mada and 
Eggon villages to be divided between the sub-emirates of Keffi and Lafia. This was 
the first step, according to Arden-Clarke, of combining “all these independent raw 
pagan districts into one emirate.”37 Arden-Clarke, like other colonial officials, was 
obsessed with the transformation of the “pagan areas” into something resembling the 
emirate system. The Lieutenant Governor rejected the idea of dividing the people and
36 Arden-Clarke5 s letter to parents, 24 February 1922
37 Arden-Clarke’s letter to parents, 28 January 1922
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creating an independent “pagan emirate ” A memorandum from the Secretary of 
Northern Provinces stated:
His Honour is also strongly opposed to the idea of the creation of 
an entirely artificial so-called ‘pagan emirate’ with a pagan ‘Emir’ 
ruling over the two Mada Districts - the Nungus and the Mamas - 
with the majority of whom he would have no historical nor 
ethnological connection. These tribes had much better be 
administered by their own tribal chiefs.38
The suggestion therefore that Bashayi should found his dynasty over the “pagan 
emirate” was rejected. Bashayi, according to the Secretary, ascended to the district 
headship “based on his personal character and not on blood, and he has no more 
right to be made a ‘pagan emir’ than Cromwell had to be King of England.”39 
Therefore, instead of creating an independent “pagan emirate” the Central Mada 
district was abolished and the Mada and Eggon were divided into two independent 
districts, namely, North and South Mada districts respectively. The Mada and Eggon 
villages that were formerly in the central Mada district were transferred to the newly 
created districts “so that the district boundaries may conform with the tribal 
boundaries.”40 Therefore, the re-organisation did not only divide “the area into 
district conforming with the inter-tribal boundary, but provides a District Headman 
over those Hill Mada villages which hitherto formed South Mada District.”41 The 
District Officer’s authority was transferred to Bashayi, who was therefore appointed 
as the first District Head of Eggon. One of my informants considered the 1922 re­
38 NAK SNP 9/830: Mada District, Plateau Province-Administration of, 1922.
39 Ibid.
40 PRO CO 959/2: Captain H.L. Norton Trail Correspondence, 1922.
41 Ibid.
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organisation merely as the transfer of Bashayi from Akwanga to Wana.42 He 
believed that Bashayi was transferred because he ordered his men to flog Ahmadu, 
the representative of Abubakar {Sarkin Nunku) during the construction of a local 
road. When he reported the incident to Abubakar, the District Head wrote a letter to 
the District Officer and informed him that Bashayi was installed for the Eggon and 
not for the Mada people and therefore should be transferred to his rightful place. 
This, according to him, was the reason for the movement of Bashayi to the Eggon 
hills.43
The Eggon people however, resisted the appointment of Bashayi as the new 
District Head of South Mada. Their concern lay in the fact that Bashayi was Fulani. 
This created tension between the colonial government and the Eggon people and in 
an attempt to bring the two sides together, Arden-Clarke had to tour with the new 
District Head before he took over the administration of the area. In trying to resolve 
the crisis, Arden-Clarke decided to divide the opposition by setting the Village Heads 
at each other. In a letter to his parents, he wrote:
I am up at Lazin-Lafia in the Mada Hills...well the jolly old 
Alogani wants to be District Head in place of Bashai [sic]. All 
the Madas are rather afraid of Bashai as he is a real live man, he 
gets things done...My job is to get Bashai accepted in face of 
this opposition...Here is how I hope to work the thing out. Its 
011 the jolly old Roman principle of “Divid et im p e r a I am 
going to try and put together confederation of chiefs against 
Bashai by jealousy.. ,44
42 Interview with Malam Yakubu Alhaii Yusuf at Andaha, 11 November 2003.
43 Ibid.
44 Arden-Clarke’s letter to parents June 1922.
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Arden-Clarke succeeded in his tactics and the village heads were unable to 
agree on who amongst them should become the District Head. Therefore, in the face 
of such disagreement, Bashayi seemed to be a compromise and he accordingly took 
over the administration of the district. But before Bashayi took over the district 
headship of the Eggon, he spent a month touring the villages that were placed under 
his jurisdiction with Arden-Clarke in order to familiarise himself with the village 
heads and elders.45
In 1924, Mr. Tomlinson, Clifford’s Assistant Secretary for Native Affairs, 
made an official tour of central Nigeria, which resulted in the first attempt at a 
comprehensive report on “pagan administration” in northern Nigeria 46 The report 
distinguished administrations under which decentralised societies had been placed 
and criticised the continued use of alien District Heads. In 1925, Clifford proposed to 
remove Jos Plateau from Bauchi province, bringing the region from mines up to 
Akwanga under one administration, which he expected would, “provide in a very 
real sense, a school of pagan administration functioning in the atmosphere 
undisturbed by the alien influence of the Emirates.”47 The opposition to Clifford’s 
reforms in the Colonial Office, however, made his position in Nigeria unattainable. 
In 1925, there was a sharp change in the high command of Nigeria and Herbert 
Richmond Palmer took over as Governor from Clifford.
Palmer returned to the Lugardian path of administration. He carried out the 
re-organisation of the Northern Provinces and in 1926, abolished Nasarawa province 
and created Plateau province. Palmer also encouraged the study of “pagan” 
institutions. He had himself rebuilt Bomo on the traditional Kanuri lines after 
investigations and, having adapted the Hausa-Fulani emirate model to Kanuri
45 NAK SNP 9/830: Mada District, Plateau Province-Administration of, 1922.
46 NAK SNP 7/11325: G.J.F. Tomlinson Report of, February 1924.
47 NAK SNP7/11996: Clifford to Secretary of State, January 1925.
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t i t  4 3institutions, he sought to extend this process to the decentralised societies. His 
view of the administration of the decentralised societies was that it should be based 
on amalgamation, using any organisation that existed. Thus, Palmer created bigger 
tribal chiefs and began the rationalisation and legitimisation of imposed District 
Heads over some communities, notably in Jama’a and other lowland divisions of 
Plateau province.49 The effect of Palmer’s reform of the provincial and divisional 
boundaries, headquarters and names was to emphasise the hierarchical aspect of the 
emirate model at the expense of indigenous institutions. The territorial authority of 
chiefs and District Heads, whether alien or not, was reaffirmed and was extended 
over tribal authorities, which were incorporated into the territorial structure of the 
emirate Native Authorities. In Akwanga, the name of the division was changed to 
Southern Division, Mama district was incorporated into Wamba under a Muslim 
District Head and the names of the districts were also changed. North Mada and 
South Mada became Nunku and Wana respectively while Nungu became Wamba 
district.50 The headquarters of the division was transferred fr om Akwanga to Wamba 
town. Thus, Akwanga was redesigned on the basis of territorial rather than tribal 
districts. But Palmer’s application of indirect rule system in the “pagan” areas was 
reversed by events in southern Nigeria. The Warn tax riots of 1927 and Aba riots of 
December 1929 were seen as the result of a misapplication of the emirate indirect 
rule model, which led to the first serious investigation of traditional authority and 
boundaries.51 Furthermore, the arrival of Donald Cameron in 1931 as the successor
48 Ballard, “Pagan Administration,” p.9.
49 Ibid.
50 NAK Jos Prof 208 Vol. II: Gazetteer of Plateau Province, 1930; NAK SNP17/11263: Notes on 
Akwanga Division by Captain Masterton Smith, 1928.
51 H.A, Gailey, The Road to Aba: A Study o f British Administrative Policy in Eastern Nigeria 
(London, 1970), pp. 135-55.
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o f  Palmer ended the whole application o f  the emirate model o f  indirect rule in the 
“pagan” areas o f  Nigeria.
Figure 3.2: The Native Administration central office, Wamba, built in 1930
Donald Cameron, a progressive colonial administrator who served as 
Clifford’s C hief Secretary, became the new Governor-General o f  Nigeria and his 
idea o f  indirect rule was again different to that o f  Lugard and Palmer. He arrived 
with a mandate to apply his experience in reforming native administration in 
Tanganyika. Cameron refuted what he considered to be “unhallowed policy 
insidiously introduced during the latter half o f  the last decade o f  thinking o f  the 
Moslem Emirates in terms o f  the Indian states.” Indirect rule, according to him, 
was a system o f  local government that rested on the ability o f  colonial officers to 
identify and locate the origin o f  pre-colonial authorities within and amongst the 
Nigerian communities.53 In order to identify the basis o f  the “traditional tribal 
authority,” he ordered research to be done into the nature and structure o f  the pre-
52 PRO CO 583/173: Cameron to Passfield, December 1931.
53 D. Cameron, The Principles o f  Native Administration and their Application (Lagos, 1934), p.91.
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colonial political organisations and institutions of all the communities in Nigeria. 
This was used as a basis for the new strategy. Cameron saw native administration in 
a tribal framework, and sought to replace the territorial basis of authority, which was 
implicit in the emirate model. Guidelines were given to colonial officials involved in 
conducting the enquiries. According to Cameron:
The proper way to search out that authority is from the bottom.
Build from the bottom; do not attempt, as I found in Nigeria when I 
returned in 1931, to make as it were, a crown or a king at the top 
and then try to find something underneath on which it might 
(perhaps) appropriately placed. Begin with the people in the lower 
course of the structure, the family first, the extended family, 
whatever it may be, that they all acknowledge as the authority that 
has regulated the society of the unit according to their own law and 
custom.54
The result of these enquiries became the basis for the reorganisation of the 
local administration that began under Cameron, which was rooted in pre-colonial 
sources of political authority and the Native Authority systems. The first group that 
began to receive attention in northern Nigeria were the Tiv, because the appointment 
of District Heads amongst them had created tension. This drew the attention of local 
colonial officers to the need for a more thorough investigation of Tiv society. As a 
result of these investigations, Tiv administration was rebuilt on the basis of three-tier 
councils, within a newly consolidated Tiv Division.55 The impact of Cameron’s
54 NAK Jos Prof 1512: Pagan Administration, Notes for the Guidance of Officers Engaged in 
Enquiries connected with, 1931.
55 D.C. Dorward, “The Development of the British Colonial Administration Among the Tiv, 1900- 
1949,” African Affairs, 68 (1969), p.60.
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reform reached Akwanga in 1933, when he was able to appoint Mr. Browne as his 
Chief Commissioner. Browne was an experienced Resident in the “pagan” areas 
under Palmer and he had a longstanding disagreement with Palmer on his application 
of the indirect rule system amongst the decentralised societies. Cameron also 
appointed Arden-Clarke, who served in Akwanga in the 1920s, as his Chief Adviser 
on native administration. Armed with people of vast experience of the decentralised 
societies, Cameron began his changes of native administration in Nigeria. Thus, in 
line with his belief that political authority had to be sought from below, Cameron 
ordered intelligence reports to be made on each district, tribe and clan in all the 
“pagan” areas of Nigeria. Whereas the ethnographic surveys of the 1920s were aimed 
at discovering underlying unities among the decentralised groups, on the basis of 
which they might be organised from above under paramount chiefs, the intelligence 
reports were intended to provide organisation from below, on the basis of local 
acceptance and recognition of legitimate authority. In place of the uniform emirate 
model, Cameron’s instructions laid out four possible types of native administration: 
tribal chief, federation of chiefs, tribal council (with rotating chairman or a District 
Officer as chairman), and clan or village councils.56 As a result, the N.A and 
divisional structure of Benue and Plateau provinces were substantially redesigned. 
The Eggon intelligence report, for example, apart from giving a detailed historical 
background of the people, recommended the formation of three federal units and the 
appointment of the councils of the several constituent clans as Native Authorities.57 
However, at the end of 1934, Cameron left Nigeria and by 1936, the revolution of 
“pagan” administration was ended. According to the Secretary of Northern 
Provinces:
56 Ballard, “Pagan Administration,” p.9.
57 NAK SNP 17/23691: The Eggon Tribal Area, Summary of Intelligence Report on, 1935.
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The basic reason of a re-organisation is to remedy discontent 
and mal-administration. If the people are content with their 
present form of government, then by all means leave them 
alone. There is no point in making changes in which appear to 
be theoretically correct though they are in fact not really 
needed.58
The doctrine of indirect rule system fashioned by Lugard, Clifford, Palmer 
and Cameroon, except on the question of emphasis in the limit of the authority of the 
chiefs, agreed on the essential concept. In a series of instructions, they defined and 
redefined the basic principles of indirect rule (Lugard in his memoranda, Clifford in 
his minutes, and Cameron in his own memoranda). This, however, created a 
disjointed policy of native administration amongst the “tribal” societies and when 
Lord Hailey made a survey of native administration throughout Nigeria in 1940, he 
found a variety of systems in operation in the “pagan” areas of the north. In Kabba 
province, the native administration relied on nominal clan heads while Plateau 
province had a varied assortment of tribal councils, village group councils and 
chiefs-in-council.59
The application of indirect rule system as a theory and administrative practice 
throughout Nigeria was criticised by Lord Hailey. Indirect rule, he argued, “has not 
only its unresolved problems, but some noticeable points of weakness.”60 He further 
argued that the system has passed through three stages, first of a useful 
administrative device, then that of a political doctrine, and finally that of religious
58 NAK SNP 6/29109: Secretary Northern Provinces to Chief Secretary, 28 May 1936.
59 NAK SNP 17/29109: Secretary of Northern Provinces to Chief Secretary, 1940.
60 Lord Hailey, An African Survey: A Study o f Problems Arising in Africa South o f the Sahara 
(Revised Edition: London, 1957), p.573.
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dogma. According to him, “we must not act as if the system had come to us graven 
on tablets of brass.”61 Similarly, Crocker, a colonial officer in central Nigeria, argued 
that indirect rule became “a formula as hieratic and as dead of creative development 
as an outworn theology.”62 He stressed:
Indirect rule degenerated firstly into a systematic glorification of a 
number of able but unscrupulous careerists, secondly into the 
practice of preserving at all costs the status and power of the 
families of the hereditary Emirs and chiefs, and thirdly into an 
undue preoccupation with Islam and the Emirates to the neglect of 
the pagan peoples.63
Colonial Officers who failed to be “indirect” enough were often punished by not 
getting promotion; therefore, the system inhibited change and progress. Crocker, 
gave an example,
When Cadets and quite junior A.D.Os asked, how are you going to 
develop these Emirates, which you have turned into medieval 
monarchies, into modem states, or communities? Or how can most 
tribal societies by developing along their own lines grow into a 
society equal to modem life? Such men were quickly marked down 
as temperamentally unsuited for life in Nigeria. No more damning 
remark could be made in the annual secret report on an officer than 
that he was “direct” or not sufficiently imbued with the spirit of 
indirect rule.64
61 Ibid.
62 W.R. Crocker, Nigeria: A Critique o f British Colonial Administration (London, 1936), p.215.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid, p.217.
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Other colonial officers like Kenneth Bradley compared indirect rule with the 
way public schools were managed.65 The values inculcated in public schools, which 
includes leadership, firmness and fairness were qualities according to him, needed in 
dealing with the “natives.” However, as John Hobson has observed, the values of the 
public school encouraged “imperialism masquerading as patriotism, militarism, 
chauvinism, arrogance and over-weaning self-confidence.”66
Generally, the introduction of the Native Authority system in Akwanga based 
on the principle of indirect rule transformed the political landscape of the region. The 
major change was the creation of the offices of District Heads, who subsequently 
became chiefs in their respective Districts. Thus, the pre-colonial authority of the 
elders began to wane and the new British appointed District Heads were given 
powers and status that had no traditional basis. For example, the colonial government 
through legislation enhanced their authority over the Native Authorities. The Native 
Law Number 43 of 1933 gave the ‘Sole Native Authorities’ statutory power to 
overrule their advisory councils and therefore the Native Administration provided the 
District Heads with the political means of exercising authority at the local level.67 
After the Second World War, there was an unexpected development among the 
decentralised groups in central Nigeria as the appointed District Heads requested the 
creation of paramount chiefs in the region. Since there was no traditional basis for 
such chieftaincies, these demands were initially discouraged, but after consistent 
pressure by the various Native Authorities, the chiefly offices were eventually 
sanctioned in 1946-47. The demand for chiefs in central Nigeria, according to
65 K. Bradley, Once a District Officer (London, 1966), p. 15.
66 J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (Third Edition: London, 1988), p.43.
67 PRO CO 847/25/47234: Memorandum on Factors Affecting Native Administration Policy (no 
date).
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Ballard, was based on the desire, “to provide a broker between the council and the 
provincial administration, and in each case the first chiefs were primarily for their 
education and administrative competence.”68 There was also the desire to obtain 
political status and recognition for the local chiefs through membership of the 
Northern House of Chiefs, which was a powerful and influential body in the 
Northern Region of Nigeria. Thus, the demand was to transform the District Heads 
into paramount chiefs like those of the emirates. In Akwanga, the demand was to 
transform the three Distr ict Heads of the division into chiefs of the three major tribes: 
Eggon, Mada and Rindre. When the colonial government sanctioned these demands, 
the District Head of Wana became Aren Eggon (chief of Eggon); the District Head of 
Nunku became Chun Mada (chief of Mada) and the District Head of Wamba became 
Oriye Rindre (chief of Rindre).69 Thus, the office of District Head that the British 
created in Akwanga became indigenised and it is to the present day looked upon as a 
symbol of political identity and unity amongst the local people.
ORGANS OF THE NATIVE ADMINISTRATION
The treasury was an integral part of the Native Administration. Public funds 
for northern Nigeria came partly out of the Governor’s central budget and partly out 
of the native treasury for each province. In Akwanga, the four districts had a 
combined treasury in Wamba, the divisional headquarters. The treasury was 
supposed to be at the disposal of the District Heads, but the extent of their control of 
it was strictly supervised and audited by a colonial officer. The first native treasuries 
to be established in northern Nigeria were those of Kano and Katsina in 1910. The 
need for the establishment of the treasuries arose from the early experience of the
68 Ballard, “Pagan Administration,” p. 14.
69 Interview at Wamba with Alhaji Yusuf Waju, 15 April 2004.
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colonial government regarding the share of tax given to the Native Administrations. 
The establishment of native treasuries was approved by Sir Hesketli Bell, (the then 
Governor of northern Nigeria). This scheme was extended to Nasarawa province in 
1911 and by 1914 most of the provinces and divisions had established their native 
treasuries.70 As already mentioned, the native treasury in Akwanga was established 
in 1914 and the District Officer proceeded to recruit a treasurer or ma’aji, the first 
being a Hausa man from Zaria.71 All the revenues due to the government were 
collected and paid into the treasury and were kept in the strong room, which had 
three keys and were held by the ma 'aji and the District Officer.72 Lugard’s Political 
Memorandum Number 9 has outlined the spending limits of the native treasury. For 
example, a first class chief was authorised to spend up to £1,000 annually in non­
recurrent expenditure, while a third class chief was allowed only £100.73 Any surplus 
from the treasury was to be handed over to the Governor for “works of public utility” 
to prevent chiefs from misappropriating the funds on projects that were 
unimportant.74 Therefore, part of the revenue generated was used to pay the salaries 
of the Native Administration employees and part was for education and public 
works. Akwanga had difficulty in producing a surplus and also did not have any 
taxable resources to generate revenue for the treasury. The little resources the 
treasury did have were spent on a long list of personal emoluments paid out to the 
Native Administration staff. For instance, between 1928 and 1929, the District Heads 
had large salaries of £120 per annum whilst the scribes received salaries of £36.75
70 NAK SNP 7/2193: Nasarawa Province, Summary of Events in, 1911; NAK SNP 10/11 p/1913: Beit- 
af-Mal, Revenue and Expenditure, 1912.
71 NAK Jos Prof 248/1920: Southern Division Report for the Year 1914; Ames, Plateau Province, 
p.44.
72 Interview with Malam Yakubu Alhaji Yusuf at Andaha, 11 November 2003.
73 Lugard, Political Memoranda, pp.333-335.
74 Ibid.
75 NAK Jos Prof 14/1929: Akwanga Division Report for the Year 1928.
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The District Officer was alarmed by the rate at which the treasury resources were 
being drained and reported, “I fear the rather swollen salary list is a relic of what may 
be termed the Nasarawa regime.”76 Salaries accounted for approximately 84 per cent 
of the total expenditure of the native treasury, which meant that there was not much 
money left for public works and development.77 The head of the treasury had an 
assistant, whose duties included the preparation of vouchers, keeping of all prison 
books and Native Administration store books and the counting of revenue brought 
into the treasury.78 The accounts of the treasury were prepared and kept by the ma ’aji 
in the cashbook, daily abstract, tax account and service ledger.79 These accounts were 
checked monthly by a political officer and also subject to periodical surprise checks 
of both accounts and cash balances.
The native treasury also had a reserve fund, which was a necessary back-up 
for unforeseen contingencies. However, most of the funds were actually used in 
assisting Britain in times of crisis. For example, following the outbreak of the First 
World War, the Native Authorities in northern Nigeria contributed £53,041 in 1916 
and £50,905 in 1919.80 At the end of 1915, the reserve funds of northern Nigeria 
totalled £121,449,2d, of which £56,445.10s.lid was invested in various stocks 
abroad and £65,003.10s.3d was deposited with the Nigerian government.81 This 
shows that the surpluses generated by the NAs were not used for their development, 
but rather for the interests of the colonising power. The colonial government was in 
control of the native treasuries as they determined the expenditure of the NAs. Once
761bid.
77 Ibid.
78 Interview with Malam Yalcubu Alhaji Yusuf at Andaha, 11 November 2003.
79 Ames, Plateau Province, pp.44-46.
so NAK SNP8 140/1915: Lugard to Colonial Office, 1916; NAIL SNP8 11/1919: Annual War 
Contributions by Native Administration, 1920.
81 O. Ikime, “The British and Native Administration Finance in Northern Nigeria 1900-1934,” Journal 
o f the Historical Society o f Nigeria, 7 (1975), pp.679-680.
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a British political officer had helped the NAs to draw up their estimates, they were 
expected to stick by it and had no powers to exceed the limit approved. Therefore, 
the native treasury fitted into the British system of indirect rule system because by 
enabling political officers to control the finances of the NAs, it ensured a degree of 
subordination. Unlike the northern emirates, the chiefs in Akwanga had no access to 
the treasury at Wamba because they were considered not be “sufficiently 
responsible.”82 Therefore, the treasury was in direct control of the District Officer.
Another important institution that helped in the sustenance of colonial rule in 
Akwanga was the Native Authority court. The courts had no jurisdiction to try “non­
natives” and only British courts dealt with offences against public order.83 The native 
courts generally entertained civil cases arising from marriage relations, debts and 
inheritance. As a rule, the native courts had no powers to try soldiers and the police 
for criminal offences.84 The court proceedings in the native courts were brief and, in 
matrimonial and debt cases, it was only the names of the parties, the decision made
oc t tand the fees that were entered into the record books. The organisation of the courts
in Akwanga in the 1930s was as follows:
District Grade Members Others
Wana C District Head (President), Village 
Heads of Alogani, Galle, Wulko, 
Wakama, Wangibi and Ungwashem.
1 Scribe, 1 
Messenger and 
Yandoka
Nunku C District Head (President), Village 
Heads of Nunku, Ancho Babba, 
Niddan, Ungwa Durumi, Muchu, 
Nunkuchu.
Maichibi, Yandoka 
and a Scribe shared 
with Wamba.
Wamba C District Head (President) assisted by 
his brother who was also the Scribe of 
the court.
1 Scribe shared with 
Nunku, 1 Messenger 
and Yandoka.
Mama D Village Head of Kwarra (President), 1 Scribe, 1
82 Ames, Plateau Province, pp.48-49.
S3 Lugard, Political Memoranda, p.277.
84 Ibid.
85 This is evident in most of the files of court cases at the National Archive, Kaduna
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Village Heads of Mama, Jimiya, 
Marhai and Arum.
Messenger
Yandoka.
and
Table 3.: .: Native Authority Courts in Akwanga in the 1930s.
Source: NAK Jos Prof 44/1932: Southern Division Report on for 1931-32
The Wana court sat every Friday of the week, while that of Nunku sat every 
Saturday of the week. The court scribe of Nunku was shared with Wamba. Fie 
remained in Nunku during the period of tax collection.86 The court at Mama was 
established at the end of 1926 and all the Village Heads were represented except the 
Village Head of Yashim.87
The native courts had jurisdiction to entertain both civil and criminal cases in 
their respective districts. The following table shows the number of cases that were 
heard in the native courts of the four districts between 1926 and 1931:
Wana Nunku Wamba Mama
Civil Criminal Civil Criminal Civil Criminal Civil Criminal
1926 46 179 20 73 39 95 37 45
1927 23 174 12 68 32 69 84 83
1928 45 120 99 95 32 74 109 115
1929 56 139 76 78 68 117 61 108
1930 105 109 40 94 183 181 44 64
1931 122 106 55 86 107 131 57 74
Table 3.2: Number of cases heard in the native courts between 1926 and 1931 
Source: NAK Jos Prof 44/1932: Southern Division Report on for 1931-32
This table shows that the majority of cases hied between 1926 and 1931 were 
criminal matters. People generally preferred to settle civil cases out of court because
• » * R8they had little faith in tlie NA courts, which were smeared with corruption. The 
District Heads and village heads, being the presidents and members of the native 
courts respectively, were corrupt in carrying out their administrative and judicial
36 NAK Jos Prof 44/1932: Southern Division Report on for 1931-32.
37 NAK Jos Prof 31/1928: Akwanga Division Annual Report 1927.
33 Interview with Malam Audu Usman at Akwanga, 10 March 2003; Interview with Dauda Madaki at 
Abu, 26 November 2003.
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functions. Since the appointment of the village heads depended on the approval of 
the District Heads, they often worked in concert with each other and were accused of 
receiving bribes from litigants, giving warrants for arrests and issuing illegal court 
orders. For example, the village head of Wulko was accused of being irregular in his 
court attendance and entertaining cases from his house.89 He was accused of 
receiving bribes from litigants and in a particular case, he granted a divorce to a 
woman to enable his son marry her without following the due process of the law.90 
The District Officer had to intervene by revoking the divorce order.
Village heads were also notorious for defying anything that threatened their 
position or interests. For example, Anja, the village head of Raga was convicted in 
1927 for resisting the authority of the native court and was sentenced to three months 
imprisonment.91 After serving his prison sentence, Anja left Raga and settled at 
Sanga in Jama’a division.92 The members of the native courts did not only receive 
bribes, but they also stole from the court. For example, in June 1942, Yamusa, the 
chief of Mada stole money from the native court. A man named Guni was accused of 
making a woman’s husband impotent through witchcraft and was fined £3, which
* * 93was not entered m the court’s register.
However, the Native Authority Courts, when they were used, had the power 
to sanction punishments for offenders in accordance with the provisions of the law. 
The choices they had were imprisonment, fines or flogging; all of which were 
dependant on the nature of offence committed. The table below shows the 
punishments that were handed out by the courts between 1926 and 1930:
89 NAK Jos Prof 44/1932: Southern Division Report on for 1931-32.
90 Namo et ai, group interview at Wulko; NAK Jos Prof 44/1932: Southern Division Report on for 
1931-32.
91 NAK Jos Prof 31/1928: Akwanga Division Annual Report, 1927.
92 Interview with Dauda Madaki at Abu, 26 November 2003.
93 NAK Jos PROF 5422: Southern Division Half Yearly and Annual Report, 1943; NAK Jos Prof 
5061: Nunku District Administration, 1942.
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Wana Nunku Warn 3a Mama
Imp Fine Flog Imp Fine Flog Imp Fine Flog Imp Fine Flog
1926 30 99 30 9 36 4 5 44 14 1 5 3
1927 55 110 47 37 80 8 8 75 8 7 52 24
1928 46 53 81 21 98 59 9 66 18 14 55 60
1929 59 43 174 15 57 28 14 72 34 5 64 68
1930 53 31 136 18 58 81 39 89 93 6 61 39
Table 3.3: Punishment handed out by the Native Courts between 1926 and 1930 
Source: NAK Jos Prof 44/1932: Southern Division Report on for 1931-32
The courts generally preferred to hand out forms of punishment (fines and flogging) 
other than imprisonment. This could possibly be explained in two ways. Firstly, by 
the small size of the NA prison, which allowed only a maximum of 60 prisoners. The 
figures above show that the highest number of offenders sentenced to imprisonment 
was 59 in 1929. Secondly, the native court, being an aim of the colonial government, 
was more interested in handing out fines in order to raise revenue, which the NA 
desperately needed. The statistics for Nunku district between 1926 and 1929 for 
example shows that the number of fines handed out were far more than other 
punishments. Flogging was sometimes preferred to imprisonment in order to cut 
down running costs. However, fines were the best option for the NAs because 
imprisonment attracted other expenses (i.e. feeding, clothing and guarding the 
prisoners), a cost which the colonial government was desperate to avoid. Following 
the amalgamation of Wamba and Mama districts in 1933, the court at Mama was 
reorganised. The Grade CD’ court at Kwarra that had jurisdiction over the whole of 
Mama district was scrapped and replaced with four new Grade CD’ courts instituted 
at Kwarra, Arum, Mangar and Jimiya.94 The Grade CC’ court at Wamba acted as an 
appeal court and any crime that potentially deserved more than two months 
imprisonment was tided at Wamba.
NAK Jos Prof 35/1934: Southern Division, Report on for 1933.
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There was also the alkali’s (judge’s) court that was responsible for the 
settlement of disputes between the immigrant groups in the division. The court was 
revived on 15 October 1926 and given ‘C’ grade powers with a new alkali (judge) 
brought from Bauchi.95 The court was located at Akwanga and had jurisdiction over 
the whole division despite the fact that the native courts were independent of each 
other. Although the colonial administration considered it convenient for an alkali to 
be available to settle cases concerning Muslims and other immigrants, the wisdom 
behind the practice and its existence in an “entirely pagan area” was questioned.96 
The alkali’s court was eventually discontinued however, as the native courts were 
given jurisdiction to fry cases involving all “Africans” in their districts.97
Another integral part of the NA were the yandoka or law enforcement agents, 
who were responsible for the maintenance of law and order in all the districts of 
Akwanga. Their other duties included making civil arrests, accompanying District 
Heads on tours for tax assessment and collection, providing escorts for prisoners or 
money and maintaining law and order at mining camps and at railway stations.98 The 
yandoka evolved from the dogarai (body guards) who were hitherto personal guards 
to the emirs before the advent of the British rule in northern Nigeria. However, the 
services of most of the dogarai ended in 1928 (with the exception of Kano) when 
colonial officials began to investigate the better organisation, training and discipline 
of the police force.99 Therefore, the yandoka came to replace the dogarai as the NA 
police with the aim of having a better police force to assist in the maintenance of 
colonial law and order. Before the establishment of the police training college at
95 NAK Jos Prof 58/1927: Akwanga Division Report on for the Year 1926.
96 NAK Jos Prof 14/1929: Akwanga Division Report for 1928.
97 NAK Jos Prof 208/1918 Volume II: Gazetteer Plateau Province 1918-33.
98 Interview with Sergeant Buba (retired), at Andaha, 12 March 2004. He was the head of the police in 
charge of Nunku district.
99 T.N, Tamuno, The Police in Modern Nigeria: Origins, Development and Role, 1861-1965 (Ibadan, 
1970), p.93.
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Kaduna in 1929, there was no systematic training programme o f  the yandoka  in 
northern Nigeria. The Inspector-General o f  police in 1928 prescribed a course o f  
“simple preliminary training” at the provincial headquarters for NA police 
detachment.100 In Akwanga, the yandoka  were sent in batches o f  three to the 
provincial headquarters at Jos to attend training sessions which lasted for three 
months.101 Most o f  the yandoka  were uneducated and therefore found their training 
difficult. Although the medium o f  instruction at the training centre at Jos was Hausa, 
some o f  the recruits neither spoke nor understood the language, which made it 
problematic.102 For example, one o f  them returned from the course with the comment 
‘useless’ from the police superintendent.103
Figure 3.3: The Yandoka Barracks at Andaha, built in the 1930s
The yandoka  were stationed in each district, with the sarkin yandoka  (head o f  
the NA police) in Wamba, the divisional headquarters. In 1932, there were 27 
yandoka, a number which had increased to 29 by 1942.104 Before the 1940s, the 
working conditions o f  NA police service were not good enough to attract a large 
number o f  literate people. The salary structure was relatively low and the
100 Ibid, pp. 100-101.
101 NAK Jos Prof 4825:Southem Division, Half Yearly and Annual Report 1942.
102 Interview with Sergeant Buba (retired) at Andaha 12 March 2004.
103 NAK Jos Prof 6004: Southern Division, Half Yearly and Annual Report 1944.
11)4 NAK Jos Prof 44/1932: Southern Division, Report on for 1931-32.
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accommodation in barracks was inadequate. In appearance, the new NA police were 
distinguished from those who continued in the personal services o f  the chiefs as 
dogarai by the uniform they wore. The NA police uniform consisted o f  black shorts; 
short sleeved shirts, red belts, shoes and long stockings while those o f  the dogarai 
were big gowns with red and blue stripes, and a turban.105 The colonial government 
through ordinances gave the chiefs power to hire the NA police for the maintenance 
o f  law and order in their respective domains.106 This meant that those that were 
employed became loyal to the chiefs and not the people they were serving. 
Therefore, they became an extension o f  the c h ie fs  dogarai in suppressing any 
opposition to his authority.
The NA prison was another important institution o f  colonial rule in Akwanga. 
There was no government prison in the division and therefore those convicted in the 
provincial and magistrate courts were sent to Kaduna or Jos for imprisonment, 
according to the length o f  their sentences.
Figure 3.4: The Native Administration Prison at Wamba, built in 1930
105 Interview with Hassan Usman at Akwanga, 14 March 2004.
106 P.T. Ahire, Imperial Policing: The Emergence and Role o f  the Police in Colonial Nigeria 1860- 
1960 (Milton Keynes, 1991), p.46.
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The NA prison was originally in Akwanga town, but following the transfer of the 
divisional headquarters to Wamba in 1930 the prison was also moved there. Serving 
prisoners were involved in the construction of the new prison and assisted in the 
building of the Native Administration offices in order to save labour costs. The 
accommodation in the new prison at Wamba was calculated by the regulation 
amount of cubic space for sixty prisoners.107 Prison staff consisted of one chief 
warder (sarkin yciri) a fluctuating number of warders and, when the need arose, a 
wardress, to look after female prisoners. The NA prison maintained a farm, which 
grew food required for the prisoners, who were also employed on the prison’s ginger 
and groundnut farms.108 Duties performed by prisoners consisted mainly of tending 
prison farms, repairing Native Administration buildings, clearance work in the town 
and station and the performance of sanitary labour.109 The prisoners were also, from 
time to time, detailed to assist the dispensary attendants in providing fuel and boiling 
water as required and in keeping the dispensary clean.110 They used local cloths and 
blankets (gwado), material for which was brought from Keffi, while the local cloth 
was made at Wana.111 The prisoners were fed at the expense of the colonial 
government and were regularly inspected by a Medical Officer. It was estimated in 
1933 that the NA prison cost about £330 a year to “guard, feed and maintain.”112
107 NAK Jos Prof 3418: Southern Division Half Yearly and Annual Report, 1939.
108 Ibid.
109 Interview with the late Musa Gun at Wamba, 22 May 2002.
110 NAK Jos Prof 2964: Southern Division Half Yearly and Annual Report, 1938.
111 NAK Jos Prof 3875: Southern Division Half Yearly and Annual Report, 1940.
112 NAK Jos Prof 208/1918: Gazetteer Plateau Province, 1933.
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Figure 3.5: Prison quarters, Wamba, built in 1930
During the 1940s, the prison building outlived its usefulness and the Resident o f  
Plateau province commented, “whatever may have been its merits in the past, it has 
now outlived them. A good permanent type building is overdue and should be 
don e...” 113 Although there have been some alterations to the original structure o f  the 
prison, the 1930s colonial prison still, to this day, serves as the only government 
prison in the area.
CONCLUSION
The colonial conquest o f  Akwanga was a clear indication o f  the consolidation 
o f  British rule in the area. This is not to suggest that the local people did not resist the 
political changes that were brought by the colonising power. The difficulty in 
applying the principle o f  native administration based on the system o f  indirect rule 
resulted in a series o f  modifications to the system to fit in with local customs and
113 NAK Jos Prof 6004: Southern Division Half Yearly and Annual Report 1944.
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traditions. As a result, the new office of District Head that was created had adverse 
consequences for the peoples of Akwanga. The pre-colonial gerontocratic system 
was replaced by these British appointed ‘chiefs’, leading to a decline in the authority 
of the elders. The peoples of Akwanga however, took the initiative to demand the 
creation of paramount chiefs in their localities. When the transformation of the 
District Heads into chiefs was eventually sanctioned in 1946, the chieftaincy stool 
became indigenised in the process of the colonial experience. The institutions of 
Chun Mada and Aren Eggon are still looked upon as symbols of ethnic identity and 
unity to the present day.
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CHAPTER FOUR
TAXATION AND CASH CROP PRODUCTION, 1908-1945
This chapter looks at the impact of taxation and cash crop production on the 
peoples of Akwanga. The colonial conquest of the region was carried out simultaneously 
with the imposition of taxes. This was seen as a token of submission by the conquered 
people and the revenue generated was used in financing the administrative structures 
that were being created. The colonial conquest of Akwanga was followed by the 
imposition of direct taxation in 1908. The peoples in the area were not used to paying 
taxes and therefore when it was first introduced, resisted its payment. Before the 
introduction of an acceptable currency, taxes were paid in kind from 1908 to 1921. After 
1922, the new colonial currency became widespread and people began to pay their tax in 
cash.
The imposition of taxation and the pressure mounted by law enforcement agents 
meant that people had to engage in cash crop production in order to meet their tax 
obligations. Communities were encouraged to produce export crops in order to boost 
their income for tax purposes. The colonial government at various stages encouraged the 
production of ginger and groundnuts, which the farmers reluctantly integrated into their 
agricultural system. However, the peoples of Akwanga did not earn their income from 
export crop production, but by exporting foodstuffs to the mining camps in Jos and 
Wamba. The tin mining industry provided readily available market for the surplus food
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crops produced in the division and the development of the mining sector was directly 
linked to the cash crop production in Akwanga.
COLONIAL TAXATION
After the colonial conquest of Sokoto and Kano in 1903, the British government 
gave an Imperial Grant-in-aid of £405,000 for the 1903/1904 financial year in order to 
fund the colonial administration in northern Nigeria.1 The financial subsidy was scaled 
down after the amalgamation of northern Nigeria with the south in 1914. British 
economic policy, like that of other European powers in Africa, encouraged its colonies 
to be financially self-supporting. In other words, local people had to pay for their own 
conquest, exploitation and administration. Hence, the revenue for the establishment and 
sustenance of colonial structures had to be generated internally. The difficulty was that 
northern Nigeria was neither producing surplus nor did it have any taxable resources. As 
observed by Cain and Hopkins, “the fundamental and persistent difficulty faced by 
colonial officials in tropical Africa was how to generate taxable resources in territories 
which were generally poor and rarely came with a ready made tax base.” The success of 
the colonial administration depended on much needed revenue and as Lugard made it 
clear, “no system can be effective unless it enjoys some measure of financial 
independence.”3
The Provincial Residents that were appointed by Lugard to administer the newly 
acquired territories of northern Nigeria were in the forefront of the support for the
1 C.W.J. Orr, The Making o f  Northern Nigeria (London, 1911), p. 150.
2 P. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 1914-1990 (London, 1993), 
pp.204-205.
3 Lugard, Dual Mandate, p.230.
167
imposition of taxes on the local people. Mr Temple, Resident of Kano, commented that 
the “authority of native over native and all recognition of authority by natives was based 
on collection and payment of some kind of material tribute, i.e., rent, taxes, presents.”4 
Amongst the “tribal” peoples of Nasarawa province, the payment of tax or tribute was 
considered to be an “outward and visible token of submission.”5 The imposition of direct 
taxation was therefore to demonstrate the transfer of sovereignty from the colonised 
peoples to their colonisers. Direct taxation was enforced as the basis of the whole 
revenue system in northern Nigeria. In 1904, Lugard enacted a Land Revenue 
Proclamation which gave the government rights to a certain proportion of the tribute 
paid by the agricultural and pastoral population in respect o f their land and produce.6 
Lugard accepted direct taxation as an essential feature of the new native administration. 
His political memorandum Number 5, on taxation, emphasised that direct taxation was 
preferable to tariffs. Lugard’s insistence on direct taxation was based on the following: 
that direct taxes were “contributions towards the cost of administration, which are 
recognised among all civilised nations as justly due from the individual;” that taxation 
was “a moral benefit to the people by stimulating industry and production;” that the 
“result (the government) aims at is to emancipate the people from indolence on the one 
hand and forced services on the other and to raise them to a plane of greater communal 
and individual responsibility.”7 Direct taxation was also aimed at providing income for 
the ruling classes, which according to Lugard lost their sources of revenue with the 
abolition of slavery and slave raids. He argued that the rulers were “provided with
4 NAK SNP7/10 No 3635: Kano Provincial Report for half year ended 30 June 1909.
5 NAK SNP 9/2946/1924: Nasarawa Province, Unsettled Districts, 1923.
6 Colonial Report No. 476: Taxation in Northern Nigeria, Journal o f  the African Society xvii (1905), 
p.312. (No author).
7 Lugard, Political Memoranda, pp. 166-69.
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legitimate incomes, and all other forms of exaction from peasantry can be declared 
illegal and suppressed.”8 Therefore, direct taxation according to Lugard was aimed at 
providing paid salaries for public work and also income for the ruling classes without 
reducing them to poverty.9 Another benefit of direct taxation according to Lugard was to 
promote an intimate relationship between the British staff and the colonised peoples. He 
maintained that the District Officer must be on tour and at each village he “should 
simultaneously involve the settlement of ancient disputes, the administration of justice 
[and] the collection of valuable statistics.”10 However, as Gorer observed, “what is the 
object of tours, sometimes accompanied by bloodshed? To bring in taxes...what is the 
object of ethnographical studies? To learn how to govern more subtly so that taxes shall 
come in better.”11
Lugard*s preference for direct taxation was based 011 his inability to raise money 
from indirect sources. He could not raise money through custom duties since the export 
and import trade of the region passed through ports in the south which had their own 
separate administration. At the initial stage of British administration, Lugard attempted 
to impose taxes 011 goods as they crossed the northern frontier from the southern region. 
This became unsatisfactory and after some negotiations by the two governments, 
Southern Protectorate agreed to pay a certain proportion of its customs revenue to
1 9northern Nigeria.
* Ibid, p .167.
9 Lugard, Dual Mandate, p.233.
10 Lugard, Political Memoranda, pp .168-69.
11 G. Gorer, Africa Dances: A Book about West African Negroes (London, 1935), p.92.
12 A. McPhee, The Economic Revolution in British West Africa (London, 1926), p.219.
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The system of direct taxation was already in operation in the emirates of northern 
Nigeria and therefore the principle was not a new one.13 Lugard consolidated the pre­
existing multiplicity of taxes into general tax {haraji) and cattle tax (jangali). General 
tax represented the variety of levies made on settled agriculturists and traders while the 
cattle tax was imposed on the nomadic pastoralists. The cattle tax was 1/6 per head of 
cattle, and (when the sheep and goats were not included in the wealth assessed for the 
general tax) 6d per head of sheep and 3d per head of goats.14 The introduction of haraji 
and jangali was aimed at reducing the number of collectors in order to make its 
collection more effective and efficient.15 Furthermore, in 1910, an attempt was made 
under the Land and Native Rights Proclamation to introduce a general system of seven 
years leaseholds and to secure for the government the whole of the economic rent. 
However, the attempt at the nationalisation of all the lands in the region was abandoned.
The major difficulty that Lugard had to overcome in order to raise revenue 
necessary for the functioning of the native administration was the transition from the 
payments of taxes in kind to cash. Before British control, taxes (where they existed) 
were paid in grain, livestock, cloth, salt and cowries. With the establishment of British 
rule, the colonial government had to make the best use of these items until a coin 
currency could be introduced and be within the reach of all who had to pay taxes. From 
1904 to 1908, the colonial government was ready to accept certain items as payment for 
taxes. The items, according to Lugard, should “easily be convertible into cash, such as 
cotton, livestock, products which could be sold for export, or possibly food which could
13 In Southern Nigeria, there was no system of direct taxation before 1914 except in Benin where it was 
imposed after its conquest in 1897.
14 Colonial Report No. 476: Taxation in Northern Nigeria
15 Orr, Northern Nigeria, p. 162.
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be issued as rations to soldiers or police.”16 The disposal of the taxes paid in kind was 
difficult, however. According to Hall:
The cattle, sheep and goats were at night exchanged by the 
wily until what had been herds of good quality were turned into 
the herds of wasters. The cloth taken in payment (locally made 
cotton goods) immediately attracted the attention of white ants, 
and the corn had to be buried in the ground (and) when dug up
17was found to be mildewed.
The colonial administration was faced with the problem of introducing a new 
currency system that could be utilised in the region, hi 1904, the government declared 
the coinage of the United Kingdom to be legal tender in northern Nigeria. The 
circulation of British currency in Akwanga began to be widespread in the 1920s and the 
first groups of people to receive wages for their services were the District Heads, the 
Native Authority scribes, and yandoka. They became groups of salary earners after the 
consolidation of colonial rule and the subsequent establishment of the native 
administration in the area. The emergence of income earners into the colonial society of 
Akwanga also accelerated the process of cash circulation into the economy. For 
example, in 1933, it was estimated that the mining companies working in the division 
paid about £12,000 a year into the local economy, the Native Administration about 
£3,500 and the colonial government £3000; a total of £18,500 a year.18
16 Lugard, Political Memoranda, p.209.
17 H.C. Hall, Barracks and Bush (London, 1924), pp,108-9.
18 NAK Jos Prof 208/1918 Volume II: Gazetteer Plateau Province, 1933.
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As already mentioned, the system of taxation existed in the emirates, but 
amongst the majority of the “stateless” groups in central Nigeria, there was no pre­
existing tax system before the coming of the British. Communities in the area had a 
minimal amount of tax imposed on them as an acknowledgement of British suzerainty. 
This tax, according to Orr, initially was of a political, moral and social nature rather than 
of financial character.19 He maintained that such taxes brought in little or nothing 
beyond the expenses of collection and of punishing infringements. In Akwanga, the 
beginning of colonial subjugation was accompanied by the imposition of taxes. In 1908, 
a tax of £94.0s.6d was imposed on the Eggon people after their encounter with the 
British. By 1911, a Resident was appointed for the whole division and was charged with 
the responsibility of assessing and collecting taxes. Tax assessments were earned out in 
various forms. At the beginning of British rale, it took the form of small sums collected
as tokens of submission and later it became a capitation tax based on population counts
20which were earned out by an administrative staff. Eventually assessments were made 
based on the wealth of each village and an amount of tax was fixed in proportion to it. 
Household income was assessed by giving a market value to estimated production as if 
such households operated in a market economy. In 1922, Arden-Clarke wrote: “I 
estimate the gross annual income of one average adult Mada [Eggon], whether male or 
female, as £4. Thus one [man] and his wife earn £8 per annum and pay a tax of 3/- or 19 
% of their annual income.”21 In assessing an individual’s income, for example amongst 
the Mada in 1922, the colonial officials carefully measured farmland with tape measures
19 Oit, Northern Nigeria, p. 166.
20 Ames, Plateau Province, p.42.
21 NAK SNP 617/1922: Reassessment Report, Central Mada, 1922.
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improvised out of ropes.22 The assessing officers took into account the amount of land 
under cultivation, crops like dawa (guinea com), and livestock as a basis for assessing 
an individual’s income. A detailed example of tax assessment of some Mada villages is 
shown below:
a) Maiashi of Andaha - 4 males, 5 females - tax to be paid - 131-
Dawa - 34 acres £51.0.0
Acha - 14.1 acres £28.4.0
1 garden £ 2.0.0 
Gross annual income £81.4.0
b) Mainja of Anjagwa - 5 males, 4 females - tax to be paid - 14/-
Dawa - 26 acres £39.00.0
Acha - 10.3 acres £20.12.0
Ridi - 2.9 acres £ 4.07.0
2 gardens £ 4.00.0
16 palm trees £ 3.12.0
6 goats £ 1.10.0
Gross annual income £73.01.0
c ) Magaii of Banin am - 2 males, 2 females - tax to be paid - 6/- 
Dawa - 8.2 acres £12.06.0
Acha - 3.6 acres £ 7.04.0
Yams £ 1.05.0
2 gardens £ 4.00.0
7 palm trees £ 1.11.0
3 sheep, 5 goats £ 2.00.0 
Gross annual income £28.06.6
d) Kwanta of Andaha - 4 males, 2 females - tax to be paid -12/-
Dawa - 18.7 acres £28.01.0
Acha - 6.2 acres £12.08.0
1 Garden £ 2.00.0
Gross annual income £42.09.0
e) Zantok of Nunku - 3 males, 2 females - tax to be paid — 8/-
Dawa - 7.3 acres £10.19.0
Acha - 3.6 acres £ 8.12.0
Garden £ 2.00.0
10 palm trees £ 2.05.0
4 sheep £ 1.00.0
NAK SNP17-K5922: North Mada District, Akwanga Division Reassessment, 1922.
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Gross annual income £24.16.0
f) Sama of Boher - 2 males, 1 female - tax to be paid - 5/-
Dawa - 3.4 acres £ 5.02.0
Acha - 3.6 acres £ 7.04.0
Garden £ 2.00.0
2 palm trees £ 0.09.0
2 goats £ 0.10.0
Gross annual income £15.05.0
g) Sarkin Samari of Nunku - 1 male, 1 female - tax to be paid - 3/- 
Dawa - 2 acres £ 3.00.0
Acha - 2.1 acres £ 4.00.0
1 Garden £ 2.00.0
2 sheep, 1 goat £ 0.15.0 
Gross annual income £ 9.19.0
h) Gumbo of Ningo - 4 males, 3 females - tax to be paid ~ 11 /- 
Dawa - 6.7 acres £10.01.0
Acha - 1.3 acres £ 2.12.0
2 gardens £ 4.00.0
3 sheep £ 0.15.0
Gross annual income £17.08.0
i) Ienko of Ancho Babba - 2 males, 2 females - tax to be paid - 61- 
Dawa - 2.9 acres £ 4.07.0
Acha - 3.5 acres £ 7.00.0
1 Garden £ 2.00.0
6 palm trees £ 1.07.0
1 sheep £ 0.05.0
Gro ss annual income £14.19.0
j) Irwa of Lalle - 1 male, 1 female - tax to be paid - 3/- 
Dawa - 1.3 acres £ 1.19.0
1 Garden £ 2.00.0
2 palm trees £ 0.09.0
Gross annual income £ 4.08.0
Source: NAK SNP17-K5922: North Mada District, Akwanga Division Reassessment, 
1922.
Examples a, b and c above were wealthy families, d, e, f  and g represented four 
families with an average income and the last three, h, i and j, were poor families. The 
number of males in the family, the name o f the family head and his village and the
174
amount of tax to be paid were also given. This clearly shows how detailed the tax 
assessments were when they were carried out by the colonial officials in the districts of 
the division.
Most of the taxes collected in Akwanga before the 1920s were in kind. This was 
because the new British currency was not in wide circulation and wage labour only 
began to be widespread in the 1920s. Before the introduction of British currency, the 
tokens of submission collected by the colonial administration were in grain, livestock 
and other valuable items. The commodification of labour had great consequences on the 
pre-colonial labour arrangements as migrant labour became intensified during the 
colonial period. The migrant labourers were from areas unaffected by the new colonial 
economic developments or alternatively were in search of a cash income to pay their 
taxes. There was the intensification of movement to Warnba - the administrative and 
economic centre o f the division -  and the surrounding villages. In other words, the 
development and expansion of Wamba town and its environs were associated with the 
presence of the mining industry and the opportunities offered by the mining companies 
and the Native Administration. The mining camps attracted people who came from 
different places to earn money by working as labourers. People from the northern and 
southern districts of Akwanga were mostly seasonal migrants, who returned to their 
places of origin after achieving their set targets. The migrants that settled permanently 
were from outside the division and as a result, new settlements were founded while old 
ones expanded rapidly. The new settlements that were established through colonial 
mining included Barikin Mai Gajeren Wando, Gongon, and Rafin Tabo.23 Other villages 
expanded as a result of mining, such as Ninkada, Marmara, Barkin Teacher, Barkin
23 Interview at Akwanga with Mr. Shammah, 13 February 2004.
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Waja and Kango Lawson. Another town that expanded as a result o f labour migration 
was Gudi. The development and subsequent expansion of Gudi was a direct result of the 
railway construction that passed through the area in the 1920s. The Hausa people that 
first came to Gudi were labourers employed in the railway construction who decided to 
settle down after their jobs ended.24 They became involved in trade and farming. This 
negates the claim by some of the Hausa people that they founded Gudi long before the 
Eastern railway construction began.25 Besides the Hausa labourers that came in the 
1920s, there were also Igbo, Tiv and Yoruba, which made the population of Gudi 
cosmopolitan.26 The cosmopolitan nature of the settlement was demonstrated in the 
grade D native court that was established in the area in 1942. It was a mixed court 
comprised of Patrick Okoli (Igbo representative), E.O. Komodi (Yoruba) and malam
27Muhammadu (Hausa), among others. The influx of immigrants into the division 
increased the population. Therefore, migrant labour became a means of procuring a 
livelihood in the new colonial economy.
24 Interview at Gudi with Adamu Slihu, 15 March 2004.
25 Group interview at the District Head’s office in Gudi, 14 March 2004.
26 NAK Jos Prof 5061: Mada District, Administration of, 1943.
27 Ibid.
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Figure 4.1: Alhaji Idirisu being interviewed at Gudi in March 2004
When taxes were first introduced in Akwanga, the people resisted their payment. 
The responses to the series o f  patrols that were carried out in the area between 1910 and 
1925 showed how the local people tried to evade tax payments. There was frustration 
amongst the political officers in Nasarawa province as the people in the area refused to 
pay their tax. The imposition o f direct taxation on the peoples o f  the region became 
difficult, if  not impossible. In 1912, Mr. Larrymore, the Resident o f Nasarawa province, 
observed: “Situated as we are, with so large a percentage o f pagans (about 85% to 90% 
o f our total population), few if any o f the more developed schemes o f taxation employed 
in the Northern Provinces can be utilized, except in our large towns such as Jema’a, 
Keffi, Abuja, Nasarawa, Lafia, Loko and Kotonkarrifi.’’28
At the early stage o f British rule in Nasarawa province, the majority o f the local 
people defaulted on paying their taxes. Tax defaulters were dealt with severely and Mr.
28 NAK SNP7/4781: Nasarawa Province, Taxation System, 1912.
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Larymore recommend that: “non-payers be forced to pay their tax and in addition be 
fined a similar amount for not doing so.”29 Some people had deserted their villages 
during tax collection. For example, when a police patrol under Lt. Routledge visited the 
Mada village of Anji in 1916, it yielded no success because on reaching the village, it 
had been deserted three days earlier.30 The troops only succeeded in capturing a number 
of head of livestock that had been hidden in the bush, which was enough to pay the 
villagers’ tax arrears in 1915. When the patrol visited Boher on 21 July 1916, they 
discovered that a great number of the villagers had deserted, including all the women, 
and that they had concealed their livestock in the neighbouring bush.31 When the people 
of Boher heard the rumours of the British coming to the village, the men took their
32women and children to Gwanje and left them there. The patrol also met the same fate 
when they visited Nmigbo and Rija as the villages were deserted and livestock 
concealed. The troops were then divided into two sections and between them they were 
able to capture one hundred and fifty head of livestock concealed at Gbugyar, which 
were sold to pay the tax arrears of Rija and Nungbo.33 Payment of taxation in kind had 
more profound effect on the Eggon people. The local people were forced to pay their 
taxes in livestock and according to Dorward, “the British colonial authorities removed 
the key to Eggon intensive agriculture, the major source of fertilizer and agriculture 
production suffered.”34
29 NAK SNP10/133p: Nasarawa Province Jama’a Mada Patrol, 1914.
30 NAK SNP10/403p: WAFF Patrol to North Mada District, 1916.
31 Ibid.
32 Interview with Sidi Tide at Gwanje Scirki, 1 December 2003.
33 NAK SNP10/403P; WAFF Patrol to North Mada District, 1916.
34 Dorward, “Nigerian Hill-Farming Society,”p .213..
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The inability of the British to pacify the groups in the division led the area to be 
“closed”. The first detailed tax assessment was conducted in 1922 by Arden-Clarke, and 
he imposed an annual tax of 21- on each male and 1/- on each female.35 Arden-Clarke 
was convinced that the tax resources of the area would be improved by the construction 
of the eastern railway that was to pass through Akwanga. Construction started in 1923 
and the labourers recruited were paid 6d per day, and it was assumed that most of this 
money would return to the government in cash tax revenue. Instead, the labourers used 
some of the money to buy food to supplement the meagre government rations and other 
items like clothes and hoes.36 The people that were able to pay their tax outright from the 
money saved were those that brought their own food and who had been accompanied by 
their kinswomen to cook for them.37
After the establishment of colonial administrative structures in the division, 
British officials, in consultation with the village heads of each village, earned out tax 
assessments. According to Captain Masterton Smith, the District Officer of Akwanga in 
1928:
The amount of tax due from each family group is announced 
by the Divisional Officer to the District Headman receiving 
receipts for each payment from the District Head’s scribe. The 
District Head finally brings in the complete amount to the
35 NAK SNP 9/830: Mada District, Plateau Province-Administration of, 1922; Rooney, Arden-Clarke,
p .12.
36 Interview at Gwanje Sarki with Sidi Tide, 1 December 2003.
37 Ibid.
179
Native Treasury. The tax usually takes from one to three 
months to collect after the total have been announced.38
Therefore, collection of the taxes was left in the hands of the head of every household. 
In describing the method of tax collection by the headmen in 1922, Arden-Clarke wrote: 
The headman has been given a number of sticks and stones 
corresponding to the number of pounds and shillings at which 
his village has been assessed. The methods by which he is to 
collect the tax have been described to him, namely: that every 
compound is to be visited, that the head of each compound is to 
collect from every male in his compound old enough to marry 
and fit to go fanning; from every female of marriageable age: 
the head of the compound will pay this money to the 
headman.39
The collection of the taxes was also left in the hands of the village or ward 
head’s representatives. Taxes were collected between October and December, when the 
harvest was on.40 Village headmen received 5 per cent of the total tax collected as 
commission.41 District and village heads were usually accompanied during tax 
assessment and collection by the yandoka, who put pressure on the local people to pay. 
The village and district heads ensured that taxes were efficiently collected as their
38 NAK SNP 17/11263: Notes on Akwanga Division, 1928.
39 NAK SNP 9/618: Re-Assessment Report on South Mada District, Lafia Division, 1922.
40 NAK SNP 17/11263: Notes on Akwanga Division, 1928.
41 Ibid.
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salaries were based on the number of taxpayers in their territory. The desire for 
remuneration and prestige made the village and district heads treat tax defaulters
mercilessly. Those that did not pay were publicly beaten and in some instances they
42were tied and left in the sun and their property seized. The extreme measures taken to 
ensure that taxes were paid were in accordance with Lugard’s general instruction that 
colonial officials were to make people pay something, “however poor they may appear 
to be in order to uphold the principles of taxation.”43 Lugard emphasised that taxes 
should be paid in cash, even if it meant that District Officers had to pressurise taxpayers 
to take their goods to the market in order to have cash in hand.44 This pressure meant 
that the people had to travel long distances to sell their goods in order to obtain money 
for tax payments. Mada people from the village of Andaha, for example, had to carry 
guinea com on their heads to Wamba market (a distance of about 40 miles). Usually, 
they set out for Wamba a day before the market day and stayed the night in Bukun in 
order to make it to the market early.45 The revenue raised through taxation was kept in 
the native treasury at Wamba and the following table shows the amount of tax paid from 
1923-1944.
Year Amount
1923/24 £4039.13/3d
1924/25 £4479. l/2d
1925/26 £4966.14/-
1926/27 £5169.4/-
1927/28 £5775,17/6d
1928/29 £5878.3/2d
1929/30 £6533.16/2d
1930/31 £6800.0.0
42 M. Namo et al, group interview at Wulko, on 29 November 2003.
43 Crocker, Nigeria, p.262.
44 Lugard, Political Memoranda, p.208.
45 Interview with Bala Maishai at Kanbar, 14 November 2003; Alhaii Yusuf at Andaha, 10 November 
2003.
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1942/43 £5035.2.0
1943/44 £4925.0.0
Table 4.1: Amount of Taxes paid to the Native Treasury between 1923 and 1944.
NAK SNP 17/11263: Notes on Akwanga Division, Plateau Province, 1929; NAK SNP 9/618: Re- 
Assessment Report on South Mada District, Lafia Division, 1922; NAK SNP 617/1922: Reassessment 
Report, Central Mada, 1921; NAK SNP17-K5922: North Mada District, Akwanga Division Reassessment, 
1922; NAK Jos Prof 208/1918 Volume II: Gazetteer Plateau Province, 1933; NAK Jos Prof STA/21: 
Akwanga Division Annual Reports 1942-46.
The rate o f taxation that was imposed varied according to the district. In 1933, it 
was estimated that in Wamba, where the tin mining industry was the largest employer of 
labour, the men paid 5/- and the women 2/-.46 hi Nunku district, however, the men paid 
4/- and the women 2/-, while in Wana district the men paid 3/- and the women 6d. The 
burden of tax for each adult according to the District Officer was estimated at about 
2/6d.47
Another form of taxation utilised by the colonial government was the jangali. 
Collection of cattle tax in Akwanga only began between 1929 and 1930, due to the 
outbreak of cattle disease in the neighbouring divisions, which forced herdsmen to move 
into the area with their cattle. £550 was subsequently collected for the year 1929/30.48 
Cattle tax was an insignificant source of revenue for the colonial administration in the 
division and the estimated amount was usually not met. For example, the amount 
estimated for 1930/31 was £200; however by 1931 only £48.4s.0d had been collected.49
The colonial administration was aware of the difficulties the Eggon had in 
paying its taxes and in 1917, the District Officer wrote: “Eggon, by reason of its 
inaccessibility and comparative density of population, has greater difficulty in finding
46 NAK Jos Prof 208/1918 Volume II: Gazetteer Plateau Province, 1933.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 NAK Jos Prof 44: Southern Division, Report on for 1932; NAK Jos Prof 208/1918 Volume II: Gazetteer 
Plateau Province, 1933.
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the cash with which to pay their taxes.”50 However, in order to encourage them to move 
to the surrounding plains, the colonial administration increased the indices of tax 
dramatically. As result of Arden-Clarke*s assessment in 1922, the annual tax burden was 
increased. For example, the tax of the people of Wana was increased from 41/7/- to 
107/14/-; Alogani from 29/16/- to 117/11/- and Wulko from 18/3/- to 107/14/-.51 The 
attempts by the colonial administration to collect taxes from the Eggons were met with 
strong opposition, resulting in armed conflict. Furthermore, the colonial government was 
aware of the effects that tax collection would have on the relationship between its 
political officers and the groups who were not used to paying taxes, hi 1924, the Acting 
Resident of Nasarawa, Mr. Norton-Traill, identified the major cause of friction between 
the colonial administration and some districts of the province. He observed that the 
communities looked upon the political officers as tax collectors and therefore they 
became enemies and had to work in a hostile atmosphere.52 He advised that the work of 
the political officers would be greatly facilitated if  “visible token of submission were 
allowed to take the form of collective, formal, annual presentation of livestock or other 
property which would present no real burden...instead of tax which every individual 
tribesman is made personally to feel.”53
The local people used different tactics to avoid the payment of taxes and during 
tax assessments it was often discovered that the wrong person was put forward as 
headman, in order to deceive the colonial officials.54 This did not go down well with the
50 SNP17/11263: Notes on Akwanga Division, 1928.
51 NAK SNP 617/1922, Assessment Report, Central Mada, 1921; NAK SNP 618/1922: Reassessment, 
South Mada, 1921.
52 NAK 7/2946: Nasarawa Province, Unsettled Districts, 1924.
53 Ibid.
54 Arden-Clarke’s letter to parents, 16 March 1923.
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government, as tax defaulters and dodgers were severely dealt with. For instance, in 
1922, two Mada men who had refused to pay their taxes “were caught, tried and suitably 
dealt with before the assembled villagers.”55 They were each given twelve strokes with 
the cane, which, by that time, was outlawed by the government. Some even tried other 
tricks in order to avoid paying their taxes in full. For example, after assessing one of the 
districts, Arden-Clarke called in all the family heads and gave them cowries and beans 
(representing the pounds and shillings) to remind them of how much tax to pay. He 
observed:
There was one dear old idiot there; about 90 years old he 
looked, with a long white beard. I gave him his cowries and 
beans and he thanked me profusely and put them away in a 
little leather bag he was carrying. When he got up to go, I 
noticed cowries and beans dropping on the ground behind him 
out of a hole in his wretched bag. So I called him back and 
asked him how much tax he had to pay. He scratched his head 
for a bit and then opened his bag and had a hunt inside for his 
cowries. After pulling out bits of tobacco, an old pipe, a couple 
of arrowheads and a few other oddments he eventually found 
two cowries (I had originally given him twenty five). He 
looked a bit puzzled but gravely informed me his tax was £2.
After a little talk I showed him the hole in his bag and gave 
him a new lot of cowries and beans.56
55 Ibid.
56 Arden-Clarke’s letter to parents 8 April 1923.
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Resistance to taxation was regarded as an act of rebellion and collective or 
individual fines were handed out as a punishment for those involved. The resistance 
became more intensified during the Great Depression when taxes were increased in 
order to compensate for declining budgets. In Plateau province, the increase in the rate 
of taxation reached its highest peak in the 1929/30 financial year when a total tax of 
£76,610 was imposed, making an average of 91-6 per adult male.57 This was made worse 
by the decline experienced in the economy and resulted in severe unrest and protests in 
different parts of Nigeria. In 1929, a resistance movement associated with bori cult 
started in Akwanga at Wangibi, where youths claimed to be inspired by dreams that a
58“European would descend from the sky and abolish all authority and taxation.” In an 
attempt by the District Head to prevent the movement from spreading to other villages in 
Wana District, he acted swiftly, forcing the leaders of the movement underground. They 
however, returned towards the end of 1930 and restarted the movement. The leaders of 
the movement urged their kinsmen not to pay their taxes and threatened armed resistance 
to a visit, either by the District Head or the District Officer himself.59 They also 
threatened the life o f their own Village Head and the Head of the hamlet. On 19 January 
1931, the District Officer, accompanied by the District Head and the yandoka and an 
escort of twelve ycinsandci (government police), went to Wakama and the yandoka 
arrested the leaders of the movement. One of the arrested was wounded in the hand 
while the other, though he fired three arrows at those chasing him, was captured without
57 Ames, Plateau Province, p. 13.
58 NAK Jos Prof 44/1932: Southern Division, Report on for 1931-32.
59 Ibid.
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anybody being injured.60 The men were arrested and tried in the Provincial Court. They 
were sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment with hard labour. After serving their 
prison sentences, in 1933, the bori leaders converted to Christianity. According to the 
Sudan United Mission report: “Oloku and Auta Tsenyu made public profession of faith 
in Church. Auta was a leader of the Bori movement, spirit worship and evil in 
character.”61
The nature and organisation of the resistance movement by the youths was not 
clear but it seemed to take the form of bori (the cult of possession). Those who attended 
the bori dances were aimed with bows and arrows and it was in the process of arresting 
the sarkin bori (leader of the cult) that one of the ringleaders was arrested.62 Bori is 
associated with Hausawa and to be possessed means to be mounted by a spirit. 
Therefore, the person mounted is regarded as a horse (doki) of the spirit.63 The spirit is 
believed to mount the head of the person through the tsere (bow), which most of the 
members carry.64 Bori dances are held in times of crisis such as epidemics, crop failure 
and drought. The bori movement in Wangibi was triggered by natural disaster, which 
was in addition to the economic depression, hi 1928 caterpillars attacked food crops in 
Akwanga and this was followed by locust infestations in 1930, 1931 and 1932.65 This 
resulted in a food shortage in 1931 in all the districts of the division.66 The colonial
60 Ibid,
61 Pamphlet: "Fifty Years in the Church o f  the Mada Hills: 1916-1966", Church o f  Christ in the Sudan, 
Mada Hills Region, (n.d), p. 10.
62 NAK Jos Prof 44/1932: Southern Division, Report on for 1931-32.
63 M. Onwuejeogwu, “The Cult o f the Bori Spirits Among the Hausa,” in M. Douglas and P. Kabeny 
(eds), Man in Africa (London, 1971), p.285.
64 Ibid.
65 NAK Jos Prof 14/1929: Annual Report, Akwanga Division 1928, NAK Jos Prof 45/1931: Annual 
Report, Southern Division 1930, NAK Jos Prof 44/1932: Annual Report, Southern Division, 1931; NAK 
Jos Prof 21/1933: Annual Report, Southern Division, 1932.
66 NAK Jos Prof 44/1932: Annual Report, Southern Division, 1931.
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government was forced to impose a ban on the export of corn from the division and also 
intervened by purchasing £220 worth of corn that was sold to the people at cost price.67 
The Eggon of the southern district of Akwanga were the people most hit by the disaster 
and, thus, the bori movement became an avenue for seeking supernatural intervention to 
alleviate their suffering.
There was general unrest in different parts of Nigeria because of the effects of 
the depression and the government used force in suppressing the protests. As noted by 
Governor Cameron, “scarcely a period of six months passed without the need to call out 
the police or even an armed force.”68 During the depression of the 1930s, one of the 
commonest ways of tax evasion in Akwanga was the building of houses near to the 
boundary line with other districts or divisions. It was discovered that during tax 
assessment, people “removed their houses temporarily” and lived with friends on the 
other side of the line.69 However, if assessments were earned out simultaneously, the
70people would “wander about in the bush until the count had been finished.” Some 
people also migrated to Keffi because of the severe punishments meted out to tax
71defaulters by the agents of tax collection in the 1930s. For example, m 1930, the 
recount of the Mada people in Nunku district showed a decrease of two hundred men 
who were said to have migrated to Keffi with their wives.72 In Wamba district, the 
recount showed a significant decrease of people who were said to have emigrated to 
Lafia division.73 Furthermore, some of the Hausa people that migrated and settled in
67 Ibid.
68 Cameron, Tanganyika Service, pp.284-5.
69 NAK Jos Prof 21/1933: Southern Division Report on for 1932.
70 Ibid.
71 Interview with Bala Maishai at Kanbar, 14 November 2003.
72 NAK Jos Prof 45/1931: Southern Division Annual Report for 1930.
73 Ibid.
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Akwanga did so because of tax pressures in Keffi.74 People’s experiences of tax 
payments during the depression period were that of oppression and deprivation. For 
example, in Gwanje, whenever the village head confirmed that the village tax had been
75paid in full, it was greeted with dancing and massive consumption of beer.
In the 1940s, colonial taxation was aimed at inducing labour supply to the mines 
in Jos and Wamba, as tin mining became an important industry in the British war effort. 
Both the goverment and the mining companies were convinced that the best method of 
inducing labour supply into the mines was through the increase in the rate of taxation. 
The native authorities were used as the propaganda machines for the dissemination of 
information about the availability of jobs at the mines.76 The increase in the official rate 
of taxation was in addition to other forms of illegal taxes imposed by the District Heads. 
For example, in June 1942, the District Officer of Akwanga sent out three hundred paper 
flags to Yamusa, the chief of Mada, to be sold to the people in aid of the Red Cross and 
the St John’s Fund. He unofficially levied a tax on the people for the flags to the tune of 
£180 and remitted only £23.10s.2d to the divisional office.77 He enforced a payment of 
11- on all households, 6d on all tax-paying males and 3d, 2d or 1.5d on all tax-paying 
women.78 The level of corruption and extortion reached its climax when people in the 
district began to disregard their leader’s authority. The government was forced to act 
because the situation was affecting the running of the Native Administration, especially 
with regard to tax collection. Yamusa was arrested and taken to court. He pleaded guilty
74 Interview with Alhaji Yusuf at Andaha, 10 November 2003.
75 Group interview at Gwanje with Lumbo, Tache Naluku and Maiganga Zenya, 14 November 2003.
76 Interview at Andaha with the late Dauda Rija, 22 March 2004. This is further discussed in the next 
chapter.
77 NAK Jos Prof 4825: Southern Division Half Yearly and Annual Report, 1942.
78 NAK Jos Prof 5061: Nunku District, Mada Administration, 1942.
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and was convicted in a Kaduna High Court in March 1943 of extortion and stealing and 
was sentenced to 18, 12 and 12 months to run concurrently. He was deposed in April the 
same year.79
CASH CROP PRODUCTION
The most obvious effect of taxing the local people was to compel them to find
resources for payments. The outcome was that the peoples of Akwanga were integrated
into the international economy as specialised producers of primary commodities. There
was a series of trials by the government that sought to encourage the production of
export crops in the area. Ginger was the first export crop that was introduced as an
experiment. Mr. James, the Assistant Superintendent of Agriculture, visited Wamba in
80March 1933 in connection with the development of ginger in the division. An 
experimental ginger farm was started earlier in May 1932 near Wamba and tubers were
obtained from Zaria and Keffi. An agricultural m alctm  was engaged to supervise the
81digging up of the crop in preparation for its grading by Mr. James. The quality of 
ginger produced in Nigeria was generally graded as third class and in Akwanga, it was 
estimated that it would fetch the farmers £25 per ton. A fanner, according to the District 
Officer, had to produce “one head load of 601bs in order to get 12/-.”82 Anangements 
were made to extend the cultivation of the crop throughout the division. The Native
83Administration prison also had a ginger farm that was run by the prisoners in Wamba.
79 NAK Jos Prof 5422: Southern Division H alf Yearly and Annual Report 1943-44; NAK Jos Prof 5061: 
Nunku District, Mada Administration, 1942.
80 NAK Jos Prof 35/1934: Southern Division Report on for 1933.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 NAK Jos Prof 4: Southern Division Annual Report 1934.
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In April 1933, about two hundred fanners were given ginger seeds and a trained 
agricultural instructor was engaged in demonstrating how to grow the crop in each 
district of the division. It was hoped that each farmer would “sell a percentage of his 
crops and see what money he gets.”84 This scheme made Mr. Maddox, an Assistant 
District Officer, conclude that there “is little doubt now that ginger cultivation may be 
the future economic wealth of this division once they really appreciate and realise the 
amount of money to be made.”85 A ginger market was held for the first time in Akwanga 
at Wamba in March 1938 and the United African Company (UAC) undertook to 
purchase all the ginger available for sale at prices similar to those in Southern Zaria, 
which was valued as Grade I - 2 Yz d - 1 lb and Grade II - 2d — 1 lb.86
The growth of ginger as a cash crop in Akwanga between 1933 and 1938 was 
slow due to the time and trouble involved in its production.87 Another major reason for 
the slow development of the commodity was that the tin mines in Wamba and Jos 
provided a ready market for the guinea com produced in the area. The mining companies 
bought large quantities of guinea com and sold it at a subsidised price to the beer 
brewers and food sellers in the mining camps.88 Therefore, local fanners were not 
interested in producing ginger as a cash crop because the sale o f their surplus grain to
ROthe mining companies often solved their cash problems.
Apart from ginger, there were attempts by some European miners to deal in other 
produce due to inactivity in the mining industiy. For example, in 1932, Mr. Stanley
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 NAK Jos Prof 2964: Southern Division Half Yearly and Annual Report 1938.
87 Ibid.
88 This is further discussed in the next chapter.
89 Interviews at Gudi with Adamu Salihu and Alhaji Idirisu, 5 March, 2004; group interview at Rinze with 
Ahmadu Nasara, Musa Waziri Amwe Inusa, 3 March 2004.
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Carpenter of the Amari Tin Mines engaged in the purchase of shea nut. The North Mada 
district had large numbers of shea trees whose surplus fruits, before Mr. Carpenter’s 
patronage, were allowed to rot on the ground. He created a market for the commodity 
and the first time the produce was sold from the district, it amounted to twenty-five tons. 
The departure of Mr. Carpenter and the lack of demand of the commodity meant that the 
trade in shea nuts was later abandoned.90 Attention was then shifted to the cultivation of 
groundnuts.
The demand for groundnuts that arose between 1906 and 1914 as a result of the 
manufacture of margarine in Europe had a profound effect on the history of the 
commodity in northern Nigeria. The earliest mention of groundnuts in the region was in 
the poem of Usman Dan Fodio, who supported its taxation. By the mid-nineteenth 
century, Barth observed that the crop was as important as potatoes in Europe.91 hi the 
early twentieth century, the centre of groundnut production in northern Nigeria was 
Kano, from where it spread to other parts of the region. The production of groundnuts, 
according to Gerald Helleiner, expanded “further and further bushwards to Katsina, 
Sokoto and Bomo Provinces and later into the under-populated Middle Belt of 
Nigeria.”92 The reason for the expansion of groundnut cultivation, according to Shenton, 
was the competitive and fluctuating prices of the commodity, which forced the 
middlemen to expand their trading territory throughout all of northern Nigeria where the
93crop could be grown.
90 NAK Jos Prof 3/1933: Annual Report Plateau Province 1932/33; NAK Jos Prof 35/1934: Southern 
Division Report on for 1933.
91 J.S. Hogendom, Nigerian Groundnut Exports: Origins and Early Development (Zaria, 1978), pp.36-37.
92G.K. Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Government and Economic Growth in Nigeria (Illinois, 1966), 
p.35.
93 R. Shenton, The Development o f  Capitalism in Northern Nigeria (London, 1986), pp.89-90.
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The origin of groundnut production in Akwanga has not yet been explored. Local 
fanners generally believe that the crop is as old as the agriculture they have been 
practising from time past.94 However, the most likely explanation for its origin is that 
Hausa traders introduced groundnuts into the area. The success of some of the Hausa 
traders in the groundnut business meant that they were “sought out, particularly by the 
Niger Company.”95 The Hausa traders operated a system of clientage, which helped 
them to penetrate into parts of the region, using propaganda to convince local farmers 
that it would be more profitable to sell groundnuts than cotton or millet and painting a 
rosy picture of what could be bought with the new cash income.96 Bribes were also 
given to the village heads, who were expected to popularise a particular clientage 
network at harvest time.97 Thus, the groundnut trade from its inception had depended 
upon a class of middlemen who bought the commodity from fanners.
An important factor that helped the development of groundnut production in 
Akwanga was that it provided cash for the payment of tax. The government encouraged 
the production of groundnuts and according to one official, “the people have been and 
are encouraged to sow groundnuts which the canteens are anxious to purchase and which
ORwill provide the people with cash to pay their tax.” The UAC opened two canteens 
after the completion of the eastern railway that passed through the area. The canteens 
were opened at Gudi and Mada stations in 1927 and 1930 respectively and the canteen at
94 Interview at Kanbar with Bala Maishai, 14 November 2003.
95 J.S. Hogendom, “The origins of the Groundnut Trade in Northern Nigeria,” in C.K. Eicher and C. 
Liedholm (eds), Growth and Development o f  the Nigerian Economy (Michigan, 1970), p.39.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 NAK SNP 17/1126 Notes on Akwanga Division by Captain Masterton Smith, 1928.
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Gudi also bought almost all the tin produced in the division." They, in turn, sold 
matches, soap, kerosene, sugar and salt.100
Figure 4.2: Ruins of the United Africa Company (UAC) store at Gudi
The UAC employed the services o f Hausa agents or middle men, buying commodities 
on their behalf. The groundnut business started slowly in the 1920s. The quantity o f  
groundnuts bought by the company during 1927 was negligible and the price offered 
was only £7 per ton.101 The price was not attractive, which made the farmers unwilling 
to sell their produce at the store. In order to encourage production, the District Officer 
took the District Heads to the canteen in the hope that their people would bring in their
109  •farm produce. The District Heads in turn called their respective village heads and 
informed them accordingly. The village heads, through their ward heads, relayed the
• • 10Tmessage to their kinsmen. In 1933, efforts were made by the government in Akwanga 
to get farmers to realise the value o f groundnuts and they were persuaded to plant at
99 NAK Jos Prof 44/1932: Southern Division, Report on for 1931-32.
100 Interview at Gudi with Adamu Salihu and Alhaji Idirisu, 5 March 2004.
101 NAK Jos Prof 31/1928: Akwanga Division Annual Report, 1927.
102 NAK Jos Prof 14/1929: Akwanga Division, Report for the year 1928.
103 Interview at Akwanga with the late Ali Afani, 22 March 2003.
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least one acre per adult male.104 These efforts yielded a result, as an increase in 
groundnut farms was noticed, especially amongst the Mada and Eggon people, although 
one colonial official described the production of the crop as a partial failure due to the 
poor harvest.105 The Native Administration also planted about three acres of groundnuts 
at Wamba in the hope that the crop would be useful, both as prisoners’ rations and for 
the purpose of determining the yield per acre, but it proved almost a complete failure.106 
In 1933 also, the district Officer, Mr. Baker, informed the UAC manager that Akwanga 
would have at least one thousand tons of groundnuts for sale, but towards the end of the 
year, only twelve tons were brought in.107 The price at £3 per ton was not attractive, and 
this was worsened by the instructions issued by the UAC manager that all groundnuts 
for sale had to be spread out and bad nuts picked out while the remainder were sieved 
and the small nuts passing through the sieve rejected.108 The District Officer 
commented, “the local fanner, having been persuaded rather against his will to grow 
groundnuts will, I fear, need a deal of persuasion to continue next year.”109 The decline 
in groundnut prices in the 1930s was not primarily due to fall in the price of margarine 
or soap or lessening in the consumption of these items, but rather to the depression 
experienced in the economy. According to Shenton, faced with falling prices, farmers 
increased their production in order to maintain their incomes.110
However, in 1940, there was a large increase in the quantity of groundnuts 
transported from Gudi railway station. For the period beginning December 1939 up to
104 NAK Jos Prof 35/1934: Southern Division Report on for 1933.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 NAK Jos Prof 35/1934: Southern Division Report on for 1933
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Shenton, Development o f  Capitalism, pp.94-95.
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April 1940, about 214 tons were transported, compared to nothing the previous year.111 
The better price of £6 per ton offered at the UAC at Gudi encouraged the production of 
the crop.112 The Eggon were the crop’s chief growers, although there was a considerable 
increase in land put under cultivation for groundnuts by the Mada people. The groundnut 
boom did not last long, however, as the production of the crop steadily declined and the 
1940 record was never reached again. The government did little or nothing at all to 
improve the traditional methods of production and to most of the fanners, the mctlamai 
gona (agricultural officers) were “less than useless.”113 The fanners were left to exhaust 
their lands without any new knowledge of agricultural techniques. The technology that 
was involved in the process of production remained the same as it was during the pre­
colonial times.
The major source of income for the peoples of Akwanga did not come from 
export crop production, but by selling their surplus foodstuff to the mining camps in Jos 
and Wamba and further to urban centres like Kano and Enugu. The major food crops 
produced in the area included guinea com, yam and cassava. Igbo and Tiv railway 
labourers were responsible for the introduction of yams and cassava into Akwanga in the 
late 1920s. Before then, guinea corn was the major food crop produced in the area. From 
colonial sources, it is clear that as late as 1921, there were no yams or cassava produced 
in the division except for cocoyams.114 Local fanners maintained that their ancestors 
“had never planted such crops and that therefore it was not right that they themselves
111 NAK Jos Prof 3875: Southern Division Half Yearly and Annual Reports 1940.
m Ibid.
113 Interview at Akwanga with Alhaji Gwamna, 26 November 2003
114 NAK SNP 618/1922: Reassessment, South Mada, 1921.
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should do so.”115 However, the change in attitude and the gradual integration of yams
and cassava into agricultural production was prompted by natural disasters experienced
in the area. As already mentioned, caterpillars attacked food crops in 1928, which was
followed by locust infestations in 1930, 1931 and 1932.116 The locust and caterpillar
infestations did not affect the yams and cassava planted by the Igbo and Tiv labourers
and soon afterwards, local fanners began to cultivate these crops. According to the
District Officer, “it is interesting to note the planting of yams and cassava, the fonner for
the first time in the division, owing to the locust invasion of 1929-1930.”117 The chief
growers of cassava in Akwanga were the Rindre people in Wamba district. The demand
for cassava in Wamba was the direct result of the mining activities in the area, which
were in addition to the soil conditions and the relative ease of planting and maintaining
the crop. Cassava was processed into flour (ialibo), which was then sold to the labourers
at the mining camps in Ninkada, Marmara and Rafm Tabo.118 The leading villages in the
production of cassava and alibo were Wamba Kurmi, Wude, Gbata, Wado, Ukusso and
Gwagi.119 The colonial administration also played an important role by encouraging
120fanners to produce cassava, which the mining companies were ready to buy. The chief 
of Wamba became a key figure in the government propaganda to convince local farmers 
with a reminder of the locust infestations of the early 1930s, which affected their crops. 
According to an informant, Musa Gun: “Mohammed Kore encouraged the production of 
cassava by planting the crop himself and he was the richest cassava fanner in the whole
115 NAK SNP 18958: Annual Report, Plateau Province, 1932.
116 NAK Jos Prof 14/1929: Annual Report, Akwanga Division 1928, NAK Jos Prof 45/1931: Annual 
Report, Southern Division 1930; NAK Jos Prof 44/1932: Annual Report, Southern Division, 1931; NAK 
Jos Prof 21/1933: Annual Report, Southern Division, 1932.
117 NAK SNP44/1932: Annual Report, Southern Division 1930.
l!S Interview at Wamba with Philip Maiangwa, 22 April 2004.
1,9 Ibid.
120 NAK Jos Prof 21/1933: Annual Report, Southern Division, 1932.
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of Wamba. He also distributed the plants freely to fanners and warned them of the
121impending famine as a result of over-reliance on guinea com.”
In the southern part of Akwanga, the cultivation of yams and cassava also 
encouraged the Eggon to migrate to the plains in order to utilise the lands available for 
the production of these crops. As Dorward observes, “the introduction of yams and 
cassava cultivation through Tiv and Igbo example and prompted by natural disasters, 
was directly linked to migration to the plains.”122 The Eggon migration, however, began 
earlier than this. In 1923, Arden-Clarke observed, people “were beginning to leave the 
hills in small numbers.”123 One of the major incentives for Eggon migration to the plain 
was the security the British were able to provide and the fear of the nineteenth century 
depredations from the sub-emirates was 110 longer an issue. The Eggon people could 
cultivate their lands on the plain with the assurance of not being captured or enslaved. 
The movement to the plain was further intensified in the 1930s as “every year more and 
more people are fanning on the plains.”124
The success in the cultivation of these new crops boosted local incomes as 
surpluses were sold to the readily available markets in the Jos and Wamba mining 
camps. The development of cash crop production in Akwanga was linked to the mining 
sector, which provided the market for most of the surplus foodstuff produced in the area. 
However, the inactivity experienced in the industry in the 1930s affected the local 
market for foodstuffs. For example, the price of guinea com fell from an annual average 
during 1929 and 1930 of over £2 per ton to 16/8d in 1931, to 15/6-l/2d in 1932 and
121 Interview at Wamba with the late Musa Gun, 4 March 2003.
122 Dorward, “Nigerian Hill-Fanning Society,” p.214.
123 NAK SNP 96/1924: Annual Report, Nasarawa Province, 1923.
124 NAK Jos Prof 4: Annual Report, Southern Division 1934.
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1933.125 This affected the income the people needed for the payment of tax. By 1936, 
with the removal of the restriction on tin mining activities, the division exported over 
1,000 tons of grain to the mines.126 During the Second World War, tin mining became an 
important industry in the British war effort and in order to keep a steady supply of food 
to the mines, the colonial government began to participate in the foodstuff business. The 
government intervention was aimed at keeping down the prices of food and also 
preventing middlemen fi’om exporting food out of Plateau province. A Restriction Order 
was imposed in Akwanga in 1943 and the government banned the “removal by whatever 
means of guinea com and yams from southern division. ..except under permit issued by 
the Divisional Officer.”127 Permits were issued to the agents of the mining companies 
and local middlemen were excluded under the guise of protecting the interests of the
1 9  5 .  .fanners. " hi addition to the agents of the mining companies, the Native Authorities 
were encouraged to participate in the foodstuff business and the local chiefs became 
agents for both the government and the mining companies.129 The local chiefs tried in 
various ways to eliminate any competition from the middlemen in buying foodstuff from 
the farmers. However, the middlemen, who were mostly Igbos, were undercutting the 
chiefs by purchasing the crops before it came to the market. They did this by either 
buying the crops from house to house or by extending credit facilities in the foim of 
goods in payment for crops while still in the field.130
125 NAK Jos Prof 45/1931: Annual Report, Southern Division 1930, NAK Jos Prof 44/1932: Annual 
Report Southern Division 1931, NAK Jos Prof 21/1933: Annual Report Southern Division 1932 and NAK 
Jos Prof 35/1934: Annual Report, Southern Division 1933.
126 NAK Jos Prof 1696: Annual Report Plateau Province, 1936.
527 NAK Jos Prof 1938 Vol. II: Food Control Order, 1943.
128 Ibid.
129 Interview at Akwanga with the late Ali Afani, 22 March 2003.
130 Interview at Gudi with Adamu Salihu and Alhaji Idirisu, 5 March 2004;NAK Jos Prof 1938 Vol. Ill: 
District Officer, Southern Division to Resident Plateau Province, 1949.
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Generally, while Akwanga polity was shaped by the colonial experience, the 
economic basis o f the society was undergoing a major transformation. The Eggon, who 
migrated to the surrounding plains, experienced the most obvious manifestation of 
change during the colonial period. As already mentioned, Eggon agriculture and 
settlement had been largely confined to the hills, but during the colonial period, this 
migration was precipitated by a number of factors, initially security and later the need to 
earn tax money. The initial fertility of the virgin lowland bush transformed Eggon 
agriculture. Within a relatively brief period of moving to the plains, Eggon fanners 
abandoned the laborious and careful use of fertilizers, relying instead upon natural 
regeneration through bush fallow. Goats and livestock were no longer confined to huts 
for their dung. However, there was no long-term investment in specific plots of land 
such as the traditional practices of fertilizer or contour fanning. Consequently there was 
a rapid depletion of natural fertility and increased erosion, leading to outward migration 
into Lafia and Nasarawa divisions by Eggon in search of virgin lands.131 It is erroneous 
as Kasimu is incorrect in arguing that the movement of Eggon to the plains in search of 
farm lands pre-dates British administration.132 He noted:
It became also clear that by the beginning of the 20th century 
the number of Eggon villages increased to such an extent that 
the entire area of what was then Akwanga Division and at least 
two thirds (2/3) of the then Lafia Division respectively were 
and are still inhabited by the Eggon. This gradual expansion of
131 NAK MAKPROF 562; District Officer, Southern Division, to District Officer, Lafia Division, 1941; 
NAK MAKPROF 284B: Resident, Benue to Resident, Plateau, 1951; NAK Jos Prof STA/21: Annual 
Report for Southern Division, 1953.
132 Kasimu, et al, Eggon o f  Central Nigeria, pp.23-25.
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the Eggon continued until it was gradually stopped. The 
stoppage o f the gradual expansion was due first to the slave 
raids of the 19/18th century and the 20th century colonialists
133wars.
As the Eggon abandoned the hills and the population pressures receded, shifting 
cultivation spread to the upland valleys, where uncontrolled bush fires scorched the oil 
palms, once so crucial to the Eggon diet and therefore so carefully protected.134 By the 
1950s, palm trees had come to be valued by the Eggon primarily as a source of palm
135wine, said to have been introduced by Igbo palm-wine tappers.
The migration of Eggon to the plain and lowland agriculture had an effect upon 
the social organisation of labour. Extensive bush-fallow agriculture, with its annual 
clearing of the bush and initial hoeing of new fields, imposed heavy labour demands at 
crucial stages during the year. Consequently, the kin-based party (burdi) assumed 
increased importance. While the work party was an indigenous institution, the 
development of extensive agriculture gave it increased economic significance. 
Moreover, new forms of labour organisation were evolved. Influential men organised 
“new-land clearing parties” (eku) in return for food and drink, while more affluent 
fanners who were able to draw upon income from the cash-crop economy began to 
employ paid labour.136 Within a decade of migration to the plains, more successful 
fanners became increasingly polygamous. The older pattern of dispersed nuclear
!33 Ibid, pp.23-24.
534 NAK Jos Prof 14/1929: Annual Report for Akwanga Division, 1928; NAK Jos Prof 35/1934: Annual 
Report for Southern Division, 1933.
Interview at Neko with Laka Bako, 3 May 2004. 
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households gave way to larger extended family compounds, hi the extended family 
compounds, the power of the patriarch increased. In part, patriarchal power derived from 
customary redistribution of produce, extended to the cash-crop sector and thereby 
involving greater access to the new wealth of the market. However, to an even greater 
extent the enhanced power of the patriarch rested 011 their increasing control over labour. 
The bride price demanded for young women increased as parents sought to retain the 
services of daughters and suitors or obtain appropriate remuneration.137 Young men, 
who could not hope to amass such payments, became even more dependent upon their 
seniors for the wealth to obtain a wife. In effect, the elders were able to reinvest new­
found material wealth into increased social control and authority. Thus, patriarchs 
regained power over the young men who were otherwise best able to exploit the new 
farmlands being opened up.
As already mentioned, some influential men and more affluent fanners were able 
to use income from cash crop production to employ paid labour for land cultivation in 
Altwanga. However, substantial social change did not result from the cash economy. 
This was because what the local fanners in Akwanga were producing was of low value 
compared with the cocoa and coffee produced in western Nigeria. Cocoa and coffee 
were the only crops in the colonial economy that did radically transformed the standard 
of living of their producers and the price of the crops was significantly high.
Furthermore, the colonial economy in Akwanga did not alter the basis of political 
authority of the society because the local chiefs were directly involved in the foodstuff 
business acting as agents for the government and the mining companies. In fact, the cash 
economy enhanced the authority of some of the local chiefs, as they were responsible for
ni Ibid.
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issuing permits for the purchase of foodstuff out of the division. In addition, they were 
also engaged in the cash crops production and as already noted, the chief of Wamba 
became the largest producer of cassava in his district.
CONCLUSION
The peoples of Akwanga had an independent attitude which meant that when 
taxes were first introduced as sign of accepting British authority, local people resisted 
paying. Resentment was displayed by people refusing to pay their taxes and/or by 
engaging in armed conflict with the colonial authorities. However, taxation did bring 
about changes, especially where local fanners were pushed into cash crop production in 
order to make money to pay tax. The transition to a cash economy was not smooth, due 
to the fact that local farmers initially resisted the cultivation of ginger and later 
groundnuts, both of which were encouraged by the government. However, the major 
source of income for fanners in the division came from exporting foodstuffs to the 
mining camps and cities. The major food crops produced were guinea com, yams and 
cassava. Tiv and Igbo railway labourers introduced yams and cassava into the area in the 
1920s and they were subsequently integrated into the agricultural system. Both the need 
to earn money to pay taxes and the prospect of virgin lands for cultivation encouraged 
the Eggon people to migrate to the plains. This had a great effect on labour mobilisation 
and social organisation.
202
CHAPTER FIVE
COLONIAL LABOUR AND TIN MINING, 1922-1945
This chapter will examine the mobilisation of labour from Akwanga for the 
construction of roads and railways, for military service and for mining. The imposition of 
taxation in the colonial society of Akwanga, as mentioned in Chapter 4, was aimed at
generating funds to pay for the machinery of government and to build up infrastructure.
There was a need to develop a transport network to facilitate the movement of troops and 
colonial officials and a need to build stations and rest houses to accommodate political
officers. It was only through the widespread use of local labour that the essential
requirements for building the infrastructure of colonial rule could be met. This was followed 
by the use of forced or so-called “political” labour in railway construction and road building 
in Akwanga. In addition, this chapter will discuss the development of tin mining and how 
the industry affected the communities in the region. Private British firms dominated tin 
mining during the colonial period and Akwanga, being part of Plateau province, became a 
major player in the international market as the leading supplier of tin, especially after the 
Japanese occupation of Malaya during the Second World War. However, tin mining had 
catastrophic ecological consequences, which intensified pressures on agricultural 
production.
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COLONIAL LABOUR
The execution of colonial projects in Akwanga depended on the availability of cheap 
local labour. Labour was needed for road and railway construction and for the building and 
maintenance of colonial stations. This was obtained by the threat or use of force by the 
colonial government through the Native Authorities. After the colonial conquest and the 
subsequent establishment of administrative structures in northern Nigeria, the British were 
faced with the problem of consolidating and coordinating their rule in a vast region with few 
communication lines. The lack of roads and railways made it difficult for political officers 
and military personnel to move around from one province to another. It became essential to 
develop a communication network using local labour.
At first, forced labour was only permitted for the purpose specified in the Roads 
Proclamation of 1903.1 This provided the muscle necessary for installing the infrastructure 
required for the colonial regime to fimction. It was used under the guise of “political” labour 
during railway construction. The earliest railway line to be constructed in northern Nigeria 
was the Baro-Kano line, which began in August 1907. During the construction of the line, 
the government did not create the conditions necessary for a free labour market but rather 
developed and encouraged political labour. Workers on the railway rendered their services 
by political means through the combined intervention of British officials and local chiefs. 
They were recruited by means of political coercion and were not expected to remain on the 
construction site for more than a few weeks at most. They worked in appalling conditions 
and in 1909, Bishop Tugwell of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) wrote to the High 
Commissioner of northern Nigeria, Sir William Wallace, about the conditions of the railway
1 NAK SNP7/2089/1907: Girouard to Colonial Office, June 1907.
2 M. Mason, “Working on the Railway: Forced Labour in Northern Nigeria, 1907-1912”, in P.C.W.
Gutkind, R. Cohen and J. Copans (eds), African Labour History (London, 1978), p.60.
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labourers on the Baro-Kano line. He observed that the men recruited did not volunteer their 
services but were forced to work and the six pence a day they were paid did not even reach 
them, as a large part of their earnings went to the foremen who transported them.3 Bishop 
Tugwell further complained about the working horns of the labourers, which he described as 
“positively revolting”.4 He stated that people worked for eight or nine hours at a stretch.
In October 1920, the Secretary of State for the Colonies approved the construction of 
the eastern railway line from Enugu to Kaduna junction line and the construction work 
reached Nasarawa province in September 1922. Before the actual commencement of the 
project, all the district and village heads were instructed by the Resident to give any required 
assistance for the completion of the job. Furthermore, Mr. Palmer, the Lieutenant Governor, 
through the Resident of Nasarawa, instructed the headmen of Toto and Umasha districts of 
Nasarawa emirate and Alago from Doma district of Lafia emirate to supply gangs of fifty 
men each from Bassa and Igbira for railway work at Ankpa in Benue province.5 The District 
Officer of Akwanga was also instructed to make men available for the job. The aim of 
sending these men to Ankpa was to enable them to gain first hand information and 
experience with regard to the nature of the railway work that would shortly commence in 
Nasarawa province. This experiment proved to be disastrous, as the labour gang from Bassa 
never arrived at Ankpa. Three of them were drowned in a flooded river between Bagana and 
Ankpa and the rest of the gang fled and on reaching their villages, spread the news with 
“elaborations and exaggerations,” which resulted in general unrest.6 A patrol under Captain 
Norton Traill had to be called into the area to enforce law and order. The labour gang from
3 NAK SNP 6 127/1909: Labour Condition at Baro, Bishop Tugwell Complains, 1908.
4 Ibid.
5 NAK SNP17/8/K1838 Eastern Railway, Opening speech by his Excellency, the Governor. 2) Final 
Report on construction of, 1927.
6 Ibid.
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Doma and half of the original contingent from Igbira reached Ankpa, but almost all of them 
deserted shortly afterwards, complaining of the lack of money, food and accommodation. 
The recruits also complained that some of them were surviving on soup made from 
horseflesh and snails.7 In addition, many of the labourers drawn from Akwanga died at 
Ankpa and this made the people in the region to be suspicious when construction reached 
Akwanga in 1923.8
Labour recruitment in Akwanga was carried out through the District Heads, who 
were allotted a fixed quota of men in proportion to their capacity.9 Each District Head was 
responsible for getting his quota together and ensuring that they reached the construction 
site. At the end of every month, scribes or malamai submitted a list of the villages in each 
district and the number of labourers supplied.10 At the beginning of the railway construction 
in 1923, over five thousand labourers were recruited from Akwanga and there were 110 
recorded deaths.11 The mortality rate among the labourers was at its highest during the hot 
season. During the same period, a number of deaths also occurred in the Alizaga village 
railway labour camp due to leopard attacks. Hausa traders circulated the news of the deaths 
and this hindered the recruitment of new labour and caused some existing workers to 
leave.12 It is still remembered that the “evil spirit” usually came in the night and attacked its 
victims by breaking their necks before taking the corpse into the bush.13 The labourers were 
alarmed by the high death rate and began to construct their huts in the form of a traditional
7 Ibid.
8 NAK SNP 9/2/1923: Nasarawa Province Annual Report, 1922.
9 Interview with Adaniu Salihu and Alhaji Idirisu at Gudi, 15 March 2004; NAK SNP 9/96/1924: 
Nasarawa Province, Annual Report, 1923.
10 Ibid.
11 NAK Jos Prof 58/1927: Akwanga Division, Report for Year 1926.
12 Ibid.
13 Interview with Sidi Tide at Gwanje Sarki, 1 December 2003.
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pigsty in order to prevent the animal from attacking them.14 By 1925 after three years of 
railway work in Nasarawa, the province had supplied 5235 people of which 60 per cent 
were said to be “volunteers”.15 Work on the difficult section between Mada and Gudi in 
Akwanga took a year to complete, with an average of 4250 people being supplied every 
month.16 People were recruited from each village and it was made compulsory, unless 
illness or old age prevented work on the construction site. If a person absconded during the 
recruitment period, his father was taken in his place. When the person was found, he was 
duly punished.17
Towards the end of the railway construction in Akwanga, the demand for labour 
drastically reduced. At the beginning of 1926, the monthly supply of labour was in the 
region of seven hundred workers. This was reduced to five hundred by April, three hundred
i  o
by August and 250 in November. Recruitment of labour was difficult during the rainy 
season as the conditions were extreme and the labourers received low wages, usually only 
six pence a day. It took some people two weeks hard labour to earn enough to pay their 
taxes. Supply of labour during the rainy season was also difficult as local people preferred to 
work on their farms. The meagre wages paid were not enough to attract them to abandon 
their farms. The Acting Director of Railways obseived that labour could be supplied during 
the dry season (between December to March) with little problem, but requests for labour 
during the rainy season were “simply cruel.”19 He further stressed, “railway officials quite 
fail to realise that to take men away from their farms for three months in the rains, is to
14 Interview with Baba Loko at Ungwan Loko, 8 November 2003.
15 NAK SNP17/8/K1838 Eastern Railway, Opening speech by his Excellency, the Governor and Final 
Report on construction of, 1927.
16 Ibid.
17 Interview with Malam Yakubu Alhaji Yusuf at Andaha, 11 November 2003.
18 NAK Jos Prof 58/1927: Akwanga Division, Report for Year 1926.
19 NAK SNP 7/3436/1912: Railway Labour, Nasarawa Province, 1911.
207
deprive them of their means of living for the rest of the year.”20 He proposed that people, 
who by their own free will, worked for at least three or four months on the railway, should 
be exempt from paying tax. A certificate, according to him, should be given to the workmen,
7 |who “would present [the certificate] to the tax collector when the latter made his demand.” 
Railway construction in Akwanga lasted for four years and affected agricultural production 
in southern and northern parts of the region. In the Eggon district for example, in addition to 
the strain of railway construction between 1923 and 1926, the District Head and his jakadu 
(ambassadors) recruited labour for their private farms. This affected the local people as they 
were forced to abandon their farms during the rainy season, which was the time when they 
should have been planting their crops. Those that managed to return home during the 
fanning season were exhausted and unable to work fully on their own farms.22 Despite the 
illegality of Bashayi’s action, the Eggon people could not report the matter to the District 
Officer because they were afraid to go to prison 23 The Eggon district supplied an average of 
one thousand labourers each month through Bashayi. The demand for labour became 
unbearable for them in 1926, resulting in their refusal to pay taxes and to cooperate with the 
District Head.24 This led to BashayTs deposition in June 1926 and six years later, he died “a 
hopeless bankrupt” in Keffi on 28 August 1932.25
20 ibid.
21 ibid.
22 Interview with Laka Bako at Argbo, 22 April 2004.
23 Interview at Kagbu with John Angbashim, Nuhu Attah, 6 December 2003, NAK Jos Prof 58/1927: 
Akwanga Division Report on for year 1926.
24 Ibid.
25 NAK Jos Prof 58/1927: Akwanga Division Report on for year 1926; NAK Jos Prof 21/1933: Southern 
Division Report for 1932.
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Figure 5.1: Gudi Railway Station, built in the 1920s
During railway construction, productive labour was diverted from agriculture to the 
building o f  colonial infrastructures, which put pressure on food production as women and 
younger children were left to cultivate the land. Before the Eggon people could settle down 
after the stress o f railway construction, the locust infestation o f the late 1920s attacked their 
crops, resulting in district-wide shortages o f food. The completion o f the railway, after four 
years o f using so-called political labour, was a great relief to the communities involved.26 
According to some informants, those that returned from railway construction were hardly 
recognised by their families because o f the stress involved. They were kept away from the 
village for some time until they were “purified”, before being admitted back into the 
village. The purification ceremony was conducted at the village shrine in the forest and 
women were not allowed to attend.
The people o f  Akwanga region also supplied their labour for the construction of 
roads, bridges, residential and government rest houses. At the early stage o f British rule in
26 Group interview with Lumbo, Tache Naluku and Maiganga Zenya at Gwanje, 13 November 2003.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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the region, the priority of the colonial administration was to make the communities 
accessible through the construction of roads and bridges. One of the earliest bridges 
constructed in the division was the Richa bridge along the Akwanga-Keffi road in 1911. In 
1922, the Resident of Nasarawa province, Mr. Sciortino, recommended a large programme 
of bridge construction in order to overcome the difficulty o f communication.29 Bridges 
across all the principal rivers from the west to the east of the division were constructed from 
1922 to 1923 using local labour.30
In addition, in 1927, the first major road constructed by the Akwanga Native 
Administration was the motor road from Akwanga to Wamba, a distance of 17 miles. The 
road was constructed to serve the interests of the mining companies working in the division, 
and was completed in mid-1927. By November of that year the first consignment of tin was 
earned by lorry from Wamba to Gudi.31 In 1928, the Divisional Officer wrote in the annual 
report that the roads constructed enabled the manager of Amari Tin Company “to run a half­
ton Ford lorry to Gudi throughout the wet season.”32 Additional roads were constructed in 
1929 resulting in the linking of Nunku with Akwanga and Akwanga with the foot of the 
Eggon hills.33 By 1936, the major road used in the area was the Jama5a boundary to Gudi 
road via Wamba (Jos-Wamba-Gudi-Keffi-Nasarawa-Loko). Feeder roads, such as Andaha 
to Akwanga (10 miles), Kwarra to Wamba (14 miles) and Akwanga to Lafia boundary (25 
miles) also used local labour for their construction.34
29 NAK Jos Prof 5061: Mada District Administration of, 1922; NAK SNP 17/11263: Akwanga Division 
Plateau Province, Notes on by Captain Masterton Smith, 1928.
30 Ibid, NAK SNP 1391/1923: Nasarawa Province Bridges (over rivers between Akwanga and Farin 
Ruwa), 1922.
31 NAK Jos Prof 31/1928: Akwanga Division Amiual Report, 1927.
32 NAK Jos Prof 14/1929: Akwanga Division Report for the Year 1928.
33 NAK SNP 17/11263: Akwanga Division Plateau Province, Notes on by Captain Masterton Smith, 1928.
34 NAK Jos Prof 1481 Communications in Plateau Province, 1939.
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Local people recruited for the construction of roads and bridges were drawn from the
immediate surrounding area. The recruits had to arrange for their own food and
accommodation for the duration of their stay at the construction site and the time spent on
35the construction site varied according to the nature of the project. Women were excluded. 
Recruits usually worked for at least a week before being relieved by new labourers.36 
Musicians were hired to play to the workers during the construction in order to induce them 
to work.
There was a deliberate policy by the government to avoid the enactment of laws and 
regulations on the use of so-called “political labour.” The colonial administration considered 
the employment of such labour as “adequately controlled by native law and custom.”37 hi 
addition, by stereotyping the conditions under which compulsory labour was employed, the 
“issue of precise regulations might have retarded its discontinuance.”38 However, in 1933, 
the Secretary of the Northern Provinces wrote to the Residents and District Officers in the 
region that the government could no longer avoid the enactment of a law regulating 
compulsory labour. He argued that compulsory labour “will endure longer if it remains 
cloaked under native law and custom.”39 The change of policy regarding compulsory labour 
in Nigeria was a direct result of the British government’s ratification of the treaty at the 
International Labour Conference of the Forced Labour Convention in 1933. The terms of the 
Convention made provision for ending of the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its 
forms, “within the shortest possible period.”40 However, the Convention in its definition of
35 Interview with the late Dauda Madaki at Abu on 26 November 2003.
36 Ibid.
37 NAK Jos Prof 591: Secretary Northern Provinces to Residents: Forced Labour in Nigeria, 1933-1945.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Regidations made Under the Forced Labour Ordinance, 1933 (Lagos, 1938), p.3.
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forced or compulsory labour excluded work of purely military character, work forming part 
of a normal penal sentence, work exacted in cases of emergency, as well as minor 
communal services.41 In addition, the use of forced labour where necessary was restricted to 
able-bodied men and to a maximum period of sixty days in a year.
The people of Akwanga were also enlisted into the colonial army during the Second 
World War. In executing the war, the British recruited over half a million soldiers from their 
African colonies, who were mostly enlisted as non-combatants (labourers in uniform). 
However, some of them received training in aims and assumed combatant roles.42 The non- 
combatants were recruited under terms similar to those of the combatants and, according to 
Killingray, recruits in West Africa were usually allocated to combatant and non-combatant 
units based 011 immediate manpower needs and 011 the basis of the physical appearance of 
the individual recruits.43 The Second World War, which local people referred to as “yakin 
Hitler” (Hitler’s war) attracted some volunteers from Akwanga. This was due to propaganda 
and the intensive recruitment drive earned out by the colonial administration. Recruitment 
in Akwanga was carried out in three batches and recruits included, among others, Sergeant 
Buba, Bashayi Wana, John Mada, Musa Wamba and Audu Wamba.44 According to Sergeant 
Buba, they joined the army voluntarily because of the effectiveness of the British 
propaganda and the promise of a better life after the war. Sergeant Buba was among the ten 
people recruited in the third batch from Akwanga; they were all sent to Ethiopia to fight the
41 Ibid, pp.3-7.
42 D. Killingray, “Labour Mobilisation in British Colonial Africa for the War Effort, 1939-46,” in D. 
Killingray and R. Rathbone (eds), Africa and the Second World War (London, 1986), p.71.
43 Ibid, p.72.
44 Interview with Sergeant Buba (retired) at Andaha 12 March 2004; NAK Wamba District DEP/64: Royal 
West Africa Frontier Force General Correspondence, 1939-1945; NAK 5927/S.3: Demobilized Soldiers, 
Return of, 1945.
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Italians and later redeployed to Burma to fight the Japanese.45 They were paid salaries and 
each soldier had a pay book given to him by the military authorities. The soldier’s salaries 
could either be paid at the war front or sent back to Nigeria for safekeeping.46 Some of the 
soldiers did send part of their salaries directly to the District Officer at Wamba for safe 
custody until their return. For example, in the general military correspondence for Akwanga, 
Audu Wamba sent the sum of £8 to the District Officer for safekeeping in April 1945, 
because he was afraid to give it to his family as they “will squander it uselessly and I will 
have nothing to depend when I shall come.”47 Others sent money to their families through 
the District Officer, with instructions on how to disburse it. Such instructions were 
effectively earned out to the satisfaction of the soldiers. For example, in October 1945, John 
Mada instructed the District Officer to stop paying his wife the allowance he usually sent 
because she refused to write to him. British political officers therefore became the contacts 
between the soldiers and their families and the soldiers enquired about and received 
messages from their families through them.
After the war, the majority of soldiers that enlisted were demobilised and they 
returned home with gratuity paid to them. According to Sergeant Buba:
Those of us returning from the war disembarked at Lagos, which 
was the demobilisation centre and where the discharge process 
was completed. We were given a post office savings book which 
contained our outstanding as well as being issued with a discharge
45 Interview with Sergeant Buba at Andaha 12 March 2004.
46 Ibid.
47 The letter o f Audu Wamba in NAK Wamba District DEP/64: Royal West Africa Frontier Force General 
Correspondence, 1945.
48 Ibid.
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certificate. At the end of our disengagement, we received all our 
financial entitlements with gratuity.49
The earlier promise of a better life after the war became illusive after the ex-soldiers 
returned home. According to Baba Baduku, “after the war ended, we could not find 
employment with the government, but instead, they encouraged us to go back to our 
farms.”50 Based on the findings of the West African War Council established in 1945, the 
government decided that “farming should provide the greatest industry” for the absorption 
of the ex-servicemen to civilian life.51 In fact the position of the government was made 
known to the soldiers before their repatriation and demobilisation: “It was hoped that many 
of you who were fanners will return to your fauns and settle down among your own 
people.. .there will be a great demand for all the produce such as palm oil, palm kernels and 
groundnuts which this country produces, so there are good prospects for fanners prepared to 
work.”52 Those that did not want to go back to their villages were encouraged to settle in a 
specially designed farm settlement. Two of these fann settlements were established at 
Jama’a and Shendam to cater for ex-soldiers from Plateau province. In order to make the 
scheme successful, the government earned out advanced planning and research and gave the 
capital necessary for its success. Despite this, the Shendam resettlement scheme succeeded 
while that of Jama’a was closed down.
49 Interview with Sergeant Buba at Andaha 12 March 2004.
50 Interview with the late Baba Baduku at Akwanga, 6 March 2004.
51 NAK Wamba District DEP/64: Royal West Africa Frontier Force General Correspondence, 1940-45.
52 Ibid.
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Figure 5.2: Retired Sergeant Buba, April 2004
The ex-soldiers from Akwanga all returned home, hoping to find jobs with the 
Native Authority. They were not left under any illusions o f a guaranteed job on their return 
and Governor Richard issued a warning that the returning soldiers must be told that there “is 
no work available to them.”53 At the end o f the war, some o f the soldiers that returned to 
Akwanga experienced difficulties in securing jobs outside farming. The pre-war occupation 
o f the majority o f the demobilised soldiers was farming: therefore, they returned to their 
farms, while the Native Administration only employed five ex-servicemen. One other ex­
53 NAK Jos Prof 5/1 No. C174 Vol. H: Governor to Secretary of State, October 1945.
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soldier found a job with a trading firm.54 Buba and Audu Wamba were fortunate to secure 
jobs with the Native Authority police and Buba was posted to Andaha as the head of the 
yandoka.55
COLONIAL TIN MINING
Railway construction in Nigeria during the colonial period made possible the large- 
scale exploitation of its mineral resources. The railway enabled Plateau province to become 
an important exporter of tin during the First and the Second World Wars. The peoples of 
Akwanga contributed to this mining process. There have been studies carried out on tin 
mining in Plateau province, although they give little or no emphasis to Akwanga, which was 
part of the province and which also engaged in tin mining.56 It is difficult to document 
colonial tin mining in Akwanga, as the small-scale operations were not clearly differentiated 
in the reports of the Nigerian Mines Department. Possibly, smaller companies failed to 
supply the required information on a regular basis and record keeping was fairly casual.
The RNC was aware of local mining activities in what would later become Plateau 
province at the turn of the twentieth century. A representative of the RNC wrote in 1890 that 
tin “a new product, seemed to me to be of excellent quality.”57 Having received the 
information about the existence of tin in the Plateau region, the RNC laid claim to it, based 
on an earlier agreement with the emir of Bauchi in 1888 for an annual fee of £100 payable 
in salt.58 In 1902, the government issued the Mineral Proclamation and granted an exclusive
34 NAK Jos Prof STA/21: Akwanga Division Annual Reports, 1945-46.
55 Interview with Sergeant Buba at Andaha, 12 March 2004.
56 See the works of Freund, Capital and Labour, C.K. Gonyok, “A History of Tin Mining Industry on the 
Plateau,” Unpublished PhD Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria (1984); P. Bower, “The Mining 
Industry,” in M. Perham (ed), Mining, Commerce and Finance in Nigeria (London, 1947).
57 PRO Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 84/2109: Claude Macdonald’s Report, 1890.
58 NAK SNP 9/488/1923: Royalties on Mineral, Correspondence Relating to 1888-1905.
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licence (Number 1) to the RNC to prospect. The licence was issued at the cost of £2196 
under the terms of the proclamation.59 hi 1911, prospectors explored the possibilities of 
mining activities in Akwanga, which was then under Nasarawa province. In his earlier 
research based on a mineral survey of northern Nigeria, Dr. Falconer noted the frequent 
occurrence of tinstone in parts of Nasarawa province. This attracted a lot of attention 
because the localities where the deposits were found had easy access to the Benue, down 
which most of the ore was shipped, before the construction of the railway.60 The interest in 
Nasarawa tin reached its peak in June 1912 with the discovery of the Jama’a “lode” which 
attracted a considerable number of mining prospectors into the province. The colonial 
government halted attempts at exploration by the mining companies because the region was 
not fully brought under British control. The government order was ignored by Mr. Campbell 
however, who as we have seen in Chapter 2, continued to prospect in the area until his 
murder at Wulko in May 1912.61 After the Wulko incident, the government refused to grant 
mining licences in Akwanga because the area was considered to be unsettled.62
Before the advent of the British into Akwanga, local people did not engage in tin 
mining.63 During the colonial period, tin mining was carried out mainly in the Nungu and 
Mama districts, although other parts of the division had smaller tin deposits, hi 1913, Mr. 
Malcolm wrote a report on the mining areas of Akwanga. On the northern and southern 
districts, he noted:
59 Ibid.
60 C. Raeburn, “The Tin Fields of Nassarawa and Ilorin Provinces,” Geological Suiyey o f  Nigeria 5 
(1924), p.9.
61 NAK SNP15: Annual Report, Kano Province, 1909-1910; NAK, SNP7/2726/1912 Campbell, D.A. 
Prospector, Death of.
62 PRO CO 446/106: Tinfields, Prospecting on the Ferin Rua [sic], 1912.
63 Interview with Baba Usman at Andaha, 22 March 2004; Interview with Muhammadu Allahnana at 
Marmara, 28 February 2004.
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Wai-Wai has a prospecting camp in its vicinity... the people are 
friendly and gave no trouble. Gudi is a small mining camp 
occupied by the tin trading company... Europeans and labourers 
can move freely in any direction... in Gako and Wulko, I found the 
attitude of the people perfectly friendly and more intelligence 
displayed than in the Northern parts of the Districts.64
A trigonometrical survey was earned out in 1927, which was completed by 1929 and 
resulted in the opening of Wana and Nunku districts to prospectors, hi June 1929, 
considerable prospecting was carried out in these districts. The East Africa Explorers had 
also taken up leases south of the Mada hills.65 Commenting on tin mining amongst the Mada 
people, an informant, Baba Usman noted:
My grandfather told me that the white tin miner came with an 
interpreter to tell the Mada people they had come to work 
peacefully and not to fight. My grandfather agreed to lead the 
European miner to the stream where they searched and found out 
there were tin deposits around the Mada hills. Consequently, my 
grandfather was entrusted with the work of building the mining 
camp, which he did and later became the caretaker of the camp.66
The peoples of Akwanga were initially reluctant to work in the tin mines. For 
instance, an attempt by the European miners to persuade the Kantana people to work in the
64 NAK SNP 10/520p/1913: Provincial Annual Report, Nasarawa, 1913.
65 NAK Jos Prof 44/1932: Southern Division, Report on for 1931-32.
66 Interview with Baba Usman at Andaha, 22 March 2004.
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mines was unsuccessful: “they looked upon the whole matter as a joke and learned readily, 
but fast as the tin was won they flung it back into the stream. When told that the tin could be 
converted into money they said that they could neither eat nor drink money and that the 
same applied to tin.”67 Recruitment of labour for the mines was not difficult during the dry 
season as paid labour was one of the quickest means of obtaining cash for tax payments. The 
mining camp “forms a source from which money can be obtained for payment of tax after 
two or three weeks work.”68
The mining work force was made up both of the people from Akwanga and migrants 
from within and outside the province. The wages paid to the mine labourers varied 
according to their skill. The local people worked as casual labourers, initially at the lowest 
and most unskilled level, carrying soil in the head pans while Hausa permanent workers held 
semi-skilled positions. According to an informant, Muhammadu Allahnana:
The people we met in control at the tin mines in Marmara were 
Hausa. They treated us badly. They would get the soil and put in 
our headpans, not minding our strength to carry it. When the 
process is nearing the tin ore, the soil became watery.. .they used to 
put watery soil in the headpans so that it would be pouring on our 
faces. When we told them that what they were doing was bad, they 
ignored us.69
Before the construction of the Bauchi light railway in 1913, Hausa porters earned 
most of the tin to the coast, hi 1908, it was carried at the cost of £29.10s per ton and only
67 NAK Jos Prof 2/10/2627: Resident Nasarawa Province to Secretary, Northern Provinces, 1918.
68 SNP17/11263: Notes on Akwanga Division by Captain Masterton Smith, 1928.
69 Interview with Muhammadu Allahnana at Marmara, 28 February 2004.
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545 tons were exported.70 The completion of the light railway from Bukuru to Zaria 
increased exports to 6,545 tons by 1914, reaching 13,009 tons in 1928. The costs of freights 
of tin were further reduced from about £11 to £8 per ton when the eastern railway from Port 
Harcourt reached Plateau.71 The reduction in the cost of transport made Nigeria a leading 
exporter of tin. The completion of the railway to the tin field rendered thousands of porters, 
who used to carry tin ore to the coast, jobless. However, the mining companies operating in 
the area absorbed most of them.72 The new railway construction also made it possible to 
easily supply artisan labour from the southern part of Nigeria to the tin mines. The influx of 
labourers from parts of Nigeria to seek employment in the mines resulted in labour glut 
experienced in 1914, which led to the reduction of wages from 9d to 6d a day.73
However, the outbreak of the First World War* increased the demand for tin, pushing 
the price from £150 per ton in 1913 to £200 in 1915.74 Earlier in 1914, because of the 
reduction in wages, the supply of labour to the mines decreased from 17,883 employed in 
1914 to 14,316 in 1915.75 By the end of 1915, the mining companies were forced to increase 
wages, which stimulated a steady supply of labour. By 1916, the number of workers had 
increased to 19,25 0.76 The war brought a steady increase in the demand for labour and 
taxation was used as a weapon of coercion to induce labour supply to the mines. In 1918, the 
Ministry of Munitions in London requested for increase in tin production from Nigeria, 
which resulted in an even greater demand for transport and mine labour. The mining 
companies suggested to the colonial administration that labour should be conscripted, but
70 Bower, “Mining Industry,” p. 16.
71 Ibid.
72 NAK SNP11 32m/1913: Government Inspector of Mines, Notes on the Tin Mines, 1912.
73 NAK SNP11 36m/1914: Nigeria Chamber of Mines. Annual Report o f Work for the Year Ended 1914.
74 NAK SNP 11 207m/1914: Mines Departmental Annual Report, 1914, 1915.
75 Ibid.
76 NAK SNP 17 ARI/27: Annual Report of the Mines Department for the Year 1916 to 1919.
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the government responded that it did not wish to use even “mild coercion on the Plateau 
pagans.”77 However, in June 1919, the Nigerian Chamber of Mines unanimously passed a 
resolution that the government should increase the rate of taxation in order to induce labour 
supply to the mines.78 In September 1919, the colonial administration notified the Chamber 
of Mines that a 10 per cent increase had been levied on the local people and by 1921 the rate 
of taxation had gone up by a total of 28 per cent over the rate in 1919.79
The tin boom of the 1920s was shattered by the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
which had a disastrous consequence on the economy of the mining communities. During the 
depression years, there was a sharp reduction in tin output and a drastic reduction in the 
number of workers and their wages, as the tin price slumped from £200 in May 1929 to 
£105 in December 1930.80 According to the Resident of Plateau province, this had great
consequences for the people of Plateau who had come to rely on the tin industry for the sale
» * 81 of both their labour and food in order to pay their taxes. The mining companies responded
to the depression by reducing their workforce and the wage bill for African workers
declined from £665,000 in 1928 to £98,000 in 1933.82 In addition, the mining companies
retrenched many of their workers and also forced those that were still at work to accept
grain as part payment for wages. The retrenchment of workers by the mining companies left
the affected people without any alternative means of employment. Those mostly affected
were immigrants from outside the province who had no farms to go back to and some of
them therefore moved to Wamba, Jos and Bukuru townships in search of petty jobs while
77 Nigeria Chamber of Mines, Minutes for Meeting for November 1918.
78 NAK SNP 10/125p/1919: Labour for Mines, 1918.
79 Ibid.
80 NAK Jos Prof 21/45: Plateau Province Annual Report, 1930.
81 NAK Jos Prof 24/11/1932: Plateau Province Annual Report, 1931.
82 Freund, Capital and Labour, p.82.
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others took to stealing. There was a dramatic increase in the number of theft and burglary 
incidents as a result o f the economic hardships experienced by the retrenched workers and in 
1931, the Resident of Plateau wrote:
while one naturally felt the deepest sympathy with those who 
suffered loss through burglary or theft, it must be remembered that 
the mining companies, when closing down their machinery, merely 
paid off their African artisans and then left them to fend for
themselves at a time when cost of living was high and further
* 83employment impossible to obtain.
The outbreak of the Second World War had a dramatic effect on the demand for 
labour in the tin mines. The British loss of Malaya to Japan in 1942 meant that Britain had 
lost its most valuable source of tin and the government therefore moved towards a policy of 
stimulating production in Nigeria. However, war time conditions meant that importing 
machinery for mines was difficult and in order to meet high production targets the 
government had resort to the conscription of forced labour, which had been outlawed in 
1933. Large-scale conscription for tin production in wartime, especially for private 
companies, was a departure from the government policy of forced labour. The British 
government, however, argued that conscription was necessary for the war effort and came 
under category (d) of the provisions of Article 2 of the forced labour convention.84 In order 
to give a human face to the conscription of forced labour to the tin mines, Orde-Browne of 
the Colonial Office argued that the work in Nigerian mines was “much more akin to
83 NAK Jos Prof 2/24/11/1932; Plateau Province, Annual Report, 1931.
84 NAK Jos Prof 3/1/2018/S2; Mines field Labour- Reports 1942-43.
222
agriculture.. .being merely the shifting of soil.”85 Between February and July 1942, a total of 
19,200 labourers were needed for the mines and only 8,000 were supplied.86 The failure to 
conscript labour was attributed to inadequate organisation, food problems, inadequate 
training and a lack of supervision.87 hi February 1942, the Mines Labour Advisory 
Committee was formed in Jos under the chairmanship of the Chief Inspector of Mines. Its 
purpose was to allocate labour quotas to the provinces earned only to arrange transport and 
the distribution of labourers to the mines and to supervise food supplies and welfare. 
Labourers were expected to remain in the mines for at least two months, but some of them 
deserted after only a week because of the lack of adequate welfare facilities. As a result of 
the high rate of desertion, the Resident of Plateau proposed that deserters should be searched 
for and retrieved through the NA system, using the same method as done for soldiers. If 
caught, deserters were liable to two weeks imprisonment and a full sixteen weeks labour 
service on the mines.88 Conscript labourers received 2/8d per day and a free blanket at the 
expense of the Ministry of Supply.89 Some colonial officials were detailed to engage in a 
propaganda tour around the divisions of Plateau province in order to encourage labour 
supply to the mines.90 The NAs in Akwanga, as part of their contribution to the war effort, 
recruited political labour for mines in Wamba and the government especially acknowledged 
Wamba NA for its “helpful” recruitment.91 The conscripts to the mines in Wamba during the
85 PRO CO 583/269: Compulsory Labour Mines, 1940-45; PRO CO 30569/1 Orde-Browne Memoranda, 
1942.
86 PRO CO 583/269: Compulsory Labour Mines, 1940-45.
87 NAK Jos Prof 3/1/2018/S2: Mines Field Labour' Reports 1942-43 and Mines Field Labour- Regulation of 
wages and conditions of service, 1944.
88 NAK Jos Prof 1/2018/S.2: Reports on Minesfield Labour, 1942.
89 NAK Jos Prof 1/1/12018/S.2: Reports on Minefield Labour, 1943.
90 NAK Jos Prof 17/4/33018: Plateau Province Annual Report, 1942.
91 NAK Jos Prof 4825:Southern Division, Half Yearly and Annual, 1942.
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war were called diban gwamna (Governor’s conscripts). According to one informant, 
Usman Ali:
The conscription to the mines started during the outbreak of the 
war. We were not told the nature of the job awaiting us in the 
mines, but we were informed that instead of forcing us to go to the 
war front, our contribution was to work in the mines. This, of 
course, was a fair bargain to us. The District Officer, accompanied 
by the police, usually went to the village heads and notifies them 
about the number of people their respective villages would need to 
supply. Our village head distributed sticks to correspond with the 
number of people required and those that had the stick were forced 
to go to the mines. Those that refused to go were fined 5 shillings,
92which was a big money in those days.
It was the high death rate among the Tiv labourers from Benue province, which 
reached 10 per cent in 1943, that caused deep concern in the Colonial Office and House of 
Commons and led to the end of forced labour in the tin mines.93 The continued criticism of 
labour conscription into the mines resulted in the Colonial Office being advised by one of its 
staff, Gerald Creasy, in August 1943, that it was time to end conscription.94 It was 
consequently decided that the best results would be achieved by raising the number of 
conscripts on the mines as high as possible during the dry season of 1943-44 and then by
92 Interview with Usman Ali at Kwarra, 23 April 2004.
93 H. Macmillan, Blasts o f  War, 1939-1945 (London, 1967), 169-71; Freund, Labour and Capital, 147.
94 Freund, Capital and Labour, p. 148.
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stopping conscription completely at the end o f April 1944, just before the farming season 
began.
The supply o f labour to the mines was determined by the wages the mining 
companies were willing to pay and any reduction on wages resulted in a decrease in labour. 
However, according to one informant, some labourers were tied to their life in the mines by 
their love o f women, beer and gambling.1)5 In order to meet their daily requirements for 
food, labourers attached themselves to uwar tuwo (food seller) who supplied food at an 
agreed price for the week. It was estimated that between 30 and 40 per cent o f the worker’s 
weekly wages went to the uwar tuwo while the remaining amount was spent on taxes, 
gambling and prostitutes.96 However, some labourers avoided making arrangements with the 
uwar tuwo by bringing their own food to the camp for the duration o f their stay.97
Figure 5.3: Muhammadu Allahnana at Marmara, March 2004
Alcohol was another expense for miners. In fact, the mining companies encouraged taking 
o f alcohol in their camps by sponsoring the brewing o f local beer. The companies recruited
95 Interview with Muhammadu Allahnana at Marmara on 28 February 2004.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
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women and paid them a wage to brew and sell beer to the labourers. They also supplied 
guinea com to the brewers at cost price.98 The range of alcoholic beverages brewed in the 
camps was burukutu, pito and busa. A slightly milder and sweeter form of beer, busa was 
often used for introducing labourers who were not used to taking alcohol into the beer 
drinking habit.99 From initially drinking busa, the labourer would graduate to either 
burukutu or pito : the former was the most common form of beer that was brewed while the 
latter was the more refined brand extracted from burukutu. The gidanje giya (beer parlours) 
were run by women hired by mining companies. They were known as magajiyoyi and were 
assisted by bar attendants who were mostly karuwai (prostitutes). They rented rooms in the 
camps to conduct their business and were patronised by the labourers.100 The customers at 
the beer parlours were entertained by masun goge (musicians) who always came to Wamba 
on Fridays and visited the gidajen giya 011 Saturdays to sing. Thus, apart from paying the 
uwar tuwo over 30 per cent o f their wages, the labourers spent a reasonable amount of the 
remaining money on beer and prostitutes. The labourers, under the influence of alcohol, 
engaged in cha cha (gambling), which was earned out close to the beer parlours. Gambling 
was rife in the camps especially in Ninkada and Marmara.101 The yan cha cha (gamblers) 
spread their mats by the beer parlours and the labourers gambled their wages in the vain 
hope of winning more money. This hardly ever happened since gambling was essentially a 
syndicate whereby its organisers were in command of the tricks involved and they simply 
cheated those who invested in the game.102 Labourers who abstained from consuming of
Ibicl.
99 Interview with Baba Usman at Andaha, 22 March 2004; Interview with Usman Ali at Kwarra, 23 April 
2004; Interview with Muhammadu Allahnana at Marmara, 28 February 2004.
100/bid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
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alcohol often spent their money on gambling. Gambling was a major drain on the wages of 
the labourers and in 1951, the Resident of Plateau observed:
The fantastic extravagance of the average labourer and his lack of 
appreciation of the need to save against the future and wasteful 
habits such as gambling, tend to have a disturbing effect on prices 
and other corrupting influences. Many consider that the 
introduction of a wage-eaming economy to certain areas has 
contributed to the decline in the standard of morality and a 
tendency to break away from established traditions, good or bad.103
Their addictions to drinking, prostitution and gambling left some of the labourers in 
perpetual poverty. Whenever wages were paid on Saturdays, the barkokin huza (mining 
camps) were busy with traders bringing cloth, food and other items for sale.104 It should be 
noted that some of the labourers, before the weekly wage payments, were already indebted 
to the magagiyoyi, karuwai and uwar tuwo for their sendees and the money was therefore 
used to clear outstanding debts and sometimes to make advanced payments with the 
remainder.105 This created a vicious cycle of debt, in which the labourers spent their wages 
before they were received, resulting in an enforced stay in the mining camps. Drunkenness 
also seriously undermined the productivity of the workers.106 The mine managers insisted
103 NAK Jos Prof 114: Plateau Province, Notes on by the Residents, 1935-55.
104 Interview with Lasisi at Wamba, 1 March 2004.
105 Ibid.
106 Interview with Muhammadu Allahnana at Marmara, 28 February 2004.
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that the magagiyoyi at Marmara and Ninkada should therefore only brew beer for
j  107consumption from Friday to Sunday.
Figure 5.4: The two remaining labourer’s quarters at Marmara, built in the 1930s
Traditional tools such as hoes, spades and calabashes were used for tin mining. 
Mining companies provided these tools for their workers and also paid for damage to the
equipment. In some cases, the companies employed blacksmiths to repair broken tools such
• 108 • • as diggers and head pans which were used in the mining process. The capitalist take-over
o f the tin mines did not improve the technology employed in the mining industry. The tin
ore that was exported before the outbreak o f the First World War was produced using
traditional methods. In other words, colonial tin mining companies “were only doing on a
large scale what the black man has been doing for generations.” ,og The only machinery
introduced into the tin fields were head pans and shovels. According to Freund, the tools o f
production remained what they had been and “in fact the industry regressed through the
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Calvert, Nigeria and its Tin, p. 137.
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elimination of smelting.”110 He further maintained that the principal changes that had 
occurred included the brutal subjugation of the peoples of Plateau, the complete destruction 
of the indigenous tin industry and the dispossession of the local population's land through 
legislation.111
The granting of mining licences to the mining companies by the government raises a 
fundamental question of land ownership in Akwanga. The communities in the area 
depended on fanning, with sectoral supplements such as hunting, fishing and craft 
production, for survival. After the incorporation of northern Nigeria into the British Empire, 
the government made a series of proclamations regarding land and its ownership. According 
to Lugard, these land proclamations began the process of weakening and undennining the 
pre-capitalist mode of production.112 The 1900 proclamation made by Lugard in Lokoja, by 
implication gave the colonial government the lands hitherto acquired by the RNC through 
treaties with the Caliph and emirs. However Lugard, in 1901, ordered for the registration of 
the RNC “lands” and Proclamation Number 16 of 1902 divided land in the region into 
Crown and Public lands.113 Crown lands included all mineral lands and lands that were 
“granted” to the RNC and public lands covered those that the local chiefs administered 
through customary laws. These lands were, according to Lugard, preserved for the “natives” 
and no European firm was allowed to use them to engage in agricultural production. In 
1913, the colonial administration introduced the Land Acquisition Proclamation that gave 
the government the right to the freehold of lands that were required for “public purposes.”114
110 Freund, Capital and Labour, p.40.
xn Ibid, p.41.
112 Lugard, Dual Mandate, pp.294-300.
113 PRO CO 16701: Land (amendment) Draft Proclamation, 1905; PRO CO 32218: Proclamation 11 1906 
“Land Amendments.”
114 NAK SNP 9 1147/1914 Northern Nigeria Annual Report, 1913.
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The proclamation gave the government the power to determine or define what the public 
interest was, in relation to the required land. This meant that requests for land, either for 
mining or for the establishment of churches, had to be approved by the colonial 
government.115 Similar to the land proclamations were the Mineral Proclamations that 
affected the mining communities of Akwanga. These Mineral Proclamations made 
provisions for mining leaseholders to pay landowners an amount of money, which was fixed 
by the colonial government and the former were to compensate the latter for any damage to 
either crops or buildings.116 Despite these provisions, the government did little or nothing to 
prevent mining companies from felling trees. They also did not ensure trees were replanted 
and as a consequence this source o f fuel became more expensive for both the mining 
companies and the local communities.117 Deforestation also had an adverse effect on the 
mining communities in terms of soil erosion. The colonial land policy for mining puiposes 
stipulated that the holders of a mining lease may, without holding a right of occupancy,
disturb crops, demolish buildings and growing timber and generally do anything on the
118surface of the land necessary for the conduct of mining operations.
Demand for land by the mining companies was far greater and more aggressive in 
Bukuru and Jos than in Akwanga.119 The scramble for land in Jos division resulted in the 
Berom people being ejected from their lands and their crops being destroyed without any 
compensation, although the government maintained that compensation was to be paid at a
115 Going through the archival records in Kaduna, especially SNP11, M Series has hundreds of such 
applications for land permits by either the mining companies or the Missions and also private individuals.
116 Bower, “Mining Industry,” p.7.
117 Ibid.
118 See KIL Microfilm Box 985: Mineral Proclamations of Northern Nigeria, 1902-1904.
119 See Freund, Capital and Labour and Bower, “Mining Industry,” for detailed discussion on the 
conditions of the Birom people regarding the effect of tin mining on their land and livelihood.
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rate of £2 per acre.120 The government was alarmed by the amount of land demanded by 
European mining companies and, as a result, allocated one hundred acres to the indigenous 
miners.121 Soon, such concessions were translated into money payments of £26-1 Os per 
annum for local miners. These payments however, never reached local miners and they were 
forced to abandon their livelihoods. It should be noted that Akwanga was a subsidiary to the 
dominant mining companies operating in Jos division and only parts of the division were 
directly affected by tin mining. The communities that were most affected were Marmara, 
Ninkada, Rafin Tabo, Bar kin Teacher, Barkin Waja, and Gungo. Although tin mining had 
great impact on the economy of Akwanga by creating a market for foodstuffs, which 
transformed the economy of the local people; the impact of mining was linked with
* » 199ecological deterioration, which in turn intensified pressure on agricultural production. 
Extensive deforestation, partly caused by mining companies and mine labourers, led to 
erosion at Ninkada, Marmara and Rafin Tabo, which destroyed farmlands. Worse still, the 
land where tin mining took place was the most fertile and fanners of the villages affected 
were forced to fann in infertile lands. This was in addition to a higher rate of taxation, which 
as we have already seen in the previous chapter, was higher in Wamba district. As a result, 
some of the local people were forced to abandon their farms altogether and work in the 
mines as labourers in order to earn money.123
The direct expropriation of land for mining purposes was only one of the new forces 
putting pressure on agriculture within the mining communities in Akwanga. Colonial 
legislation made all land in northern Nigeria the property of the crown, thus, the peoples of
120 Bower, “Mining Industry,” p. 14.
12J Ibid, p.5.
122 The impact o f tin mining on the economy of Akwanga has already been discussed in Chapter 4.
123 Interview with Muhammadu Allahnana at Marmara, 28 February 2004.
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the region had no right either to forbid mining nor bargain for compensation under the 
Mineral Ordinance of 1916. As Freund argued, even where compensations were paid, the 
mining companies usually made their arrangements without any recourse to administrative 
adjudication.124 The mining companies and the government did not take the issue of land 
compensation seriously until in late 1940s. In 1945, it was claimed that the “general attitude 
of the mining community can best be described as one of injured innocence and passive 
resistance to the settlement of just claims.”125 However, cash compensation was no 
substitute for the land which would have given the fanner, and his children after him, a 
permanent means of livelihood. Even when, in 1950, compensation rose to £32 an acre, cash 
was difficult for an illiterate fanner to invest, and much of it was flittered away.126
CONCLUSION
Labour in the colonial period was acquired and controlled through the intimately 
linked policies of taxation, colonial law and policing, thus provoking resentment from local 
people. The recruitment of labour for the execution of colonial projects had an effect on the 
agricultural sector, as the withdrawal of productive labour affected food production in the 
region. When farmers were hit by a natural disaster after the construction of the railway, a 
lack of surpluses stored from previous fanning seasons resulted in food shortages. 
Furthermore, colonial legislation regarding the lease of lands for mining purposes added to 
the pressure on agricultural production. Fertile lands in the Wamba region were taken over 
for tin mining without due compensation for the local farmers and, even in 1945 when the 
government began to pay compensation, this was not commensurate with the losses suffered
124 Freund, Labour and Capital, p. 159.
125 NAK Jos Prof 2/26/12601: Plateau Province, Annual Report, 1945.
126 NAK Jos Prof 27/2057: Plateau Province, Annual Report, 1950.
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by the local fanners and their families. In addition, mining had environmental consequences 
on the land as it caused erosion. The government did not take this issue seriously until after 
the Second World War, which was, by then, too late to make any significant difference.
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CHAPTER SIX
RELIGIOUS ENCOUNTER IN AKWANGA, 1926-1955
The aim of the chapter is to explore how the peoples of Akwanga responded to 
Christianity and Islam and how they adapted to the changes brought by these faiths 
during the colonial period. The Akwanga region became a hunting ground for both 
Christian and Muslim missionaries seeking converts to their respective religions. Since 
the local religions did not seek converts outside their kinship groups, the two world 
religions were left to compete for prospective converts. Missionaries of these two 
religions engaged in theological debates that were centered around rituals for the worship 
of God and the nature of Christ and Mohammed as proclaimed mediators with God. 
However, the open support during the 1950s of the Northern Regional Government to the 
spread of Islam took religious encounter to a different level. Christian missionaries 
started a propaganda war with Islam, which had political and social implications in the 
region. The events of the 1950s also triggered the development of self-rule in the local 
churches, which then became a political network for Christians struggling against Muslim 
domination.
ISLAM DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD
As already mentioned in Chapter 1, Islam came to Akwanga in the mid 
nineteenth century through Nunku in the northern paid of the division and Muslim clerics
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played an important role in the spread of the new faith in the district. Regarding Mada 
traditional religion, Norton-Traill, the Divisional Officer of Jama’a in 1913 observed 
that: “the M ada.. .believes in one God inhabiting the sky, who is all good and all 
powerful...this idea of one God was not as far as could be ascertained a modem idea 
introduced perchance by some wandering Mohammedans.”1 However, Islam did not 
penetrate other parts of the division until after the establishment of colonial rule. Islam 
made its first leap in the central and western parts of Akwanga when, in 1905, the 
jurisdiction of the emirs of Keffi, Lafia and Jama’a was extended to the region. This was 
followed by the appointment of Bashayi, a Fulani as District Head over the Mada and 
Eggon people in the central district of Akwanga in 1913. In the creation of native 
administrative structures, the government employed the Hausa-Fulani, who were mostly 
Muslims, to take charge of the various departments of the Native Administration at the 
divisional headquarters in Wamba. Therefore, Muslim influence began to be felt 
amongst the peoples of Akwanga, as observed by one colonial official in 1914:
It can hardly be doubted that the practice of placing large numbers of 
pagans under Fulani District Head and supporting the authority of 
these by the powers of government when and where necessary led to 
an extension of Islam...The pagan headman tended to start wearing 
Muslim dress especially when they were called into meetings at the 
District Headquarters and this donning of the garb of the Muslim 
often proved that first step to Islam.
1 PRO CO 959/2: Captain H.L Norton Traill Correspondence, 1913; NAK SNP 10/706p: H.L. Norton- 
Traill to Resident Nasarawa, July 1913.
2 NAK SNP 9/820: Mada District, Plateau Province - Administration of, 1914.
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The first Rindre and Kantana men in Wamba district to be converted to Islam 
were mcilam Mohammed Kore and Mohammed Waya respectively. According Yusuf 
Maikano:
Islam was introduced to us at Wamba by Mohammed [Kore]. hi 
those days, Lafla emirate paid their taxes here [Wamba] and the 
emir’s representatives, who were Muslims, usually brought it with 
them. These Muslims from Lafia introduced Mohammed to Islam 
and soon afteiwards those that were close to him were converted.
Majority of the people refused to join Islam and remained pagans.3
At the early stage of its development in Wamba, Islam was confined to the District Head 
Mohammed Kore and his close associates, who played a major role in the spread of 
Islam in the surrounding villages, hi the village of Kantana, it was Mohammed Waya 
who introduced the local people to Islamic influence. According to an informant: 
Mohammed Waya, a man from Kpara, who was converted to Islam 
in Lafia, introduced Islam into Kantana. He was fond of using scent 
so we ran away from him because his body smelt and when we saw 
him with white clothes we also ran away from him. But later some 
people joined him because he was neatly dressed.. .the elders 
refused to join.4
3 Interview with Yusuf Maikano at Wamba, 22 March 2004.
4 Interview at Kantana with Adamu Sale, 3 April 2004.
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The elders in Kantana were hostile to Islam when it was first introduced. However, the 
adaptability of Islam to local customs meant that new converts were able to worship 
baku (ancestor spirits) and Allah at the same time.5 Gradually, a few people began to 
become interested in the new religion.
One of the reasons behind the spread of Islam in Akwanga during the colonial 
period was the Pax Britannica. British law and order gave great impetus to the 
expansion of Islam by facilitating the movements of Islamic agents. During the colonial 
period, Muslim traders could enter any settlement in the region without fear, for British 
justice would clamp down hard on any village that murdered such strangers. For 
example, in 1928, two Eggon men were sentenced to death for killing a Hausa man to 
serve as a deterrent to their kinsmen.6 With their security guaranteed, Muslim traders 
began to take their goods into the hills and come into contact with the local people. The 
exposure of Eggon people to Islam was gradual and it began by the adoption of Muslim 
names. According to an informant, Abdul Ebuga: “when I was born, a Hausa trader that 
came to the hills asked my parents to call me Abdul, and they did. Some people also 
began to change their names and that was how some of them became Muslims.”7 
Exposure to Islam as a consequence of British rule was not particular to the Eggon 
people. Meek has observed similar trends throughout northern Nigeria in 1925:
By the opening of communications pagans and Muslims are coming 
into contact.. .(the pagan) soon realizes the narrowness o f his own 
religion compared to the universality of Islam...this belief in evil 
spirits is not affected by his outward change of faith. He finds too that
5 Ibid.
6 Sir Rex Niven, Nigerian Kaleidoscope: Memoirs o f  a Colonial Servant (London, 1982), p. 106.
7 Interview with Abdul Ebuga at Nasarawa Eggon, 23 March 2004.
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the Muslims are tolerant and they have better houses, better clothes,
o
and a better knowledge of the world than he.
Colonial rule in Akwanga also gave opportunities to the Hausa-Fulani to work at 
the tin mines in Wamba and for employment in the central administration. Tin mining 
played an important role in the Islamisation of the peoples of Akwanga. Some of the 
local labour migrants to the mines from other districts of the division became separated 
from the rituals and structures of their religions. They felt lost because their traditional 
religion could not offer adequate rationale of life in their new environment. 
Additionally, they felt socially excluded and as a consequence became vulnerable. One 
of my informants, Allahnana, observed:
When we came to work at the mines in Marmara, we became 
isolated from our kinsmen, but found ourselves working with 
Muslims and under a Muslim overseer. At work we discovered that 
a Muslim overseer tended to favour his fellow Muslim and when 
we returned home, we decided not only to become Muslims, but 
also persuade our family to convert to Islam.9
Conversion to Islam was simple. Muslims attracted non-Muslims by practical 
offers and made few initial demands on them for cultural renunciation, but they also 
knew how vital it was to keep up preaching to the converted. According to Alhaji Salihu, 
the would-be convert turned to a malam for the necessary ritual, which was brief and
8 Meek, Northern Tribes, p.8.
9 Interview with Muhammadu Allahnana at Marmara, 22 May 2003.
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superficial, consisting only in memorising a few s u r a t  (verses) of the Koran. This was
followed by a declaration of faith during a service in the mosque.10 After the completion
of the ritual, the new convert was given a turban as a visible sign of the conversion. The
observances of Muslim rituals followed by the peoples of Akwanga were as simple as
the procedure of conversion. The basic duties of Muslims -  bearing witness to one God;
reciting the five daily prayers; giving alms; observing the fast and making the pilgrimage
to Mecca -  were for most people in the region reduced to two, daily prayer and fasting.11
Pilgrimage to Mecca was practically impossible because the few converts could not
afford to travel to the holy land; bearing witness and reciting of the Koran was also
* 1 ^difficult because the local converts had no in-depth knowledge of the new religion. "
THE SUM AND THE CONVERSION OF THE “PAGANS” OF CENTRAL 
NIGERIA
Christian missionary activities in northern Nigeria began in the late nineteenth 
century with the activities of the Church Missionary Society (CMS). In 1892, the Hausa 
Association was formed in Britain in memory of J.A. Robinson, whose brother Cannon 
Robinson was sent to leam Hausa in the Hausa community in Tripoli in 1893. hr 1894, 
he went to Lokoja and later spent three months in Kano. He reported back in 1895 about 
the readiness of the Hausa to receive the missionaries. Camion Robinson, like other 
missionaries of his time, were of the assumption that the Hausa, some of whom were 
literate, were capable of understanding the “metaphysical truths” of Christianity. It was 
hoped that once the Hausa accepted the new religion, they would help to spread it to “the
10 Interview with Alhaji Idirisu at Gudi, 14 March 2004.
11 Interview with Yusuf Maikano at Wamba, 22 March 2004.
12 Ibid.
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less healthy and less enlightened parts of the continent.”13 The CMS began to prepare to 
send missionaries into northern Nigeria and in 1898, a number of missionaries were sent 
again to Tripoli to study Hausa. In 1895, Bishop Tugwell had made an exploratory 
journey to Bida and the following year he visited Keffi, where the emir had said that he 
would welcome the missionaries.14 On his return to England, he met with Lugard in 
London and requested his support as the newly appointed High Commissioner of 
northern Nigeria. Lugard agreed to support them but advised the missionaries not to go 
into areas where the government could not guarantee them appropriate security.15
The missionaries who left England under the direction of Bishop Tugwell were 
Dr. Miller, Burgin, Ryder and Richardson. When they arrived in Lolcoja, Lugard 
informed them of the security situation and advised that they should only go as far as 
Daba (a town about a hundred miles from Bida). They however, by-passed Daba 
deciding to continue their journey into the heart of Hausaland and were welcomed at 
Zaria en route to Kano. The emir of Zaria, Kwassau, provided the missionaries with 
accommodation and insisted that they should stay in the town. Although the gesture of 
the emir was politically motivated, the missionaries accepted it and later advised him to 
submit to the British authority, which would guarantee his throne and his subsequent 
survival in the new dispensation.16
The success the missionaries had in Zaria gave them the confidence to head for 
Kano, which was the largest Hausa city. They were however denied access into the city
13 E.A. Ayandele, “The Missionary Factor in Northern Nigeria, 1870-1918,” Journal o f  the Historical 
Society’ o f  Nigeria 3 (1966), p.504.
14 E.P.T. Crampton, Christianity in Northern Nigeria (London, 1975), p.37.
15 This became a major problem later between Lugard and Bishop Tugwell, as the former did not honour 
his part of the agreement.
16 Church Missionary Society (hereafter CMS) G3/A9/OL Miller to Baylis, 18 February 1902.
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and were taken to meet the emir, Aliyu outside the city walls. They were humiliated and 
ordered to remove their shoes and stockings and were not allowed to look at the emir in 
face. They were told by the emir that the Koran had everything they desired to have and
17they were subsequently ordered to leave Kano within two days. After their expulsion
from Kano they came through Zaria and the emir who had earlier welcomed them now
became hostile, but reluctantly allowed them to settle at Girku to the south. The mission
1 ^to Kano was, according to Miller, a colossal blunder. It became obvious for the 
missionaries that the conversion of the Hausa-Fulani was not to be as easy as they 
thought. Lugard advised that they should concentrate their energies instead on the 
“pagan” peoples of central Nigeria.19 He was anxious not to offend the emirs, who were 
the integral part of his indirect rule system. The desire of the Christian missionaries to 
evangelise the “pagans” in central Nigeria in order to counter the expansion of Islam led 
to the formation of the Sudan United Mission (SUM), which dominated missionary 
activities in Akwanga.
The SUM was foimded in 1904. One of its leaders was Grattan Guinness, who 
edited a magazine designed to promote interest in mission to Africa. According to Boer, 
Guinness and the other evangelicals were alarmed by the fact that Africa was in 
imminent danger of becoming a Muslim continent.20 According to the head of the SUM, 
Karl Kumm, the reason for the founding of the mission was “to counteract the Moslem 
advance among the pagan tribes in the Benue region. This camiot be done by going to
17 CMS. G3/A9/01: Richardson to Baylis, 26 July 1900; PRO C.O. 446/7: Lugard to Colonial Office, 
1899 and PRO CO 446/14: Lugard To Colonial Office, 27 February 1901.
18 W. Miller, Reflections o f  a Pioneer (London, 1936), p. 13.
19 CMS. G3/A9/01: Memo of interview with Lugard, 23 July 1906.
20 J.H. Boer, Missions: Heralds o f  Capitalism or Christ? (Ibadan, 1984), p.32.
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the Mohammedans, and therefore our work will lie among the pagan tribes.”21 The 
mission appealed to the public for at least 150 missionaries to be placed in some 50 
stations along the southern frontier of and it was hoped that for each tribe “at least three 
white missionaries, a medical man, an ordained educationist” could be found.22
In 1904, a party of three missionaries was sent to Tripoli to study Hausa. While 
at Tripoli, Kumm’s attention was drawn by the Resident of Bauchi province, Mr. 
Temple, to “a great Plateau with comparatively healthy country with a large population
9 9of pagans” as a suitable location for his proposed mission. In order to raise the funds 
necessary for the mission, Mrs. Lucy Kumrn wrote an impassioned open letter to British 
Christians, appealing to them to back the missionary adventure. “We plead for the 
neglected millions of the Sudan,” she wrote; “give yourself to the tremendous task of 
evangelising at last this greatest and most populous of all the wholly neglected regions 
of the surface of the globe.”24 Lucy’s letter resulted in the SUM council collecting £550, 
which was to provide for three men for the mission and the first year’s expenses.25 
Drawing from the experience of the failure of the CMS party at Kano, the SUM 
missionaries were not permitted by their council to “go forward blindly” and were 
warned not to be “ignorant of what serious developments might lie ahead.”26 The first 
party of the SUM left Liverpool on 23 July 1904 under the leadership of Dr. Karl 
Kumm, with Dr. Ambrose Bateman, John Burt and John Lowry M axwell27 They were 
commissioned to undertake an expedition of investigation and commence work in
21 K. Kumm, From Hausaland to Egypt through the Sudan (London, 1910), p.41.
22 Ibid.
23 J.L. Maxwell, H aifa  Centuiy o f  Grace: A Jubilee Histoiy o f  the Sudan United Mission (Belfast, 1952),
p.26.
24 Facing the Challenge: Sudan United Mission to Action Partners, 1904-2004 (Doncaster, 2004), p.4.
25 Ibid.
26 Maxwell, Centuiy o f  Grace, p.26.
27 Ibid, pp.3-10.
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Bauchi province. Their intention was to spread Christianity among the Jukun, Yergam, 
Birom and the freed slaves at Rumasha. Arriving at Lokoja they began their orientation 
with the assistance of two CMS missionaries while Kumm went to speak with Lugard. 
Lugard suggested beginning at Wase, which was about halfway between the Benue river 
and the Bauchi plateau.28 Lugard also allowed the SUM to import their supplies duty 
free and in addition granted a reduction in the fares for the missionaries using the 
government steamers.29 Wase station lasted until 1909, when it was closed down and 
Maxwell, writing retrospectively, observed:
I have sometimes thought that it was a pity that we did not, right 
at the first, settle it in our minds that we would not dig ourselves 
in anywhere until we had done a good deal more investigation.
We were easily brought to follow the suggestion of the High 
Commissioner, and stay at Wase. If we had looked around us 
more, we might have done better both for ourselves and for the 
work which was the reason for our coming to the country at 
all.30
The SUM soon realised the difficulty in carrying out this mission and therefore 
Kumm engaged himself in an international campaign to recruit missionaries from 
different countries. He went to the United States, Canada, New Zealand and South 
Africa and in each of these countries, branches of the SUM were established with its 
own independent mission in Nigeria. Karl Kumm visited South Africa in 1906 and
28 Ibid, p.38.
29 Lightbearers (March, 1905), p .8.
30 Maxwell, Centuiy o f  Grace, p.54.
243
through his preaching, many people heard the call to the mission’s service in Nigeria, 
including Reverend George Botha of the Dutch Reformed Church and Mr. Vincent 
Hosking, a member of the Methodist Church. They only arrived in Nigeria the following 
year as they first went to England to attend a six month course at Livingstone College, 
before proceeding to Nigeria in 1908.31 It was the South African branch of the SUM 
which later dominated missionary activity in Akwanga. The mission became 
independent and non-denominational, with the different branches working in close 
relationship with each other but with a high degree of autonomy. The British branch of 
the SUM served as the coordinator of the whole mission in Nigeria. Although the British 
branch was responsible for the formation of the organisation, the major reason for its 
leadership role in Nigeria was simply because the branches were serving in a British 
colony and therefore, the British branch was in the best position to influence the 
Colonial Office in London.32 The SUM also had a close relationship with the Sudan 
Interior Mission (hereafter SIM), but this “exceedingly desirable coalition was not,
33however, maintained” and it was discontinued in 1907. Also after its early association 
with the SUM, the Dutch Reformed Church Mission of South Africa became a separate 
denominational mission and took charge of the mission amongst the Tiv.
However, some of the South African missionaries that remained in the 
interdenominational branch of the SUM sought new areas to establish their stations 
north of the Benue.34 Mr. Judd visited Akwanga to investigate the possibility of 
establishing a mission station amongst the Eggon and Mada people, but because of on-
31 The SUM 75th Jubilee, 1904-1979 (Tunbridge Wells, 1980), p.22.
32 J.H. Boer, Missionaries Messengers o f  Liberation in a Colonial Context: A Case Study o f  the Sudan 
United Mission (Amsterdam, 1979), p. 116.
33 Maxwell, Centuiy o f  Grace, p. 62.
34 Ibid, p.23.
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going security problems the area was closed to any European enterprise. A temporary 
station was opened in 1917 at Keana to work amongst the Arago. Some of the 
missionaries did occasionally visit Akwanga to preach, despite misgivings on the parts 
of colonial officials. In 1922, Arden-Clarke wrote to his parents: “The general attitude of 
the government is not sympathetic to the missions out here.. .the type of man sent out as 
a missionary is very often not the right sort. They don’t seem to try and understand the 
native mind.”35 Some government officials were not keen 011 the influence of the 
missionaries because o f the bad effect they were seen to have on the peoples’ moral 
character following conversion to Christianity. Arden-Clarke, for instance, observed that 
they become “undisciplined and a general nuisance to the community.”36 He gave an 
example of how four missionaries had set up a stall in a village market and started 
telling the story of the cross in English, which resulted in local people thinking they 
were mad.37 The people of the area did not understood English, which made it difficult 
for the missionaries to convey their message of salvation. Arden-Clarke suggested that 
instead of sending out twenty poorly paid and unsuitable missionaries, a few really good 
men should be selected and be trained in simple medicine for twelve months and then be 
equipped properly before leaving.
The restriction imposed 011 European enterprise in Akwanga was finally lifted in 
1926. In that year the region was finally opened up for European ventures, Keana station 
was abandoned and the mission workers were moved “onwards to grasp the greater 
opportunity” amongst the Eggon people of the southern part of Akwanga. Reverend
Letter of Arden-Clarke to parents 15 May 1922
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
jS Maxwell, Centuiy o f  Grace, p. 15 8.
245
Hepburn established the first mission station in Akwanga in 1926 at the heart of the 
Eggon hills in Wana district. However, before the full evangelization of the Eggon 
people began, it was necessary to win their confidence and the missionaries started this 
process by visiting them in their homes, treating the sick and offering a home for those 
suffering from leprosy during the long period of their treatment.39 The Eggon people 
were, however, reluctant to accept the missionaries amongst them. The elders were 
concerned about their children being taught bad manners and becoming disrespectful to 
the accepted norms of society.40 The major obstacle to the missionary’s conversion 
effort was their lack of understanding of the Eggon way of life. One of the robust 
prejudices according to an informant, Laka Bako, was the description of the leaders of 
the ashim cult as “deceivers of the people,” which was in addition to the insistence by 
the missionaries that would-be converts must abandon their traditional religion, which 
they dismissed as “paganism” and “devil worship.”41 The total rejection of local belief 
systems by the missionaries made their work harder. Religion permeated into all aspects 
of the peoples’ lives, so that it was not possible always to isolate it and for people to 
suddenly change their ways of life.42 The SUM church at Wana was not as successful as 
the missionaries expected and up to the 1930s, the church did not expand or establish 
any out-station beyond the Eggon district. By 1932, after six year’s toil, the SUM only 
claimed one convert and there was no sign of the mission’s influence on local customs 43 
In 1935, the missionaries admitted that the mission work at Wana was “different from
39 Interview with Adigizi Musa at Wowen, 26 February 2004.
40 Ibid.
41 Interview with Laka Bako at Aligbor, 13 March 2004.
42 Interview with Reverend Mari at Alushi, 20 May 2003.
43 NAK Jos Prof 44/1932: Southern Division Report on for 1931-32.
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other districts; older people were more willing to accept than younger people.”44 The 
positive response by some the elders towards the new faith was more to do with their 
physical needs being met by the missionaries. The Eggon people had one o f the largest 
numbers o f  people suffering from leprosy in the region and this disease affected mostly 
elderly people. Leprosy treatment provided by the missionaries became the major 
attraction for some o f the elders, who received medical attention and care.45 Therefore, 
their tolerable attitude towards the new religion was a direct result o f the tangible 
medical benefits they were getting by associating with the missionaries.
Figure 6.1: The grave o f Reverend Hepburn at the Eggon hills
44 Pamphlet: “Fifty Years in the Church of the Mada Hills: 1916-1966,” Church of Christ in the Sudan, 
Mada Hills Region, (no date).
45 Interview with Rev. Mari at Alushi, 10 May 2004.
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One of the major difficulties in converting younger Eggon to Christianity was the 
consistent attack by the missionaries on polygamy, which was central to the organisation 
of social and economic life. Polygamy was the one institution that the missionaries 
refused to compromise on.46 Arden-Clarke observed that unless the missionaries 
changed their approach towards polygamy, “Christianity will be knocked out by 
Mohammedanism” in Akwanga.47 The insistence on the part of the missionaries that 
early converts abandon all except their senior wives did not go down well with local 
men. As Islam did not attack polygamy (even where this involved more than four wives) 
many people found Islam more attractive than Christianity.48 According to Mr. Ames, 
monogamy and the permanence of Christian marriage were the greatest stumbling 
blocks to their conversion work 49 He maintained that the “polygamy of paganism is an 
institution which is based on social economics and the arithmetical impossibility for all 
to be polygamists may have been the cause of the relative impermanence of its marriage 
bonds.”50 Economically, with high infant mortality, there was the need for multiple 
wives to ensure a large number of children, who in turn would ensure adequate 
productivity by the family. The early success of the missionaries working amongst the 
Eggon appears to have been more to do with the provision of physical needs than the 
conviction in people’s hearts. The major attraction of the mission was the hospital and 
the SUM established the first dispensary amongst the Eggon people in 1926. The news 
of its success in curing sicknesses soon spread around the villages, which attracted
46 E. Smith, The Christian Mission in Nigeria (London, 1924), p,51.
47 Arden-Clarke to parents 15 May 1922.
48 Interview with Baba Maluku at Nasarawa Eggon, 2 April 2004.
49 Ames, Plateau Province, p.310.
50 Ib id
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people to visit the mission station.51 The mission hospitals were a great success, as 
acknowledged by Ames:
It was through their medical work that the missions have 
achieved their greatest success and I cannot express too 
strongly and sincerely my intense admiration for the relief and 
comfort they must have brought to thousands of sick and
* 52suffering the past twenty years or more.
In the northern part of Akwanga, a mission station was established amongst the 
Mada people in the late 1930s. Before the SUM established its station at Wana, there 
were European missionaries at Randa in Jama’a division, but they did not usually visit 
the district except to entrain at Gudi. There were however two small churches, one 
Church Missionary Society (CMS) and a Roman Catholic Mission (RCM), which were 
built by the railway labourers at Gudi.53 The early Christian converts among the Mada 
people were those that attended the mission school or dispensary at Randa. In May 1928, 
one Kado from the village of Ancho Babb a and Chujama from Ungwar Durumi along 
with six other Mada boys were accepted at the SUM school in Randa. In May 1931, 
Chujama converted to Christianity and was baptized by one o f the missionaries.54 
Chujama began to preach to his kinsmen with some success. The missionaries at Randa 
were unaware of the development of a Christian community amongst the Mada people 
and it came as a surprise as none of them “had known that such work existed in any
51 Interviews with Tsaku Musa, Ablikn Gabi and Kuje Kigbu at Angbaku, 1 March 2004.
52 Ames, Plateau Province, p.312.
53 NAK Jos Prof 45/1930: Akwanga Division Annual Report for Year, 1929.
54 Fifty Years in the Chinch, pp. 12-13.
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North Mada village, but there it was.”55 Chujama was successful in his mission and even 
converted a man and his wife.56 When Mr. Judd from Randa visited the village for the 
first time, Chujama organised a gathering of the people to listen to him preach. Quoting 
Mr. Judd, Maxwell wrote:
The chief, the elders and many of the adult population gathered 
round a large tree, and Chujama placed his band of ‘seekers’ to 
the right of this tree...Then he stepped out before the people, 
said a few words, and lifted his right hand. As he sway [sic] his 
arm to and fro, sixty or seventy boys and girls sang...in Hausa 
and then Mada. It was lovely to hear them, and to see the joy in 
their faces.57
The SUM opened a mission station amongst the Mada, which was started by a 
medical work at Ancho in November 1937. The opening of a mission station at Ancho 
followed in April 1938 and a church was opened with 83 in the congregation including 
the village head of Rija.58 This does not suggest however, that the missionaries and their 
new religion were widely accepted.59 The general apathy of the people towards the new 
religion meant that those attending the church were mostly from Ungwar Dummi, where 
Chujama started his mission. Some of the surrounding villages living close to the new 
mission station at Ancho refused to attend any of the activities organised by the 
missionaries.
55 Maxwell, Century o f  Grace, p. 170.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Fifty Years in the Church, p. 17.
59 Interview, with Reverend Amin Zaigi, at Akwanga, 2 March 2004.
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Figure 6.2: A new church built on the foundations o f an earlier one by Reverend Hepburn in 1926
Missionary activities in Akwanga in general began to expand in the late 1930s, 
by which time there were four different missionary societies working in different 
locations in the area. They were the SUM, the RCM, the Methodist Mission and the 
CMS.60 In October 1938, Reverend Fathers Andrew Geraghty and Michael Harrison 
were sent to explore the possibility o f establishing a Catholic mission station in 
Akwanga region. They visited the southern part o f the division and received permission
from Mr. Hall, the District Officer, to open a mission station if  the chief o f Eggon
agreed.61 He did so and they were granted two sites in Odeigi Kasa and Alogani. The 
District Officer did not receive any objection from the SUM to the fact that another
• • , _ £2 i (missionary group was coming into its area o f influence. In March 1939 both sites had 
houses built and priests appointed to them. The mission station at Odeigi Kasa was not
60 NAK Jos Prof 2282: Southern Division, Half Yearly and Annual Report, 1937.
61 NAK Jos Prof 4825: Southern Division Half and Yearly Report, 1940.
62 Ibid.
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successful because the local people were suspicious of the priests and refused to have 
any contact with them, which resulted in the closure of the mission station in April 
1940.63 The missionaries therefore concentrated their efforts in Alogani and the mission 
arranged for two Irish nurses, Jane Powell and Angela d’Arcy to set up a dispensary near 
the station. The dispensary was opened in July 1939 and within a few days, the local 
people came in large numbers for treatment.64 However, the nurses were not mentally 
prepared to work in their new environment and therefore returned to Ireland in June 
1940. The dispensary was eventually closed down due to inadequate supply of 
medicines.65 By 1942, the Catholic mission station at Alogani was run by two Reverend 
Fathers. As observed by the District Officer, “the Eggon have not so far proved a fruitful 
field for their labours.”66
As already mentioned, the SUM established their first mission station at the heart 
of the Eggon hills. However, between 1948 and 1949, the station was moved to the 
plains at Kagbu. The movement was necessary because most of the people that hitherto 
settled on the hills for security reasons began to relocate to the plains. According to 
Maxwell:
It comes to pass that, in the course of a few years, we find that 
oiu* station up on the hill no longer enables us to reach our 
people. We have got to go where they are on the plain. So, 
though we have made our home comfortable and our garden 
beautiful up among the hills, down we must come to the
63 Roman Catholic Mission (hereafter RCM) Diary, Alogani/Alushi 1940.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 NAK Jos Prof 4825: Southern Division, Half Yearly and Annual Report, 1942.
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lowland, and start anew among our people there. The preacher 
must be in touch with his people.67
RELIGIOUS ENCOUNTER: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM AND COLONIAL RULE 
IN AKWANGA
As already mentioned, Christianity came to Akwanga later than Islam and thus, 
Islam and indigenous systems of beliefs had interacted for a longer time. During the 
colonial period, there was competition between Islam and Christianity to win converts 
and the benefits of these world religions were presented to the peoples of Akwanga, 
considered a vast reserve of potential converts. Islam was more responsive to local 
culture. The Islam encountered by the European missionaries in Akwanga was already 
heavily mixed with traditional practices. Christian missionaries perceived Islam in a 
negative way according it lower status than Christianity. According to Maxwell:
It [Islam] denies human ability...It brings its followers a book 
which it claims is God's own word, it enjoins an ordered set of 
observances, and a picturesque worship-ceremony. It makes no 
embarrassing moral demands, and sanctions slavery and 
polygamy.. .It exalts Mohammed, its founder, to a place of honour 
and dignity away beyond that accorded to any other human being, 
and teaches men to look for his intercession on the day of 
judgement...It knows nothing of a quickening, sanctifying and
67 Maxwell, Century o f  Grace, p.279.
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empowering Holy Spirit. In a word, it neither has, nor believes in, a 
Gospel which can meet our human need.68
There are two important issues raised by Maxwell in his observation of Islam 
which became central in the encounter between Christianity and Islam in Akwanga. He 
mentioned, firstly, that Islam “enjoins an ordered set of observances and a picturesque 
worship-ceremony” and secondly, that it exalts Mohammed to a place of honour and 
“teaches men to look for his intercession.” Thus, in their contest for converts in 
Akwanga, the theological issues raised in the debates between Christians and Muslims 
were the rituals for the worship of God and the nature of Christ and Mohammed as 
proclaimed mediators with God. Islam emphasised the ritual importance of being clean 
through alwala (ritual ablution before prayer) in approaching God, while Christians 
maintained that Christ’s sacrifice on the cross, had the power to cleanse mankind clean 
without any specific ritual. Ritual purification was an important theme that both 
Christians and Muslims wanted to present to their audience, but Islam had an advantage 
over Christianity 011 the aspect of religious ritual. As described in Chapter 1, the spirits 
of the ancestors were approached through rituals that were conducted by the heads of the 
cults and although Muslim alwala was different, it served the same purpose.
Ritual purification was not the major factor that attracted peoples of Akwanga to 
Islam, in the conversion efforts by the Muslim missionaries. However, according to an 
informant, Alhaji Yusuf, “some of us joined Islam because it is a religion of purity and 
because Allah is holy, we must approach him in a pure way, which involves the
68 Maxwell, Centuiy o f  Grace, p.32.
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cilwala”69 The theme of cleanliness as a condition of the heart was the standard 
Christian missionary response to Muslim promotion of their rituals and prayer. 
According to Reverend Mantani:
When I first gave my life to Christ, the constant argument with 
my Muslim friends was that our religion was not pure. What they 
failed to understand was that we Christians are more concerned 
with our inward purity not what we can do to show our fellow 
men that we are clean. God required a pure heart, not outward 
ceremony as being promoted by Islam.70
Christianity was presented as an internal religion that was interested in the purity of the 
heart while Islam was an external or outward religion. Quoting the book of Matthew 
15:19, Mantani argued: “for out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, 
fornications, thefts, false witness blasphemies.” Likewise the European missionaries 
often emphasised the inward “difference” that existed between Christianity and Islam. 
According to Maxwell:
People just do not realise the terrible gulf that separates the 
Moslems from the Christians.. .One could wish they might realise 
the true inwardness of Islam, that is utterly anti-Christ, and really 
blasphemous in its misinterpretation of the character of God, 
setting Him forth as guilty of such abominable cruelty as even an
69 Interview with Alhaji Yakubu at Andaha, 4 May 2003.
70 Interview with Reverend Mantani Kreni at Akwanga, 22 March 2004.
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ordinary decent man, with all his sinfulness, would regard with
71horror.
The second theological issue raised by Christians and Muslims was that of a 
mediator, hi search for the most effective mediator with God, the Muslims presented 
Mohammed, while the Christians presented Christ. Both religions presented their 
mediators as more effective and powerful substitutes for the local spirits of the ancestors 
who could mediate with the supreme being on their behalf. The Muslims had more 
positive view of Christ than Christians had of Mohammed. Christians considering 
Mohammed a “false prophet,” while the Muslims regarded Christ as anabi Isa “Prophet 
Jesus.”
However, Christianity had one distinct advantage: it could put forward a more 
elevated view of Christ, as God incarnate, than Islam did of Mohammed. Christian 
evangelists made the most of Christ’s supernatural conception and of the miracles 
described in the Gospels. The Christian missionaries used the miracles performed by 
Christ as written in the Gospels as evidence of the powerfulness and effectiveness of 
Jesus as God incarnate. The healing of the sick, the waking of the dead, walking on the 
sea and the miracle of feeding the thousands were all used by Christians when engaging 
with Muslims. The popular song that brings home the message of Christ’s healing 
powers in Akwanga was: “Wani iri mutan ne Yesu..,ya warka da makafai, yar tada 
matatu” (what kind of a man is Jesus...He healed the blind, He has woken the dead). 72 
Some people in Akwanga were clearly converted to Christianity because of the healing
71 Maxwell, Centwy o f  Grace, p.222.
72 This song came in an interview, with Reverend Mari at Alushi, 3 April 2004.
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powers that Christ possessed. According to Sidi Tide, “I joined Christianity because I 
knew that my problems would be solved by Jesus alone, who has the power to heal me. I 
was a sick person before I became Christian, but after I accepted Jesus Clnist in my life I 
was healed.”73 It should be noted that the healing powers of Jesus were boosted by the 
medical work provided by the Christian missionaries, which was considered part of the 
religion. However, 110 religion was very good at or obviously better than any of the 
others dealing with the most intractable illness. They claimed to offer healing and tried 
to persuade the local public that the apparent success was due to their privileged 
relations with the divine. All the religions offered healing to their audience and people 
wanted to believe them; but no religion seemed able to offer decisive proof of its power. 
Generally, when strengths of Islam and Christianity are compared as religions 
competing for “local” favour, one factor seems to stand out 011 each side. For Islam it 
was the appeal of the spiritual techniques of the malams — prayers and charms — while 
for Christianity, it was the appeal of Christ as mediator.
The competition to convert the peoples of Akwanga was a challenge the 
European missionaries took very seriously. Maxwell asked: “who was to win, Christ or 
Mohammed? The question pressed for an adequate and immediate answer. Cross or 
Crescent? Which shall prevail?”74 The answer is that the vast majority of the population 
in the region did not become Christians or Muslims but remained predominantly 
attached to their own beliefs. It should be noted that the number of Muslim converts was 
negligible in relation to the non-Muslim population, but significantly higher than the 
Christians. The number of Muslims was in the hundreds (including the Hausa-Fulani
73 Interview with Sidi Tide, 20 November 2003.
74 Maxwell, Centiay o f  Grace, p.33.
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immigrants that settled in the area), but certainly less than one per cent of the total 
population of the division.75 As already mentioned in the preceding section, there were 
less than five Christian converts amongst the Eggon by 1945 and in addition, the number 
of Mada converts by 1947 was only 46, out of a population of over 50,000; that is less 
than one tenth of 1 per cent of the total population of the district.76 The picture for the 
whole Plateau province, which was the stronghold of the SUM was not encouraging 
either. By 1953, only 3.3 per cent of the inhabitants of the province had been converted 
to the Christian faith.77
One advantage Islam had over Christianity was the free association of Muslims 
with the non-Muslim population in Akwanga. Muslims associated themselves freely 
with the “pagans” while “Christians were regarded as a people separate from them. An 
informant, Reverend Akawu Mako, best captures the Christian attitude towards non- 
Muslims and Muslims in Akwanga: “menene ya hada diihu da haskel” (what is the 
relationship between light and darkness).78 Christians saw their religion as the light of 
the world while both Muslims and non-Muslims were living in “darkness” and dwelling 
amongst the “unbelievers” was to be avoided.79
The lack of progress by the European missionaries created tension between 
Christian missions and the colonial government. The European missionaries accused the 
government of hindering their work while at the same time encouraging the spread of 
Islam. The major problem that the Christian missions claimed to be facing in northern
75 From the rough estimates collected in the districts, my informants put the number of Muslims in the 
1930s and 1940s to between two to eight hundred. However, there is no way of confirming or dismissing 
the claims. Therefore, it will be safer to put the number in hundreds, considering the majority of the 
Nunku clan were Muslims and couple of dozens in Wamba and Gudi.
76 Interview, with Rev. Mantani Kreni at Akwanga, 2 April 2004.
77 Ayandele, Missionary Impact, p .345.
78 Interview with Reverend Akawu Mako at Akwanga, 15 January 2004.
79 Ibid.
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Nigeria was that the government imposed restrictions on their work. The position of the 
Christian missionaries is summarised by Maxwell:
The writer cannot refrain from expressing his regret that a British 
Government should have so promoted and protected Islam in 
Nigeria that it had found an entry into hundreds of communities 
where it never had a footing before the Union Jack lent it its 
protection. Why should the propagation of Christianity be blocked 
and forbidden, and that too by the representatives of a nominally 
Christian nation?80
Throughout the colonial period, there was continued friction between the missionaries 
and the colonial government on the issue of restrictions to missionary work in parts of 
northern Nigeria. Even amongst the communities in central Nigeria, the colonial 
government was cautious about the influence of the missionaries. In 1911, Hesketh 
Bell, the Governor of Northern Provinces wrote to the Colonial Office:
It is to be feared that the spread of the elements of Christianity 
among the pagans in this country will, at first, create many 
difficulties, and will certainly tend to weaken the influence of 
those chiefs who are not prepared to follow the teachings of the 
missionary. There will be a tendency among converts to pay more 
attention to the advice of the white missionary than to the orders 
of their own rulers, and it is to hoped that those who are engaged
80 Maxwell, Century o f  Grace, p.253.
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in mission work will detach themselves, as much as possible, 
from interference in local secular affairs.81
The restriction of mission work, especially among Muslims, was considered as 
the greatest obstacle the missions were facing in northern Nigeria. At a conference in 
Lokoja in 1910, the missions passed a resolution that 011 the basis of the principle of 
religious tolerance, it was the right of a people to choose their own religion. This implied 
that the missionaries must be free to preach without restrictions wherever people were 
ready to listen.82 In the 1920s, the colonial administration, especially during the 
Governorship of Palmer (1925-1931) restricted missionary work in central Nigeria 
mainly 011 the grounds that the missions had carved out areas for themselves larger than 
they could serve adequately. According to Farrant, this was an attempt by the colonial 
government to divert missions from the Muslim provinces. He argued that the mission 
“deliberately leaves stretches of country between its main stations so that a field for 
evangelism will be available when there are converts” and “the unoccupied spaces of 
today are fields of food for the church tomorrow.” However, he also blamed the 
missionaries for being too soft and patient towards government restrictions and he 
predicted that “whereas in the past the attitude of the mission has been conciliatory and 
yielding, they will now insist 011 plain rights” and the government had erected a barrier 
and “we must sweep it away.”84 Farrant, however, found the restriction imposed 011 the 
mission to work amongst the Muslims as “the purpose of God” and in 1933, he wrote
81 PRO CO 446/100: Sir Hesketh Bell to Colonial Office; Missionary Work in Nigeria, 1911.
82 PRO CO 446/105: Missionary Conference held at Lokoja, July 1910; SUM 10: Minutes of Conference 
in Northern Provinces, Nigeria, 1910-1935.
83 SUM Records: Farrant to Palmer, 11 September 1928.
84 SUM: Field Report, 31 December 1929.
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that while it is easy to blame the government, “it was the purpose of God to turn the
o  c
messengers of the Cross first to the pagan and not to the Muslim.” He stated that 
originally, missions in the Sudan were aimed at the Muslim community, but were 
prevented by the government. Instead, they ended up building Christian community 
amongst the “pagan” peoples, “kin in race to the Mohammedan tribes.”86 According to 
him, God prepared such a community “in order that the Mohammedan people should 
become dissatisfied with what they have and reach out for reconciliation with him 
through Clnist Jesus.”87
However, the restriction imposed by the colonial government was not the major 
factor that resulted in the failure of Christian missions in Akwanga. It should be noted 
that the category of “unsettled district” was lifted in Akwanga in 1926 and by 1935 the 
SUM could only claim one convert at Wana. Thus, although the government did not 
restrict their work in the area, their inability to have enough converts or trained local 
evangelists to further the spread of the new faith to other parts of the region affected the 
spread of Christianity in Akwanga. Up to 1936, there were only two missionaries for the 
whole of the Akwanga region and they were unable to establish any out-station. The new 
church at Ancho was no different either. In Wamba district, the District Head, a Muslim, 
thwarted any effort by the Christian missionaries to establish their presence in that 
area.88
The European missionaries interpreted the restrictions imposed by the colonial 
government as an official opposition to the spread of the Christian faith and therefore
8:5 Lightbearer (September, 1933), p. 101.
86 Ibid.
87 SUM: Field Report, 1937.
88 Interview at Wamba with Philip Maiangwa, 23 March 2004.
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open support for Islam. The SUM field secretary, Mr. Farrant, accused the government 
of being anti-Christian and guilty of three basic “evils.” The first charge was that the 
colonial government increased the menace of Islam by supporting its spread. Secondly, 
the government was accused of perpetuating the separation of Nigeria into two cultural 
regions by restricting the missionaries in the north while allowing them unlimited access 
in the south. Lastly, Farrant accused the colonial government of antagonising the 
Christian church. According to him: “The net result of twenty-nine years of rule by a 
Government which professes to see a menace in Islam is that by their encouragement 
and policy there are more Moslems and Islam is better organised and more of a force
89than when Britain occupied the country m 1900.”
Another major problem that Christianity caused amongst the groups in Akwanga 
for which the missionaries were blamed was the constant conflict between the adherents 
of the new faith and the “traditionalists.” This conflict became widespread in Nigeria 
and a Residents’ conference was summoned to consider the issue in 1935.90 After being 
converted to Christianity, many young people refused to recognise the authority of their 
elders. For example, there was reported friction in some villages of the Mama and 
Kwarra areas between SUM followers and the local inhabitants, a situation that was 
described by the District Officer as “a problem with no short cut solution.”91 It started 
when the local elders demanded obedience to their authority, which included the 
recognition of tsafi (ritual) regarded as an integral part o f such authority. The 
missionaries encouraged their converts to disregard traditional practices. The rejection of
89 SUM: Farrant to Oldham, 16 December 1926.
90 A. Ijagbemi, Christian Missionaiy Activity in Colonial Nigeria: The Work o f  Sudan Interior Mission 
Among the Yoruba, 1908-1967 {Lagos, 1986), pp.47-48.
91 NAK Jos Prof 5422: Southern Division, Half Yearly and Annual Report 1943-44.
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the tscifi by the converts and the insistence on the side o f the elders reached a stalemate 
and created considerable tension, forcing the colonial government to impose restrictions 
on the number of religious classes opened by the missionaries.92 The establishment of 
such classes was subjected by the Divisional Officer to the approval of the elders of the 
villages. For example, the elders of Gita and Nakere in Wamba district unanimously 
turned down the application by the SUM to establish religious classes in their villages. 
The reasons given were that the mission followers often revealed the tscifi secrets to the 
women and regarded the elders as masu duhn (“living in darkness”).93 Furthermore, the 
elders alleged that the converts encouraged the people to refrain from working on 
Sunday and also encouraged young women to marry only Christians.94 The missionaries 
were insistent that their converts should keep Sunday a holy day while the elders 
demanded that young men should work on that day. The new adherents were mostly 
made up of the youths whose labour the elders relied on and their refusal to work on 
Sundays was backed by the missionaries.95 This, among other reasons led the colonial 
administration and some elders to refuse permission to the missions to establish new 
religious classes in some of the affected villages. Commenting on the issue, the District 
Officer wrote:
The earlier applications which were approved, were so approved 
by the elders, largely because they had no previous experience 
of missionary activity and not being able to visualise the 
inevitable friction...the mission followers have increased in
92 Ibid.
93 NAK Wamba Dist. DEP/27: Sudan United Mission, Application for Classes of Religious Instructions 
and Schools (1945).
94 Ibid.
95 In te r v ie w  with Rev. Akawu Mako at Akwanga, 4 April 2004.
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numbers and as a result elders of villages who have not yet 
approved a C.R.I.,[Classes for Religious Instruction] taking a 
line through their neighbours who have done so, are very 
chary.96
After the Second World War, European missionaries came to realise that the 
conditions of their work would not be the same as prior to the war. The Christian 
missionaries were fighting two battles: firstly, training the small number of converts they 
had to succeed them after their departure Rom Nigeria, and secondly, countering the 
threat posed by the Muslim dominated Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) in the politics 
of decolonisation in northern Nigeria. This involved the Islamisation programme 
embarked upon by the leader of the party, Sir Ahmadu Bello. The greatest challenge to 
Christianity came in 1949, when a motion was moved by a member of the NPC for a 
private member’s bill in the Northern House of Assembly calling for a curb on Christian 
missionary activities in northern Nigeria. Christian missionaries in central Nigeria saw 
this as an attempt to re-establish a new caliphate in the region, which the local people 
had resisted for over a century. Ahmadu Bello travelled to Muslim countries and 
received substantial sums of money in order to commence his mission of conversion,
07government funds and institutions were also used in this strategy. Gifts were presented 
to the new converts and they were offered jobs by the Native Authorities as their reward 
for accepting Islam. Therefore, in the competition for converts in Akwanga after the 
Second World War, Christian missionaries were faced with the most difficult task of
96 Ibid.
97 J. Paden, Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna ofSokoto: Values and Leadership in Nigeria (London, 1986), p.533.
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engaging with revitalised Muslim missionaries backed by the state and its resources. In a 
secret survey of Islam commissioned by the government in 1952, it was observed that 
there was “a perpetual competition in the pagan areas between Christianity and Islam for 
converts...it is greatly believed that a greater number embrace Islam annually than are 
converted to Christianity.”98
The religious engagement in the 1950s was more to do with material benefits 
than the theological debates of the 1920s-1940s. The Christian missionaries, with limited 
resources and few foot soldiers, became concerned about the new competition they were 
facing. In Akwanga, however, Ahmadu Bello only gained a few converts, including 
Ragon, Bara, Usman Sarkin Noma, Musa (the late sarkin Akwanga) Akawu Baduku. 
These new converts were called yan tuban Sardauna (Sardauna’s converts) and they 
received gifts of alawayo (white clothes) and salt, among other items as rewards for their 
conversion. Bara was promised the village headship of Gwanje, a promise that eluded 
him until his death in late 1980." The disturbing aspect of the conversion mission of 
Ahmadu Bello to the Christian missionaries in Akwanga was that some of his converts 
were previously Christians. For example, Ragon and Isa Alushi were Christian converts 
before joining Islam to enhance their social status and mobility.100 However, despite the 
resources and the manpower used in the process of Islamisation in Akwanga, there was 
no mass conversion to Islam.101 hi fact, the exercise gave the Christian missionaries an 
advantage. The church became the rallying point for the Christians and the missionaries
98 PRO CO 554/1321: Moslem Influence and Problems in Northern Nigeria, 1952. See details of the report 
in P.H.G Scott, A Survey o f  Islam in Northern Nigeria in 1952 (Kaduna, 1953), p .l 1.
99 Until his death, people that knew Bara called him zaki or sai ka yi sarautan Gwanje (Lion or you must 
become the chief of Gwanje). Interview with Reverend Ayuba Gajere, 2 March 2004.
100 Interview with retired Captain Isa Alushi at Akwanga, 22 April 2004; Interview at Akwanga with 
Reverend Ayuba Gajere, 2 March 2004.
101 Sarduna’s converts in Akwanga were not more than a dozen.
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began to instil in their clergy and converts the danger posed by Islam in the Northern 
Provinces. The horrors of the nineteenth century slave raids were recalled and anti- 
Hausa-Fulani feelings began to be aroused. The missionaries found sympathizers that 
were not necessarily Christians, but shared these sentiments. Therefore, Christian 
missionaries engaged with Islam in a psychological and propaganda war as opposed to 
the material benefits to tempt potential converts by Muslims. They de-emphasised the 
“worldly gains” people were seeking in a religion, but rather emphasised on “eternal 
life” through accepting Christ. According to Reverend Mako, “People at that time were 
carried away by material things and we as Christians we have to think about our 
relationship with God: tserara ne miikci zo, tserara ne za mu koma...komai arzildn mu, a 
duniya ne zamu barsu” (“we came into this world naked, and naked we shall go 
back...no matter how wealthy we are, we are going to leave the wealth in this 
world”).102
It is important to mention that some people in Akwanga made a conscious decision 
to convert to Islam that was not associated with the conversion exercise carried out by 
Ahmadu Bello. The benefits of belonging to the Islamic faith pushed some people into 
joining the new religion. For example, Islam brought prestige and respect to its converts 
and thus, enhanced social mobility in the colonial society. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
the Hausa-Fulani, who were mostly Muslims were appointed into senior positions in 
Akwanga and their privileged positions was perceived by the local people as a result of 
their religion. Thus, the attraction of Islam for some individuals was associated the 
opportunity to gain promotion in the Native Administration.103 For example, according
102 Interview with Rev. Akawu Mako at Akwanga, 4 April 2004.
103 Interview at Wamba with Yusuf Waju, 23 March 2004.
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to Isa Alushi, the reason for his conversion to Islam was because of the opportunity it 
offered him in the Native Administration and the new social status that Muslims had at 
that time.104
On another note, trade became an important factor that aided in the conversion to 
Islam of the few emerging local businessmen in Akwanga in the late 1950s. When the 
government lifted the restriction imposed on the foodstuff business in Plateau province 
after the Second World War in 1945, a few individuals in Akwanga began to serve as 
middlemen for Hausa grain and groundnut merchants from Kano.105 It was only in the 
late 1950s that local businessmen like the late Alhaji Angulu, Musa and Yakubu were 
able to engage in long-distance trade. According to Alhaji Musa, they were initially 
encouraged to become Muslims by their Hausa business partners who offered them gifts 
and credit facilities. However, the need to establish a business network outside Akwanga 
was the major factor that encouraged local businessmen to convert to Islam.106 As Alhaji 
Yakubu remarked, “in those days, even if you died in Kano or Kaduna, people would
107not have known, but by accepting Islam, we became part of the Muslim family.” In 
addition, by converting to Islam, these local businessmen became acceptable to the 
Hausa traders in Kano, which aided their economic mobility in business circles. In fact 
the Hausa businessmen were able to contribute substantially towards Alhaji Angulu and 
Musa’s pilgrimages to Mecca.108
Belonging to the Muslim community, however, came with its problems. For the 
individual converts in Akwanga, their aspects of life were permeated with religious
104 Interview with retired Captain Isa Alushi at Akwanga, 22 April 2004.
105 Interview at Nasarawa Eggon with Alhaji Musa, 16 March 2004.
106 Ibid.
107 Interview at Nasarawa Eggon with Alhaji Yakubu, 22 May 2004.
108 Ibid.
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meanings and thus, they expressed devotion to God not only through religious ritual, but 
also through the general conduct of day-to-day life. According to Sergeant Buba, “our 
daily lives are guided by religiously oriented moral concerns, for example, giving help to 
the poor and weak, dress modestly and completely avoid alcohol and intoxicants.”109 
Some of the duties expected from the Muslim converts -  dressing modestly and avoiding 
alcohol -  made them distinct in their outlook and behaviour from the non-Muslims. 
They began to adopt Hausa dresses and language and kept a distance from traditional 
ceremonies, which usually brought the local people together.110 The new converts 
looked at themselves as having more in common with the Hausa-Fulani or their 
newfound Muslim community than their kinsmen. The consumption of alcohol and other 
intoxicants was substituted with the chewing of kola nuts.
Generally, the growth of Christianity in Akwanga was slow until the 1950s. By 
1955, Sunday attendance exceeded 6,000 with 700 registered members. From 1955 to 
1957, there was a further increase in Sunday attendance from 6,500 to 10,035 and 
growth in membership from 734 to 1,121.'11 It should be noted that the early 
preconditions of becoming a Christian were relaxed. In addition, the emergence of 
indigenous clergy helped in the process of winning local people to the Christian faith. 
According to an informant, Isuwa, “the ordination of pastor Abimiku in the early 1950s 
was important to the growth of Christianity amongst the Eggon. We saw him as one of 
us and he spoke the language we understood.”112
109 Interview at Andaha with Sergeant Buba, 23 April 2004.
1,0 Ibid.
111 J.B. Grimley and G.E. Robinson, Church Growth in Central and Southern Nigeria (Michigan, 1966),
p.100.
112 Interview at Endehu with Isuwa Ambi, ISNovember 2003.
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Changes in northern Nigeria in the 1950s had a wider implication for self-rule in 
the church. The radical political changes during the period transformed the framework of 
missionary strategies as well as the relationship between missionaries and their converts. 
Some of the missionaries had always viewed national aspirations with considerable 
misgivings and they regarded the assertive, self-confident stand of African nationalism 
as detrimental to evangelical Christianity.113 After 1945, African nationalism in Nigeria 
assumed a more radical dimension as some nationalists began to demand political 
changes in native administration. Some of the nationalist leaders often castigated the 
missions for collaborating with colonial oppression and exploitation. As a result, the 
missionaries became fearful that the anti-colonial and anti-European sentiments 
characteristic of that era might be extended to the rejection of Christianity. The SIM 
working in central Nigeria described the situation as “dark and threatening.”114 The SIM 
response to what it saw as the propaganda of the “atheistic literature” of the nationalists 
was the establishment of a magazine, The African Challenge in 1951 as a weapon in the 
war of ideas.115 hi 1954, the SIM opened Radio ELWA, which became the voice of the 
mission in the propaganda war. Within the mission churches, the European missionaries 
began to hand over church control to Nigerians and encouraged the development of self- 
rule in the local churches. The process of transfer of the SIM mission to Nigerians 
resulted in the establishment of the Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA) in 
1954. The formation of the church began with a series of meetings in 1950-54. At a 
meeting in Kagoro in 1954, a new constitution was accepted and in May of the same
113 See Ayandele, Missioncay Impact, chapter two.
114 The Sudan Witness, 2 (1951), p. 8.
115 Interview with Obed Munchapku, (former editor of the Challenge) at Akwanga, 14 December 2003.
269
year at Egbe the ECWA was founded.116 The SUM was looking at self-rule in the church 
from a political point of view, their move towards organising all the SUM churches in 
northern Nigeria into one institutional body was partly motivated by long-term political 
considerations. They had experienced the benefits of belonging to a large organisation in 
their dealing with the colonial administration and they felt that a similar organisation 
would be in a better position in relation to the future authorities of an independent 
Nigeria, hi 1955, all the SUM churches including those of Akwanga formed the 
Tarayyar Ekldesiyoyin Kristi A Sudan (the Fellowship of the Churches of Christ in the
1 1 7Sudan) after a meeting at Randa.
The politics of decolonisation influenced the development of self-rule in the 
churches. At that time, it became clear to the missionaries that the Muslim-dominated 
NPC would take over the government of the region and they became apprehensive about 
their future in the new Nigeria. The missionaries were confronted with two major 
problems, namely, would they lose their property to the government in the event of their 
being forced out of the country? To whom would they hand over their property? Their 
fear was against the background of the experience in China in 1949, when Christian 
missionaries were expelled from the country and had their property confiscated. This 
increased the fear amongst the missionaries working in northern Nigeria and they began 
to interpret Islam mainly in political terms, “as a movement aspiring for political 
dominance” and were worried that the “Muslims of a future independent Nigeria would 
control northern Nigeria completely and block the expansion of Christianity.”118 Faced 
with this situation, the missionaries began to think about counter measures and they
116 Grimley and Robinson, Church Growth in Central Nigeria, p.83.
117 Ibid, p.87.
118 N. Kastfelt, Religion and Politics in Nigeria: A Study in Middle Belt Christianity (London, 1994), p.37.
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recognised that their converts should begin to take over more leading positions in the 
churches. The SUM began this process of transfer by ordaining its first indigenous 
pastors: Pastors Ainbi, Abimiku and Mamman from Jama’a and Akwanga in 1958. The 
SUM also took steps to register the Churches in Akwanga with the government.119 By 
encouraging self-rule, the missionaries hoped to have considerable indirect control on 
subsequent political events.
CONCLUSION
Although colonial rule in the Akwanga region encouraged the spread of 
Christianity and Islam, the majority of the population remained indifferent towards both 
these religious faiths. It is difficult to explain the behaviour of the local people towards 
Islam and Christianity, but it is possible to suggest that individuals had different motives 
for converting to these world religions. For example, the early converts to Christianity 
amongst the Eggon people did so because of the healing powers associated with the new 
religion, which was backed by the mission hospitals. Local businessmen found Islam 
more attractive to enhance their economic mobility because of the credit facilities they 
enjoyed and business network they established by belonging to the Muslim community. 
However, the ashim cult and other traditional practices endured despite the pressure to 
change during the colonial period. Although Christianity and Islam offered an alternative 
vision for the future, these world religions were unable to overthrow the indigenous 
beliefs in the religious lives of the peoples of Akwanga. The majority of the local people 
stuck to their indigenous beliefs, which continued to dominate religious life throughout 
the colonial period.
1,9 Fifty Years in the Church, p.26.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE POLITICS OF DECOLONISATION IN AKWANGA, 1945-1960
This chapter examines the process of decolonisation in Akwanga. It begins by 
looking at the constitutional changes after the Second World War, which made it 
possible for the educated elites to be involved in the administration of the region. The 
MacPherson constitution of 1951 set in motion the formation of political parties to 
contest elections. In central Nigeria, the decolonisation period witnessed the rise of a 
separatist movement for the creation of a Middle Belt state, which was supported by 
the Christian missions. The protest movement was a reaction against Hausa-Fulani 
Muslim domination and it led to the formation of the United Middle Belt Congress 
(UMBC) in 1955. The UMBC represented the minority interests of ethnic groups in 
central Nigeria. Although the size of its legislative delegations to the Regional House 
of Assembly was never large enough to be effective, they served as a means of 
public expression for minority concerns.
Before the 1959 federal election, most people in Akwanga were not directly 
involved in the political process in northern Nigeria. This was because elections were 
earned out indirectly and through multiple constituencies. However, churches in 
Akwanga became involved in politics because the politicians that emerged in Plateau 
province were mission trained clergy and teachers. The church became a political 
network for expressing a Christian identity against the Hausa-Fulani and Muslim 
dominated Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) in the process of decolonisation. 
When direct elections were introduced in 1959, a new group of politicians emerged
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in Akwanga who had no connection with the Christian missionaries. They were 
government trained employees of the Native Administration and because of their 
educational background, they became opinion leaders in the region.
POLITICAL CHANGE IN NORTHERN NIGERIA, 1945-1959
The Northern Region of Nigeria before 1945 was relatively peaceful in terms of 
political development. The system of indirect rule had attained its greatest success in 
the region and it gave little or no encouragement to Western education and thus 
ensured political stagnation. Although the government recognised the need to train 
people in order to participate in the colonial administration, the intention was not to 
produce an intelligentsia who would later challenge the colonial status quo as 
experienced in India. In the emirates, the government was initially only interested in 
educating the sons of the emirs with the hope of training them to be the future leaders 
of the region. In addition, missionary activities were restricted in the Muslim areas, 
which meant that the talakawa (commoners) had no access to mission education, 
which delayed their political awareness. The highly stratified authoritarian political 
structure of the Hausa states was enhanced by certain interpretations of Islam 
designed to inculcate habits and attitudes of subordination, which prevented any 
open challenge to the Native Administration before 1945. M.G. Smith observed: 
“Hausa regard obedience to their superiors and loyalty to their chiefs as one of the 
doctrines of Islam - adininmu addinin biyayya ne - (our religion is a religion of 
obedience)...Islam acts as another force giving definition and stability to the social 
system.”1
1 M.G. Smith, The Economy o f Hausa Communities ofZaria (London, 1955), p.93.
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In Akwanga, the late introduction of Western education delayed the political 
awareness of the local people in the region. The government was reluctant in 
establishing schools and although they acknowledged that the division was poorly 
served educationally, blamed it on the “apathy of the people themselves towards 
education.”2 The first attempt to educate the local people was started by Reverend 
Hepburn, who established a SUM mission station in Wana district in 1926. He began 
a school, teaching literacy and Bible classes in Hausa. Those admitted were Eggon 
pupils while the Mada boys attended the SUM mission school at Randa in Jama’a 
division.3 By 1929, the SUM school at Wana had a total of five boarders and a 
fluctuating number of day pupils.4 In 1936 the colonial administration opened an 
elementary school at Wamba. The performance of the school up to the early 1940s 
was regarded as a failure by the government and the education department. This was 
blamed on the negative attitude of parents towards education. The concern of the 
parents however, has to be seen from the perspective of the indigenous systems of 
training. The local people had their system of education designed to enable the 
children to participate fully in society. To educate the children meant teaching them 
about the environment, farming, building houses, making crafts and tools among 
others. All these provided an immediate means of livelihood to the family as opposed 
to colonial education, which meant nothing to the local people. Also, there were no 
leading examples for the people to appreciate the future benefit of sending their 
children to school but it was considered a total waste of resources.5
2 NAK Jos Prof 2282: Southern Division, Half and Annually Report 1937.
3 NAK Jos Prof 45/1930: Akwanga Division Report for the Year 1930.
4 NAK SNP17/11263: Akwanga Division, Plateau Province Notes on, by Capt Masterton Smith 
(1929).
5 Interview with Adamu Yakubu and Dauda Rabo on 3 March 2004.
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In July 1942, a new elementary school was started at Andaha and was 
attended by about 24 pupils.6 The attempt to erect these schools at Kwarra and Wana 
was delayed as the necessaiy teaching staff was not forthcoming. In the 1950s there 
was expansion in both mission and government education in Akwanga. This period 
also witnessed the emergence of qualified teachers that were from the area and they 
included among others, Audu Waju, Mohammed Waju, Audu Maiyaki and Adamu 
Musa Gale.7 These educated elites became opinion leaders and they helped in 
shaping the political landscape of Akwanga region during the politics of 
decolonisation.
The end of the Second World War marked a new beginning in the political 
history and the subsequent functions of the Native Authorities. Post-war political 
pressure resulted in the changes that the colonial government introduced. There were 
several explanations given for the changing British colonial policy during that 
period. According to Creech Jones (the post-war Labour Government Secretary of 
State for Colonies), the propaganda of the war of denouncing authoritarianism and 
preserving freedom and democracy became infectious and it would have been 
embarrassing and hypocritical for Britain to “show indifference to colonial 
progress.”8 Although the process of imperial ‘liquidation’ occurred veiy rapidly, it is 
impossible to point to a particular event and say that this marked the end of the 
British Empire. Decolonisation should be seen as a result of several interlocking 
factors making the transfer of power from the British to their local subjects in 
northern Nigeria both advisable and possible. According to Heinlein, the principal 
reason was Britain’s, “habit of considering the goodwill of local nationalists as the 
best guarantee for its interests; the momentum of disengagement in most colonies
6 NAK Jos Prof 4290: Southern Division Half Yearly and Annual Report.
7 Ibid.
3 A.C. Jones, (ed), New Fabian Colonial Essays (London, 1959), p.20.
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can be attributed both to local dynamics as well as to changed international
conditions.”9 It should be noted that British policy makers at the end of the war did
not envisage full independence for their colonial possession but they attempted to,
“adjust political relationships; a process which ultimately accelerated and escalated
beyond Britain’s control.”10
One of the post-war political changes was the introduction of the Richards
Constitution in 1945, which was aimed at promoting “the unity of Nigeria, to provide
adequately within that unity for the diverse elements which make up the country, and
to secure greater participation by Africans in the discussion of their own affairs.”11
The new constitution enlarged the legislature in Lagos to allow the participation of
the northerners who were hitherto excluded by the Clifford constitution of 1922. It
also established three regions in Nigeria with regional legislatures, each region
having jurisdiction over its own budgetary and administrative matters. In northern
Nigeria, the constitution established the House of Chiefs and House of Assembly for
the region. The House of Chiefs was made up of all the first class chiefs and not less
than ten second class chiefs selected from among their members by an electoral
college of second-class chiefs. Chiefs in Akwanga were of lower grade (third and
fourth class status) and they therefore had to be specially nominated by the Governor
to attend any meeting or debate in the House of Chiefs. The first special appointment
to the House of Chiefs in Akwanga occurred in 1951 when the chief of Wamba was
12nominated to represent the chiefs of the area. The Northern House of Assembly on 
the other hand among other officials had no less than 20 or more than 24 unofficial 
members, of whom 14 to 18 were to be selected by Native Authorities and six to be
9 F. Heinlein, British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945-1963: Scrutinising the Official 
Mind (London, 2002), pp.5-6.
10 N.J. White, Decolonisation: The British Experience since 1945 (London, 1999), p.3.
11 A.F. Richards, Political and Constitutional Future o f Nigeria (Lagos, 1944), p.8.
12 Northern Region o f Nigeria: Provincial Reports 1951 (Kaduna, 1953), p.60.
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appointed by the Governor.13 The principle of nomination was objected to and 
regarded by the southern Nigerian nationalists as undemocratic as only four out of 
the 28 unofficial members were to be directly elected. Therefore, the nominated 
members were never representatives of the people as they represented the colonial 
government that nominated them.
Before the introduction of the Richards constitution, the educated group in 
northern Nigeria were politically weak but the changes brought about by the 
constitution helped them to influence government policies. Some of them were 
nominated as unofficial members of the House of Assembly and they used the 
platform of the House to criticise the Native Authority system. The educated group 
realised the need for reforms in the operation of the Native Administration in the 
region and in August 1950, Tafawa Balewa moved a motion in the unelected 
Northern House of Assembly calling for reforms of the system. His boss in the 
education department in Bauchi province influenced his radical stand. At the end of 
1949, Mr. Robert Hepburn Wright was appointed as the Provincial Education Officer 
for Bauchi and he formed a close relationship with Balewa. Wright was responsible 
for promoting Balewa into the senior cadre of the civil service and he worked with 
him to press for administrative reforms in the region. He was instrumental in 
Balewa’s speech in the Northern House of Assembly and later in the Lagos 
Legislative Council calling for reforms in the northern region.14 In the Northern 
Regional House of Assembly, Balewa demanded that an independent commission be 
set up to investigate the system of Native Administration in the Northern Provinces 
and to make recommendations for its modernisation and reform. He added that a full 
discussion at all levels should be permitted on any report to be produced. He
13 Colonial Records on Northern Nigeria (London, 1954), pp. 142-146.
14 Then the Wind Changed: Nigerian Letters o f Robert Hepburn Wright, 1936-49, Edited and 
Introduced by R. Pearce (London, 1992), p.xix.
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concluded that the people of the region were ruled by might and little effort was made 
to win their confidence.15
This speech by Balewa came as a surprise to many members of the House who 
wondered how a man dared to criticise the NA openly. According to Ahmadu Bello 
(who later became the premier of Northern Region), “no one had hitherto ventured to 
comment publicly about, much less criticise the Native Authorities and 
administration. The schoolmaster from Bauchi was on dangerous grounds...in some 
quarters heads were wagged and eyebrows lifted.”16 The motion moved by Balewa 
received a mixed reception outside the House. The educated groups in the region 
supported Balewa5 s view on the need to change the way the Native Administrations 
were operating, but the colonial government and the chiefs were anxious about the 
new demands. Although the government accepted some of Balewa’s observations, 
they dismissed his criticism of the operation of the NA system. The government 
argued that Balewa had no intimate knowledge of the working of the Native 
Administration and that his comments were a reflection of the insecurity and 
frustration of the educated groups in the service of the NAs. The colonial 
government did not accept the suggestion that an independent commission should be 
appointed to review the operation of the NAs but promised to consult the educated 
groups in any future restructuring of the system. The chiefs rejected any reform that 
would undermine their authority in the performance of their duties. Senior emirs and 
chiefs did not accept the suggestion of the appointment of a commission and 
according to Rwang Pam (the chief of Jos), although he agreed with Balewa’s 
observations, he did not want any commission to be constituted.17 While the emir of
15 A. Bello, My Life (Cambridge, 1962), p.73.
16 Bello, My Life, p.74.
17 A.D Yahaya, The Native Authority System in Northern Nigeria 1950-1970 (Zaria, 1980), p.39.
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Keffi supported the idea of appointing a commission, the emirs of Jama’a and Lafia
1 swere either indifferent or did not want to comment.
The Richards constitution was envisaged to last for nine years, with the 
provision that there should be a limited review of it at the end of the third year.19 
However, the constitution soon came under attack from Nigerian politicians and the 
major source of complaint about it was that it was imposed from above, for there was 
no consultation of public opinion. When Sir John MacPherson became the Governor 
of Nigeria in 1948, he announced that the Richards constitution would be revised 
earlier than envisaged.20 Constitutional conferences were organised and it resulted in 
the introduction of a new constitution (the MacPherson constitution), which was put 
in force in 1951. Under the new constitution, the three regions got a higher degree of 
autonomy; the Regional Assemblies were maintained and regional elections were to 
be held in 1951. The Regional Assemblies were to be subjected to a central body, the 
House of Representatives. The Regional elections of 1951 were the first to be held in 
Nigeria. The elections were to be indirect and this more than anything else was a 
decisive push towards the formation of political parties.
With decolonisation on the way, educated groups saw themselves as the future 
leaders of an independent Nigeria, while the chiefs began to refashion their position 
in order to make themselves relevant to the new political era. The gradual transfer of 
power to the educated groups in the administration of northern Nigeria tormented the 
emirs and chiefs. Some of the educated groups saw the traditional rulers as 
“anachronism to the process of democratisation and modernisation.”21 The chiefs 
began to weigh their options on how to respond to the changing political climate. In
18 Ibid.
19 Richards, Future o f Nigeria, p.9.
20 Legislative Council Debate, 17 August 1948, p.8.
21 M. Yakubu, An Aristocracy in Political Crisis: The End o f Indirect Rule and the Emergence o f 
Party Politics in the Emirates o f Northern Nigeria (London, 1996), p.l.
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some parts of Africa, traditional rulers quickly adjusted to the political change by 
establishing political parties. In northern Nigeria, the chiefs contemplated the 
formation of their party in association with the unofficial members of the House 
Assembly but the idea was abandoned with the emergence of the NPC, which 
became pro-Native Administration and chiefly power.
In the 1940s, embryonic political associations began to be organised by the 
educated youths who were exposed to nationalist thought from southern Nigeria or 
abroad. One of the most important early associations in northern Nigeria was the 
Bauchi General Improvement Union, established in 1943-44 by malam Sa’adu 
Zungur, who in 1948 became the Federal Secretary of the NCNC. In 1946, the first 
non-localised northern political association was formed in Kano called the Northern 
Progressive Association (NEPA) with malam Raji Abdallah as its general secretary.22 
NEPA’s programme emphasised political reform, economic development and 
educational opportunity for promising northern students. Emerging political 
associations in Nigeria had different motives in their formation. In the south, 
criticisms were directed at the colonial system as a whole, while in the north, 
criticism was directed at the application of the principles of indirect rule. Within the 
different associations in northern Nigeria, there was disagreement as to what 
direction these reforms should take.
In 1948, following the amalgamation of various associations, the Jam’iyyar 
Mutanen Arewa (JMA) was established at Kaduna as a cultural organisation.23 The
22 For further details about the development of local associations in northern Nigeria, see R.L. Sklar, 
Nigerian Political Parties in an Emerging African Nation (First Africa world edition: New York, 
2004); R.L. Sklar and C.S. Whitaker, “Nigeria,” J. Coleman and C. Rosberg (eds), Political Parties 
and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Los Angeles, 1970); B.J. Dudley, Parties and Politics in 
Northern Nigeria (London, 1968); C.S. Whitaker, The Politics o f Tradition Continuity and Change in 
Northern Nigeria (New Jersey, 1970); B.J. Dudley, “The Northern Peoples’ Congress” in J.P. 
Macintosh (ed), Nigerian Government and Politics (Evanston, 1966).
23 Dudley however argued that the JMA had political orientation. B.J. Dudley, “The Nomination of 
Parliamentary Candidates in Northern Nigeria,” Journal o f Commonwealth Political Studies 2 (1963).
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JMA held its first general meeting at Kano in December 1949 and over ninety 
delegates attended. However, at the meeting, some radical members of the JMA 
wanted the organisation to be declared a political party, a move that was resisted by 
the majority of its members. The disagreement on the issue resulted in a split and the 
subsequent formation of Jam’iyyar Neman Sawaba - The Northern Elements 
Progressive Union (NEPU) in 1950, while the JMA continued as a cultural 
organisation.24 Therefore, NEPU became the first political party to be formed in 
northern Nigeria. NEPU was established as a left wing political party and it was anti- 
Native Authorities and the established masun Sarauta (ruling class). NEPU became 
the party of talakawa who felt resentful against the bureaucratic intemperance and 
autocracy of the Native Authority. The party’s 1950 declaration of principle was 
geared towards the emancipation of the talakawa from domination of masun sarauta 
through reform of the autocratic Native Authority system.25
The JMA continued as a social and cultural organisation with the objective of 
combating “ignorance, idleness and injustice” in the northern region.26 In order to 
participate in the 1951 election, the JMA met in Zaria and a decision was taken to 
declare the association as a political party, which became known as Northern 
Peoples’ Congress (NPC) in October 1951. The conservative outlook and 
background of most its members made it more acceptable to the emirs and chiefs and 
therefore, the NPC aimed “not to usurp the authority of the Natural Rulers but to 
enhance such authority whenever and wherever possible.”27 It confined its 
membership and activities to the north. After the establishment of the NPC, the 
government banned civil servants from participating in politics, but they did not
24 Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p.146.
25 Sklar and Whitaker, “Nigeria,” J. Coleman and C. Rosberg (eds), Political Parties, pp.606-607.
26 Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p.210.
27 Bello, My Life, p.96.
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place any restriction on the Native Authority staff. Therefore, the NPC drew its 
support from the chiefs, ruling class and the Native Authorities. The principles that 
both the NPC and NEPU stood for were contradictory and while the NPC wanted to 
strengthen the position of the ruling class, NEPU’s aim was to abolish these powers 
where they existed. In other words, NEPU projected its image in northern Nigeria as 
one of irreconcilable interests with the NPC. This “antagonism of interest” 
manifested “itself as a class struggle between the members of that vicious circle of 
the Native Administrations on the one hand and the talakawa on the other”.28 NEPU, 
“being the only political party of the talakawa1’ was diametrically opposed to those 
of the NPC “family compact” oligarchy which it was determined to reduce to 
nonentity.29 Thus, both the NPC and NEPU in different respects became part of the 
reaction to certain implications of indirect rule system in northern Nigeria.
The period after the Second World War also witnessed the emergence of 
separatist movements in different parts of the north. Although the aims of these 
movements vary, they were generally against the dominance of the Hausa-Fulani in 
the region. In Plateau province, the most important association was the Berom 
Progressive Union (BPU) founded in 1945 to secure fair compensation from the 
mining companies for land used for tin production.30 The BPU also had a political 
motivation. Apart from seeking compensation for the Berom people, it wanted to 
take control of the affairs of Jos township, which since its inception in the early days 
of tin mining, was dominated by the Hausa-Fulani. The BPU was opposed to the 
Hausa-Fulani dominated Jos Native Authority and as a consequence of petitions by 
the association, a Berom chief of Jos was appointed in 1947. The BPU became
28 Pamphlet: NEPU Declaration o f Principle (Jos, 1952).
29 Ibid.
30 Dudley, Parties and Politics, p.92.
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instrumental in the organisational direction of the protests movements in central 
Nigeria that resulted in the formation of the UMBC in 1955.
In central Nigeria, Christian missionaries were instrumental to the formation 
of political associations and therefore raising the political consciousness of the local 
people. As discussed in Chapter 6, the radical political changes after the Second 
World War transformed the framework of missionary strategies as well as the 
relationship between missionaries and their converts. They became apprehensive 
about their future in the Northern Provinces and their fear was set against the 
background of the experience in China in 1949, when Christian missionaries were 
expelled from the country. Thus, the missionaries became sensitive about political 
change, which threatened their work. In order to co-ordinate a response to the 
political situation in the region, a secret meeting was held at Bukuru in Jos in 1948 to 
consider a Christian response. The churches were to raise the consciousness of its 
members and to warn them of the dangers posed by Islam.31 What set the Middle 
Belt movement in motion was the reaction to a private member’s bill in the Northern 
House of Assembly in 1949 calling for a curb on Christian missionary activities in 
northern Nigeria. Reaction to this bill led to the formation of the Northern Non- 
Muslim League (NNML) in 1949 under Pastor David Lot and it was supported 
principally by the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) and the Sudan United Mission 
(SUM). The formation of the NNML raised two major problems. Firstly, there were 
non-Muslims in the predominantly Muslim areas of Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, Bomo 
and Zaria and the NNML was not intended to include them.32 Therefore, the 
organisation was narrowly restricted to only the people of central Nigeria. Secondly, 
the NNML’s association with the Christian missions made some people in the area
31 H. Kukah and T. Falola, Religious Militancy and Self-Assertion: Islam and Politics in Nigeria 
(Aldershot, 1996), p.237.
32 Dudley, Parties and Politics, p.93.
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uncomfortable and if the peoples of central Nigeria were to present a common front, 
an organisation not so obviously associated with missions was needed.33 Thus, in 
1950, the NNML was renamed the Middle Zone League (MZL) in order to tone 
down its overt religious identity and project a more political identity “in order to 
emphasise the separatist predilection of its membership.”34
As the 1951 election drew nearer, it became clear to the Christian 
missionaries working in central Nigeria that Muslims would dominate the new 
political era in the Northern Provinces. According to Maxwell, "Moslem members of 
the Government would greatly outnumber the non-Moslems, so that the Christian 
minority would be hopelessly out-voted.”35 Churches became the rallying point for 
the Christians and the missionaries began to instil in their clergy and converts, “the 
idea of an impending Moslem subjugation and Islamisation of all non-Moslems 
living in the Northern Provinces.”36 The missionaries encouraged their converts to be 
united in order to present a common front against the political danger ahead. In 1950 
Maxwell observed: “If they [Christians] do not stick together in these days of a new 
governmental order, when the executive and legislative work of Nigeria is being 
transferred to African hands, they may find themselves being exploited by the 
Moslem peoples of the north. The only unifying force for the non-Moslems is the 
Christian church.”37 Although the regional election was indirect and based on 
multiple constituencies, the churches in Plateau province became involved in 
political campaigns. In Akwanga, despite the fact that the people in the region were 
not directly affected by the election, Sunday sermons became politicised.38 Clergy
33 ibid.
34 Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p.346.
35 Maxwell, Century o f Grace, p.299.
36 Mangvwat, “Process of Class Formation,” p. 123.
37 Maxwell, Century o f Grace, pp.293-4.
38 Interview with Baba Loko at Ungwan Loko, 8 November 2003.
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and Christian politicians from Jos and Bukura began to visit churches in Akwanga to 
educate the local people 011 the political situation in the region. The Bible became 
the key political text used to develop a strong Christian identity. As in parts of 
Africa, the book of Exodus became a symbol of political struggle because the story 
in the book has elements of oppression, liberation and political struggle.39 Parallels 
were drawn between the suffering of the Israelites in Egypt and the political 
oppression of Christian minorities in northern Nigeria. Christians in central Nigeria 
like the Jews in bondage felt that; “mere servants have ruled over us. There is no one 
tearing us away from their hands” (Lamentations 5:8).40 Strong leaders like Moses 
and Joshua in the Bible were needed to carry the Christians out of their political 
bondage.
Those that led the MZL were either clergy or former graduates of the SUM 
school at Gindiri. They took control of political leadership in the whole of Plateau 
province because of their educational background, and these communities looked 
upon them as people who were knowledgeable in politics and therefore could 
represent their interests.41 Their opinion was sought after and respected. Christian 
politicians in central Nigeria in general used the Bible to justify their involvement in 
politics and according to Kastfelt, they sought not only the political kingdom, but the 
kingdom of God as well and their work was “to unite the two into a Christian 
political kingdom, or a Christian community.”42 The interpretation of Exodus in 
politics therefore implied that the Muslims oppressed the Christians and like God’s 
chosen people, the duty of every Christian politician was to lead the people out of
39 Walzer, Exodus and Revolution, p. 133.
40 Interview with Baba Loko at Ungwan Loko, 8 November 2003.
41 Group interview with Lumbo, Tache Naluku and Maiganga Zenya at Gwanje, 13 November 2003.
42 N. Kastfelt, “Seek Ye First the Christian Political Kingdom: The Bible as a Political Model in the 
Nigerian Middle Belt,” in N. Kastfelt (ed), Scriptural Politics: The Bible and Koran as Political 
Models in the Middle East and Africa (London, 2000), p.210.
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political bondage.43 Therefore, the MZL basically sought to protect Christian 
interests, particularly from the perceived Muslim threat. The MZL leaders and their 
supporters saw the forthcoming election as an opportunity to sweep away the Muslim 
domination and replace it with “a new order where peace and God’s justice will 
reign” (Isaiah 2-11; Revelation 21:1-5) 44
The 1951 regional election was carried out on a provincial basis and all five 
candidates elected in Plateau province were Christians. However, the Hausa-Fulani 
members of the NPC dominated the newly constituted Northern Regional House of 
Assembly. The imbalance in the membership of the House meant that there was 
continuous tension between the Muslim majority and the non-Muslim minority, 
especially when it came to the discussion on religion. As observed by one colonial 
official in 1952:
In speaking about the Northern House of Assembly, Mr. Niven 
[President of the Northern House of Assembly] said that he had 
found his task a difficult one and had frequently had to intervene in 
the course of debates to call members to order. He said that the 
most difficult part of his job had been to prevent the discussion of 
religion in the House. He said, for example, that in discussing a 
grant to mission schools Moslems speakers had attempted to attack 
Christianity and that Christian members of the House, mostly from 
Middle Belt Provinces had attempted in their replies to defend 
Christianity as such.45
43 Ibid, p.211.
44 Reverend Akawu Mako: Personal communication.
45 PRO CO 554/372: Situation in the Northern Province of Nigeria, 1952.
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It should be noted that the actions of the Muslim members of the Regional 
House of Assembly gave room for their non-Muslim counterparts to be suspicious. In 
a secret survey of Islam in northern Nigeria commissioned by the government in 
1952, the findings revealed that the Muslim members of the House had political, 
social and religious interests in other Muslim countries.45 Such interest according to 
the report was evinced by repeated requests in the Regional Houses and their 
committees for visits to be arranged for delegates from Northern Provinces to inspect 
and report on the educational, religious and economic systems in operation in 
Muslim countries like Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.47 In addition, when it came 
to the ministerial appointments after the 1951 Regional elections, non-Muslims were 
excluded. When the first four Northern Regional ministers and three northern 
ministers at Lagos were appointed, they were all Muslims. When three seats 011 the 
Executive Council of the Northern Region were unfilled, Sharwood Smith (Governor 
of Northern Provinces, 1952-57) suggested these seats to be filled with non-Muslims, 
but the suggestion provoked a great opposition from Muslim ministers 48 According 
to him:
When we discussed the matter [of appointing non-Muslim 
ministers] one evening at an informal meeting at which the 
Northern Ministers at the centre were also present, I found, to my 
great suiprise, considerable opposition to the idea. I was thought to 
be exaggerating or prejudiced. Abubakar, for one, contended that 
this talk of anti-Muslim and anti-Fulani feeling was largely 
propaganda spread by the more bigoted of the foreign missionaries
46 PRO CO 554/1321: Moslem Influence and Problems in Northern Nigeria, 1952; P.H.G. Scott, A 
Survey o f Islam in Northern Nigeria in 1952 (Lagos, 1953), p.l.
47 Ibid.
48 B.S. Smith, But Always as Friends: Northern Nigeria and the Cameroons, 1921-1957 (London, 
1969), p.237.
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in the pagan areas...If the region was to have unity the Muslim 
Ministers must admit non-Muslims to their councils as equals and 
accord them responsibilities equivalent to their own.49
In 1953, Muslim ministers reconsidered their earlier stand on appointing non- 
Muslims to the Executive Council and two ministers were appointed from central 
Nigeria: Peter Achimugu and Yahaya Ilorin. However, in order to weaken the MZL 
opposition in the House of Assembly, the leadership of the ruling party pressed the 
leaders of the MZL to join the NPC in 1953.50 This led to a split in the MZL: one 
group, under the Berom leadership, favoured an alliance with the NPC, while others 
opposed it. Those that opposed the party alliance with the NPC formed a new party, 
Middle Belt Peoples’ Party (MBPP). The alliance with the NPC by some members of 
the MZL was perceived to be betrayal of the mandate of the peoples of central 
Nigeria they claimed they were representing.51
The first election that peoples of Akwanga were directly involved was the 
1956 regional election. During the election, Plateau province was divided into seven 
electoral districts and for the first time Akwanga was allocated a seat for all the 
districts.52 The electoral regulations stipulated that there would be 131 elected 
members to the Regional House of Assembly, four official and five special members 
-  making a total of 140 members.53 The election was to be conducted through an 
electoral college. Membership of the Electoral College was confined to those that 
were not in prison or had not been convicted of any offence. Candidates that were
49 Ibid, p.238.
50 The NPC did not like the criticism from the opposition parties. The feelings of most of the NPC 
ministers was summarized by Niven, “why pay someone to criticize you?.. .there are plenty ready to 
do so without payment.” Niven, Nigerian Kaleidoscope, p.256.
51 Interview with Reverend Mari at Alushi, 22 April 2004.
52 NAK 2559: House of Assembly Elections, 1956.
5iIbid.
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interested in contesting the election must deposit £25 in cash “in such treasury as the 
Electoral Officer or Presiding Officer may direct.”54 In order to conduct a successful 
election in Akwanga, the total seats for the final Electoral College was divided per 
head of the population of the three districts. The 100 members were divided as 
follows, Eggon 48, Mada 27 and Wamba 25.55 Primary elections were to be held on 
8 October while the final election was to be conducted on 30 October. Each of the 
districts in Akwanga was divided into electoral areas. In Wamba, for example, the 
district was divided into three electoral centre, where elections would be held; Junior 
Primary School Wamba, the Chiefs Palace and the Native Administration Office.56 
The District Officer, Mr Wilson was appointed as the Electoral Officer while other 
two colonial officials, Mr Hilton and Gregory were to serve as returning officers. The 
1956 election in Akwanga was an NPC affair as the two candidates contesting in the 
election were from the same party. Although the election to the Regional House of 
Assembly was through an electoral college, those that were contesting the election 
carried out their campaigns in all the districts. 57 The two contenders in the election 
were Muazu Gambo Nunku, a former court scribe and Audu Waju, a teacher from 
Wamba. Muazu won the election with 59 votes while Audu Waju secured only 20
4. 58votes.
The NPC dominance in the regional election of 1956 in Akwanga did not 
reflect the changes experienced in other parts of central Nigeria. As already 
mentioned, the MZL witnessed its first split in 1953 and following the efforts of the 
Chief of Kagoro, the factions were reconciled and this resulted in the formation of 
the UMBC at Kafanchan in June 1955. The UMBC emerged to provide
54 Ibid.
55 NAK 2559: House of Assembly Elections, 1956.
56 Ibid.
57 Interview at Wamba with Yusuf Maikano, 24 March 2004.
58 NAK 2559: House of Assembly Elections, 1956.
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organisational direction to the demands of the people of central Nigeria. The major 
aim of the UMBC was to represent the minority groups of the region in the politics 
of independence and to actualise the creation of a Middle Belt State with its House of 
Chiefs and House of Assembly distinct from the Northern Region. The demand for 
the creation of the Middle Belt state by the UMBC was reinforced by the difference 
of religion between the various groups in central Nigeria and the Muslims in the 
north of it. According to Logams, “underlying the conceptions of the Middle Belt 
political identity in Nigerian politics was Christian solidarity in the religious identity 
of the Middle Belt as contrasted with the Islamic identity in the north.”59 Thus, the 
driving force in the formation of the UMBC was religious affinity between the 
peoples of central Nigeria rather than ethnicity.
The lack of consensus in the leadership of the UMBC meant that the party 
was in a continuous crisis. In 1956, Sharwood Smith described the crisis in the 
UMBC: “The United Middle Belt Congress has experienced fission in so many and 
diverse ways and places that its chaotic and eternally fluid state defies summary. Its 
right wing is commanded by Pastor David Lot, its left wing by Moses Rwang.”60 
Despite the inconsistency in the leadership of the UMBC, the party was leading the 
call for the creation of a Middle Belt state. However, the demand for further 
regionalisation of Nigeria suffered a setback in 1957 at the London constitutional 
conference as the Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd told delegates that Britain would 
consider the granting of independence to Nigeria if pressure in the country did not 
result in the creation of new states. In this event, Britain would have to determine
59 P.C. Logams, “The Middle Belt Movement in Nigerian Political Development: A Study in Political 
Identity, 1949-1967,” (PhD ICeele, 1985), 56.
60 PRO CO 554/1183: Political Situation in Northern Region of Nigeria, 1956.
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their viability, thus delaying independence.61 The NPC opposed any change to the 
regional boundaries, claiming that, in its case, the interests of the minorities of the 
Middle Belt were adequately catered for within the Northern Region.62 The Action 
Group had consistently encouraged the political expression of the minorities and 
stated that this problem should be dealt with before independence.63 However, the 
constitutional conference established three committees to make special reports on the 
subjects of minorities, fiscal matters and delimitation of constituencies.
The Commission to enquire into the fears of minorities in Nigeria (Willink 
Commission) was inaugurated in 1957. The Commission was under the chairmanship 
of Henry Willink QC, the former Member of Parliament for Croydon. The terms of 
reference given to the Commission were: to ascertain facts about the fears of 
minorities and propose means of allying those fears; to suggest safeguards which 
with this purpose could be included in the constitution of Nigeria; if no solution 
seemed possible to the Commission it should suggest recommendations for the 
creation of one or more new states.64
A memorandum by the Regional Government was presented to the 
Commission through the Attorney General, discouraging the creation of new states. 
The memorandum’s title page was a quotation Rom Luke 11:17: “But I-Ie, knowing 
their thoughts, said unto them, every kingdom divided against itself is brought to 
desolation; and a house divided against a house falleth.” Thus, the crux of the 
government’s argument was that the unity, and not division of the region was vital to 
its survival and existence. According to Ahmadu Bello (the Premier of Northern
61 Report by the Nigeria Constitutional Conference held in London in May and June 1957 (London, 
1957), p.24.
62 PRO CO 554/1528: Proposal by NPC, 1957.
63 Manchester Guardian, 19 August 1958, p.5; Times, 21 August 158, p.7.
64 PRO CO 957: Commission on Minority Groups in Nigeria (Willink Commission), 1957-58; PRO 
CO 554/1539: Commission of Enquiry into Minority Problems in Nigeria, 1958.
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Region), if new states were created in the region, “it would break the steady 
stabilising influence which people in the North are convinced is the major role we 
have to play in forwarding the progress of the Federation.”65
The UMBC and the Action Group were in favour of the creation of a Middle 
Belt state and were represented at the Commission by Fani Kayode. He relied on 
religious differences which exist between the ‘far north5 and the Middle Belt as the 
basis for the creation of the new proposed state. Kayode argued that the citizens of 
the new proposed state would be those who were commonly referred to as 
“pagans.”66 It was difficult for the UMBC-Action Group legal team to argue for the 
creation of a Middle Belt state based on ethnic affinity of the groups in the region as 
there were over two hundred different groups with varying cultures and languages.
The NPC lawyers argued that the creation of a Middle Belt Region would 
only result in chaos as different tribes were brought together.67 Mr. Rewane 
representing the UMBC-Action Group alliance, disagreed with the NPC submission 
that the Middle Belt would be “a chaos of tribes chaotically delineated, [but it would 
be possible] “to classify them under four main groups: the Nupe group, comprising 
Nupe, Igala, Idoma and Igarra; Tiv group, comprising Tiv, Jukun and Arago; the 
Berom including Ankwe, Angas and Eggon; and the Bachama, Chamba and 
Bulawa.68 Abdul Razaq, one of the NPC lawyers, objected to this classification and 
argued that each of these groups comprised numerous languages and dialects.69 He 
further observed that although there was “tribal consciousness’5 in the Middle Belt, 
there was no desire for the different groups to come together. In order to support this 
claim, Abdul Razaq, called the chiefs of Mada, Eggon and Rindre to speak to the
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
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Commission and none of them said anything in favour of the Middle Belt Region. 
Most of the chiefs in centr al Nigeria were against the creation of a Middle Belt state 
as their appointment and patronage depended on their loyalty to the NPC-led 
government. In fact, Keffi Native Authority submitted a memorandum to the 
Commission disassociating itself with the call for the creation of a Middle Belt state. 
The three major reasons given were: that funds were insufficient for the functioning 
of an additional state; “resultant taxation increases will bear hardly on the 
peasantry”; and that there would be no sufficiently educated people to run the new 
state.70
The Willink Commission after hearing evidence came to the conclusion that 
there was no solid foundation to the minority allegations and therefore, it could not 
recommend the creation of one or more new states.71 The Commission was of the 
opinion that there were more elements that bound most of the peoples of northern 
Nigeria together than divided them:
There is the faith and law of Islam; there is a tribal grouping, the 
combination of the Fulani, the Hausa, the Nupe and Kanuri.. .there 
is the Hausa language, widely used as a lingua franca; there is a 
system of administration based on the Emir and a feudal pyramid 
below him — all these elements fusing to make what may for 
convenience be called the Northern System.72
In addition, the Commission based its argument against the creation of a new 
state in northern Nigeria primarily upon the difficulty of drawing boundaries between
70 Ibid.
71 Report o f the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears o f Minorities and Means o f Allaying
them (London, 1958), p. 87.
72 Ibid.
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peoples and the belief that strong local feelings were only a transient feature of the 
Nigerian political scene.
The Delimitation Commission, was set up after the 1957 constitutional 
conference to divide Nigeria into constituencies for the federal election in 1959. The 
Commission was under the chairmanship of Lord Merthyr and began its work in 
October 1957. During its stay in Nigeria, the Commission visited the three regions 
and each of the regions had set up an advisoiy committee made up of the 
representatives of the main political parties who were able to make recommendations 
to the Commission.73 One of the instructions given to the Commission was to divide 
the country into 320 electoral districts of approximately equal population, which 
should not adhere strictly to equality of numbers, but should have regard to the 
physical features, transport facilities, existing local government or Native Authority 
areas.74 It was decided at the 1957 constitutional conference that there should be 
approximately one seat in the new House of Representatives to every one hundred 
thousand people in Nigeria. The Federal Department of Statistics estimated on the 
basis of the 1952-3 census that the population would be 31,559,026, and it was 
therefore agreed by all parties that there should be 320 seats 75
The work of the Delimitation Commission had wider implications for 
Akwanga region as it was allocated a seat in the forthcoming federal election in 
1959.76 This election was important because for the first time, the people in the 
region would be directly involved in the election of their representative to the new 
Federal House. In order to conduct a successful election, an Electoral Commission
73 Report o f the Constituency Delimitation Commission (Lagos, 1958), p.70,
74 Nigeria Constitutional Conference, p.207.
75 Constituency Delimitation Commission, p. 80.
76 For detailed discussion on the 1959 federal election in the three regions, see K.W.J. Post, The 
Nigerian Federal Election o f 1959: Politics and Administration in Developing Political System 
(London, 1963).
294
was set up in August 1958 and the Colonial Office appointed Mr. Wraith as the new 
Chief Electoral Commissioner. Since the federal election in 1959 would be the first 
direct election to be held in northern Nigeria, the Commission had to organise the 
registration of electors," and Regulation 4 of the Commission stated: “Every person 
shall be entitled to register as an elector and if so registered to vote at an election 
who on the qualifying date is ordinarily resident in Nigeria and is a British subject or 
British protected person of the age of 21 years or upwards, and if ordinarily resident 
in the Northern Region is a male.”77 Provision of the Regulation disqualified women 
in the Northern Provinces from participating in the election, a limitation, which was 
criticised by the opponents of the NPC. Debate about the status of women before the 
1959 election was controversial as their subordination was thought to be sanctioned 
primarily in religious rather than secular terms. Therefore any attempt to redefine 
such status must proceed on religious grounds. NEPU repeatedly challenged the 
exclusion of women from public affairs by emphasising that no Quranic text denied 
full political participation for women.78 The NPC was not in favour of women’s 
involvement in politics and the leadership of the party used the argument of lack of 
education to block any reform to the existing arrangement. According to Ahrnadu 
Bello, the “education of women must reach a far greater strength, and the number of 
properly educated women must be increased to many times the present number 
before the vote would be used to full advantage.”79 Although women in northern 
Nigeria were not involved in political decision making in the period leading up to 
1959, all the political parties had a ‘women’s wing’ affiliated to them. These
11 Federation o f Nigeria Official Gazette (Lagos, 1958), p.220.
78 B.J. Callaway, Muslim Hausa Women in Nigeria: Tradition and Change (New York, 1987), pp.98- 
99.
79 Bello, My Life, p.233.
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women’s wing, according to Barbara Callaway, came to have a derogatoiy
» * ■ SOconnotation as they existed primarily to provide entertainment at political rallies.
The registration procedure in Akwanga was simple. Describing the process, 
Abdul Egbuga, who seived as an Assistant Registration Officer, noted:
An interested voter had to appear in person and fill in a form 
declaring himself to be 21 years of age or above and must be a 
resident of the area for some time and also stating his sex and 
occupation. But because the majority of people in Akwanga were 
illiterates, they usually ask us to fill in the forms, which we did. If 
we were not convinced that the voter was 21 years of age or not a
* • • • S 1resident in the area, we might reject his application.
Although the process of registration was straightforward, the majority of the people 
in Akwanga did not come out to register for the election, as they were suspicious 
that voter’s registration was connected with taxation.82 In addition, most local 
people did not show any interest in party politics and consequently withdrew 
themselves from the political process. The registration was to be held from the 2 
March to 11 April 1959 and in order to encourage the local people to come out to 
register, the District Officer made it clear to the District Heads: “the registration is 
not a tax count and is not concerned in any way with tax.”83
80 Callaway, Hausci Women, p. 100.
81 Interview with Abdul Ebuga at Nasarawa Eggon, 22 March 2004.
82 Ibid.
83 NAK DEP/79: Registration for Federal Elections, 1959.
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Figure 7.1: Abdul Ebuga at Nasarawa Eggon, March 2004
The Electoral Commission issued a rule that registration areas should not 
contain more than 2000 electors and that no voter should have to travel more than 12 
miles to register.84 This rule was not followed in Akwanga as the “geographical 
disposition and demography” made it practicably impossible as shown below:
Registration Area Miles from Wamba No. of Electors
Sabon Nunku 26 1991
Ungwan Zaria 35 1498
Akwanga 16 1673
Nasarawa Eggon 38 1483
Lizzin Keffi 56 2017
Mada Station 59 1741
Wangibi 59 1266
Wakama 19 1491
Wulko 26 756
Umme 38 1184
Wamba - 2138
Mama 14 2191
Jimiya 15 364
Source: NAK DEP/79: Registration for Federal Elections, 1959
The Electoral Commission also issued out guidelines with regards to the 
qualifications o f  candidates for the forth-coming election. In order to be eligible to
84 Ibid.
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contest the 1959 election, a prospective candidate must be male (in Northern 
Provinces) and over 21 years of age; must have resided in the area for at least three
o cyears before the election and had to be of sound mind. A person that was declared 
bankrupt or who had served more than six months prison sentence was disqualified to 
contest in the election. An aspect of the disqualification that affected candidates in 
parts of northern Nigeria was the exclusion of public office holders in contesting the 
election, which pulled the carpet under the feet of the staff of the Native Authorities. 
Disqualification of public officers was announced only three weeks before the 
election and the party most hit by the new electoral law was the NPC who had about 
two-thirds of its candidates from the Native Authorities, including some Village and 
District Heads.S6 Leadership of the party quickly withdrew all candidates affected by 
the new law in order to avoid legal challenges after the election. In Akwanga, m alam  
Audu (the chief of Eggon) was the NPC candidate for Akwanga federal constituency, 
but after the introduction of the new law, he was disqualified and his younger brother,
87Yakubu Allahnana was nominated to contest for the electoral seat.
An interesting aspect of the election in Akwanga was the nature of the 
campaign conducted in the area. The opinion of local chiefs and especially of the 
educated elites in the region played an important role in the way local people decided 
to vote. National politics were still remote to most people in Akwanga, and without 
any contact with political leaders at the national level, many voters tended to know 
veiy little about what was going on. The voters therefore had to rely on the few 
individuals who were able to grasp some of the ideas of the national campaign and 
pass them on at local level. These groups of people became opinion leaders in 
Akwanga and were mostly employees of the Native Administration or the Christian
85 Instructions to Polling Officers (Lagos, nd), p.20.
86 Post, Federal Election, p,226.
87 Interview with Yusuf Maikano at Wamba, 24 March 2004.
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missions. They included among others; Iliya Rine, Balarabe Nunku (Ciroman 
Nunku), Audu Waju, Adamu Musa Galle, Abdul Ebuga and Yusuf Waju 
(Maikano).88 Local people looked to these literate members of the community for a 
lead. In their respective districts, they were the main leaders of opinion and were 
admired due to their success and the ease with which they moved in the modem 
world because of their educational background. Therefore, their views on politics 
were sought after and their opinions trusted. This was a shift from the pre-1959 
elections where politics was dominated by Christian trained elites from outside 
Akwanga. The reliance 011 the relatively young educated group in Akwanga meant 
that in the new sphere of party politics the traditional superiority of age was often no 
longer recognised. According to an informant, Baba Loko: “We had no idea of what 
was going on at that time because it was the first time we were given the opportunity 
to vote. Since we were not familiar with how things worked, we relied on Balarabe 
and his friends who knew more than their elders, so we looked up to them and 
followed their advice.”89
The emerging educated group in Akwanga acted as the contact with the 
outside world and they fed information generated during the national campaign and 
transmitted them to the voters. This meant that the elaborate programmes and politics, 
which formed the substance of the national campaign, reached the constituencies only 
in a simplified form. If an idea did filter through to the constituency it was translated 
by the elites into local terms, and reinforced by local prejudices. The campaign 
strategy of using local issues in national election played to the advantage of the NPC 
in Akwanga. Besides the fact that the Native Authority staff in the division were 
mostly supporters of the NPC, the campaign of the party was conducted almost
881bid.
89 Interview with Baba Loko at Ungwan Loko, 20 March 2004.
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entirely on the constituency level. As Post has observed, there was far less generation 
of ideas at the centre of the NPC, and no party newspapers by which they might be 
communicated.90 Much more responsibility was laid on the local politicians to 
formulate and spread their own ideas, and in consequence these were usually in the 
form of local appeals. According to an informant, Audu Maiyaki, the local people 
were concerned mostly with the issue of fertilisers, provisions of wells and good 
roads.91 This played into the hands of the NPC, which was seen as the party in power 
and thus capable of providing these basic facilities/amenities. The issue of the 
creation of a Middle Belt state, which was the basis of the UMBC-Action Group 
campaign, was not the immediate priority of the majority of the people of Akwanga. 
They were more interested in their day-to-day affairs than obscure and complicated 
politics of state creation.92 Another advantage that the NPC had over the UMBC in 
Akwanga was the party symbol for the election. The three major political parties in 
Nigeria — NPC, NCNC and Action Group — had party symbols. The NPC symbol was 
a hoe; the Action Group palm tree and the NCNC a cock. According to Maikano, the 
NPC campaign in Akwanga was devoted to impressing the local voters with the 
symbol of the party -  hoe -  which represented the occupation of the majority of the 
people (farming) and therefore, representing their interests.93 However, mission 
trained elites were strong supporters of the UMBC and they used their influence as 
opinion leaders in their respective district to canvass support for the party.
Generally, the importance of a few opinion leaders in shaping the political 
decision of the local people meant that often the idea passed on were judged not in the 
light of their own merit, but according to the status of these elites. Association of
90 Post, Federal Election, pp.284-328.
91 Interview with Audu Maiyaki at Akwanga, 11 November 2004.
92 ibid
93 Interview with Yusuf Maikano at Wamba 24 March 2004.
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opinion with status meant that the parties sought to gather together as successful a 
body of campaigners as they could. Although majority of the native authority staff, 
including teachers were strong NPC members/supporters in all the districts of the 
division, the UMBC-AG supporters were becoming popular to the voters.94 These 
opinion leaders became important in helping voters to make a voting decision and 
although they could not directly order the local people to vote for a particular party or 
candidate, they were able to convince voters by virtue of their personal prestige 
within the colonial society of Akwanga.
Besides the local educated group in Akwanga who played an important role in 
the electioneering, the chiefs in the region became partisans in the election of 1959. 
The chiefs were strong supporters of the NPC and they used their positions as leaders 
of the Native Authorities to canvass support and also coerce their subjects into the 
party.95 The chiefs in the region, according to Yusuf Maikano, received their 
instructions to campaign for NPC from Ahmadu Bello and they in turn invited the 
village heads to their palaces,96 The village heads were given instructions to mobilise 
their people and vote for the NPC candidate.
The federal election was fixed for Saturday, 12 December 1959. However, 
finding enough staff to man the polling stations in Akwanga became a serious 
problem because employing literates who were not Native Administration staff to be 
engaged in electoral duties was practicably impossible 97 Out of the 51 applications 
received by the District Officer of Akwanga for electoral duties, only 29 candidates 
were suitable.98 The practice of engaging Native Authority staff in electoral duties
94 Ibid.
95 Interview with Abdul Ebuga at Nasarawa Eggon, 22 March 2004
96 Interview with Yusuf Maikano at Wamba, 4 Aril 2004.
97 Interview with Abdul Ebuga at Nasarawa Eggon, 22 March 2004; Interview with Audu Maiyaki at 
Akwanga, 11 December 2004.
98 NAK DEP/79: Registration for Federal Elections, 1959.
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was common in parts of the Northern Provinces and the UMBC-Action Group 
alliance was quick to attack the engagement of Native Authority staff as Polling 
Officers. In an editorial of the Action Group Daily Sewice, the newspaper 
commented:
Everyone knows that every District Head in the Northern Region is 
virtually an organising secretary of the NPC. And we know that 
one of the evils of the Electoral College System which we are now 
replacing is that it makes it possible for an Emir to frighten 
members of the College into voting for the candidates of his 
choice. To appoint District Heads as Polling Officers is to 
perpetuate this evil and to defeat the very purpose of adult 
suffrage."
The involvement of local chiefs in electoral duties was criticised in an open 
letter by Rotimi Williams -  the Action Group chief legal adviser.100 He challenged 
the instructions given to Polling Officers in the Northern Provinces to allow District 
and Village Heads to take charge of security during the election. As noted in Chapter 
3, the Native Authorities under the local chiefs had the responsibility to maintain law 
and order in respective districts, which included polling stations. The Electoral 
Commission had no power to assume the control of the Native Authority police and 
as a federal body it had to respect Regional sovereignty.101 Plowever, a compromise 
was reached between the Electoral Commission and the Northern Regional 
Government and it was agreed that District and village Heads were to enter the 
polling stations only to cast their votes.
99 Daily Service, 12 June 1959.
100 Daily Times, 13 November 1959.
101 Reports on the Nigeria Federal Elections, December 1959 (Lagos, I960), pp. 16-17.
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Polling stations were closed for voting at 5pm and any voter after that time 
was not admitted. The election regulation stated that any person “already inside the 
polling station or in the immediate vicinity waiting to enter and vote” was to be 
allowed.102 When polling was finally completed, the ballot boxes from all the polling 
stations were taken to Wamba to be counted, which was followed by the 
announcement of the result by the Returning Officer.103 The closely contested seat in 
Plateau province was that of Akwanga federal constituency, which was won by 
Yakubu Allahnana of the NPC with a majority of 314 votes.104 The total number of 
votes cast for the election was 16,973 out of 19,803 people that registered (20.5 per 
cent of the population). The NPC won 5,842 votes (34.4 per cent); NEPU-NCNC 
alliance, 2,481 (14.6); Action Group, 5,528 (32.6 per cent); two independent 
candidates, 2,642 (15.6 per cent) and 480 (2.8 per cent).105 In Plateau province, the 
NPC and NEPU recorded some electoral gains. Out of the nine federal seats, the NPC 
won three, NEPU one, and the Action Group five.106 In central Nigeria where the 
UMBC was strong, the result of the 1959 federal election showed that majority of 
candidates that won the election achieved it under the Action Group ticket.
It is difficult to determine what factors influenced the voting decision of the 
people of Akwanga in the election. Local people had different motives for voting for 
a particular candidate or a political party during the election. Some voters were 
influenced by the educated group or the local chiefs, who were considered as opinion 
leaders in the region, rather than the programmes or ideology of any of the political 
parties.
102 Nigeria Official Gazette, p.240.
103 Interview with Abdul Ebuga at Nasarawa Eggon, 22 March 2004.
104 The Nigerian Citizen, 19 December 1959.
105 Ibid.
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Although some of my informants argued that the educated group or the local 
chiefs did not influence their voting decisions, on a closer examination, the reasons 
they gave for voting for a particular party were those that the opinion leaders 
transmitted at the local level. For example, according to an informant, Alhaji Idirisu, 
“we voted for the NPC because it was the strongest party in whole of northern 
Nigeria and it was the only party that could provide us with fertilizers, good roads and 
schools.”107 The ability of the NPC to provide these facilities was the popular slogans 
used during the electioneering campaign by the NPC political activists. The Action 
Group-UMBC supporters on their part were concerned with the dominance of Hausa- 
Fulani in the NPC. According to Sidi Tide, “we knew the plans of some of the Hausa- 
Fulani in the NPC. They wanted to win the election so that they could gradually 
convert us to Islam even by using force as they tried to do with our grandparents. We 
voted for Iliya’s party because it was fighting for our interest.”108 The election was 
keenly contested because of the effectiveness of the propaganda of the opinion 
leaders who used different tactics to gain support for their respective parties. They 
gauged the local concerns and sentiments and cleverly articulated them in their 
election campaigns.
Although voters were attracted to vote for a particular candidate or a political 
party for various reasons, the decision of the opinion leaders in Akwanga played a 
major role in deciding the voting pattern in the region. As already mentioned, the 
opinion leaders could not force individuals to vote for a candidate or a party, 
however, their respected position in the colonial society meant their opinion was 
highly regarded and sought after. An informant, Maiganga Zenya, summed up the 
importance of the opinion leaders in the voting in Akwanga in the 1959 elections: “it
107 Interviews at Gudi with Alhaji Idirisu on 5 March 2004.
108 Interview with Sidi Tide at Gwanje Sarki, 1 December 2003.
304
was our first election and we had no idea of what the parties stood for. All we knew 
was what our leaders [village heads and educated group] told us. Since they were 
familiar with the politics and the way of the white man, we followed their advice.”109 
It is important to mention that the way people in the region voted in the 1959 
elections defied religious, social background or ethnic classification. Although the 
Action Group-UMBC alliance, on the one hand, enjoyed a considerable support from 
Christian voters, the major factor that contributed to this was the presence of the 
mission-trained teachers who became opinion leaders in areas without government 
schools. The NEPU-NCNC alliance on the other hand gained its support from the 
Hausa and Igbo immigrants in Wamba and Gudi. The political awareness of the 
immigrant group was higher than those of the local people.110 The Hausa and Igbo 
people were able to register in their numbers for the election. The Hausa immigrants, 
who were mostly labourers in the mining industry, were strong supporters of NEPU 
who became resentful of the Native Administration that the NPC represented. The 
Hausa and Igbo voters were the only groups that made conscious decisions in their 
voting pattern that were uninfluenced by the local opinion leaders. Their voting 
decision, however, reflected the alliance both NEPU and NCNC had at the national 
level.
The failure of the UMBC in 1959 elections was its ineffectiveness in 
attempting to forge a common goal throughout central Nigeria. In fact, formal party 
organisation did not begin until late 1958 when they were already in alliance with the 
AG and it was possible for the latter to provide the UMBC with financial aid. Until 
March 1960, there was no any real attempt made at establishing a party organisation 
with the institution of divisional and provincial party organs and below this, the
109 Interview at Gwanje with Maiganga Zenya, 14 November 2003.
110 Interviews at Gudi with Adamu Salihu and Alhaji Idirisu, 5 March 2004
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constituency organisations. NPC on its part employed a variety of strategies in order 
to weaken the UMBC leadership. Leaders of the UMBC were given money and 
offered political appointments, which created confusion in the party as they began to 
fight with each other. Some members of the UMBC crossed over to join the NPC and 
began to betray their former members. For instance, Yahaya Kwande from Shendam 
division of Plateau province did not only join the NPC, but converted to Islam. His 
reason was that the NPC was the enemy he knew and that the presence of himself and 
others in the party would counter the Hausa-Fulani dominance.111 Pastor David Lot 
became one of the strongest supporters of Sir Ahmadu Bello in the Northern House of 
Assembly. In a speech to the House in 1963, he declared:
All of us in this region are ready at any second to sacrifice 
ourselves, to die, I repeat, to die in order that Ahmadu Bello will 
be alive. I know, sir, all the Christian community are always 
praying to God that Sir Ahmadu Bello will be protected by 
God’s mighty hand.112
The disarray in the leadership of the UMBC meant that the party did not pose any 
serious threat to the NPC. Its alliance with the NPC resulted in factions forming 
different movements and by 1960, the UMBC only existed in Lafia and Tiv divisions 
and thus, it became more of a protest movement of the Tiv people.113
In the 1960s, politics in Akwanga began to change and the influence of the 
educated group and the local chiefs began to wane. The influx of Hausa and Igbo 
immigrants into the region injected new life and changed local politics. The Hausa
111 H. Kukah, Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria (Ibadan, 1993), p.9.
112 Northern Home o f Assembly Debates March 1963.
113 See further discussion on the Tiv riots in M.J. Dent, “A Minority Party -  The United Middle Belt 
Congress,” Mackintosh (ed), Nigerian Government and Politics, pp.461-507.
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immigrants in Wamba and Gudi, for example, were labourers and mostly NEPU 
supporters who, as already mentioned, were against the NPC. They began to 
influence local people on their voting decision, a situation capitalized upon by some 
of the educated Christians, who considered the NPC as a threat to their political and 
religious survival.114 Although the immigrants and the Christian elites had no fonnal 
alliance between them, they were able to forge a common goal: the defeat of the 
NPC in any election.
CONCLUSION
A major dimension of decolonisation in northern Nigeria was the struggle 
between “traditional” and “modem” elites for state power at the local, regional and 
federal levels of government. The participation of the peoples of Akwanga in the 
political process was complicated. The local people removed themselves from 
politics as a defense mechanism, beginning in the n ineteenth century and continuing 
into the mid twentieth century. Although there is no concrete evidence to explain the 
attitudes of the peoples of Akwanga towards party politics, it is possible that because 
of the slow development of Western education in the region, there was a delay in the 
political awareness of the local people, which only began to evolve in the 1960s. For 
example, when direct elections were first introduced in 1959, the majority of the 
peoples of Akwanga showed their lack of interest by not registering, because they 
thought the elections were connected with tax assessment. In addition, the lack of 
experience of party politics and electioneering in Akwanga produced a low turnout 
for the 1959 federal election.
114 Interview with Abdul Ebuga at Nasarawa Eggon, 22 March 2004; Interview with Audu Maiyaki at 
Akwanga, 11 December 2004.
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The dominance of local chiefs in political decision-making began to change 
after 1959. The young educated groups that emerged during the period leading up to 
independence took control of leadership of the various districts in Akwanga. In 
addition, the social and economic changes experienced in Akwanga began to have a 
bearing on' political developments in the region in the 1960s. For example, the influx 
of Hausa immigrants sharpened the political awareness of the local people. These 
immigrants were talakawa and mostly NEPU supporters who became resentful of the 
Native Authorities in the emirates and therefore became propaganda machines in 
discrediting the NPC. This resulted in an unusual alliance with the emerging 
educated Christians, who considered the NPC threat not only in political terms, but 
also from a religious point of view. Although there was no formal alliance between 
the Hausa immigrants and the mission-trained elites, they sang from the same hymn 
sheet: a dislike for the NPC.
The performance of the political parties at the grassroots level depended on 
the support they enjoyed from the educated elites. The NPC was strong at the 
divisional and district headquarters because of the concentration of the Native 
Authority staff/teachers. The UMBC-Action Group had strong support from the rural 
areas because of the good will of the mission-trained teachers who were sympathetic 
to their aims. By the 1960s, the political divide in Akwanga was based mostly on the 
influence of the educated elites rather than any other ideological persuasion.
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CONCLUSION
This research has sought to direct attention away from the achievements of 
centralised states and towards the history of the minority “tribal” societies in the 
savannah of central Nigeria. Earlier views of the history of the “pagan” peoples of 
the region stressed the importance of external influences -  centralised states and 
colonial rule -  on decentralised societies. The decentralised societies were 
considered to he static and virtually unchanged from the nineteenth century to the 
beginning of the twentieth century. This research shows that the notion of static 
“tribal” societies is a misnomer. It has been argued that the peoples of Akwanga, like 
other decentralised societies, were able to forge their society and create their own 
distinct history and identity outside the control of the centralised state builders by 
resisting their incursions.
By the end of British rule in Nigeria in 1960, the social and economic 
structures of Akwanga region were transformed from those at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Although the colonisation of Akwanga was an interlude of 
comparatively short duration, it radically transformed the economy and society of the 
region. One of the immediate impacts of colonial rule in the region was the 
imposition of British law and order, which resulted in the establishment of a greater 
degree of continuous peace and relative stability. The Eggon people took advantage 
of colonial peace to colonise new agricultural frontiers in the plains. They descended 
from their crowded hill village settlements to the neighbouring lowlands, from which 
insecurity had hitherto barred them. The depredation of the Hausa-Fulani in the 
nineteenth century was no longer an issue. However, the migration of the Eggon 
people to the lowlands was not only as a result of law and order imposed by the
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British. It was also prompted by the introduction of taxation, which induced them to 
move in order to earn tax money by the cultivation of cash crops.
One important implication of colonial rule in Akwanga was rapid population 
growth. The population of the region more than doubled from about 40,000 at the 
start of British rule to over 100,000 by the 1960s. This was as a result of a 
combination of factors: the influx of immigrants, who took advantage of colonial law 
and order to trade or seek employment with the native administration or farming and 
the advance in medical sciences, which brought endemic diseases under control and 
reduced death rates.
There was an expansion in the geographical frontier of Akwanga as new 
towns like Gudi, Marmara, Rafin Tabo were established while Wamba was 
subsumed into an expanding colonial administrative and commercial capital. In 
addition, the readjustment of the political and geographical boundaries to fit in with 
the native administration system meant that Akwanga was redesigned on the basis of 
territorial rather than tribal districts. In terms of political relations, there was also a 
fundamental and permanent shift in the source of political power and authority from 
the traditional elites of clan and religious heads to the educated elites. These 
educated classes were products of both missionary and government schools. 
Therefore, Western education became a source of political power in the colonial 
society of Akwanga and thus transformed the politics of the region and the reliance 
on a relatively young educated group at the expense of the traditional elites. By the 
1960s, the traditional superiority of age was often no longer recognised in party 
politics and the educated groups became the opinion leaders in the area.
The introduction of taxation and the cultivation of cash crops changed the 
economy of the region, over which colonial and indigenous authorities exercised
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little control. After the government lifted the restriction imposed on foodstuff 
business in Akwanga, it resulted in the emergence of local entrepreneurs in the 
1960s, such as Alhaji Angulu, Alhaji Yakubu and Alhaji Musa, who were able to 
break into the long-distance foodstuff trade.
The present-day economy and society of Akwanga is a product of historical 
forces, which have wrought significant alterations since the time of initial colonial 
contact. Colonial mle changed the region into a food reserve and labour pool for tin 
mining. British economic policies like the high rate of taxation in mining areas and 
the surrounding communities were designed to restrict development which might 
compete with its perceived role within the Nigerian colonial economy. The taxation 
pressure exerted on the local people propelled them to supply labour to the tin mines 
or engaged in the production of food crops in order to earn tax money. The mining 
camps became a ready market for the food crops produced in Akwanga. However, a 
major transformation in the economy of Akwanga was the introduction of new crops, 
which changed dramatically the organisation of labour, settlement patterns and the 
composition of household units. For example, immigrants introduced the cultivation 
of groundnuts, yam and cassava in the 1920s, which were integrated into the 
agricultural system of the local people in Akwanga during the colonial period and 
remain to present-day an important source of income and food.
To conclude, colonial mle changed Akwanga society from top to bottom. 
During the sixty-odd years of British rale, the social, political and economic 
organisation of the region was altered. Although this transformation was of a massive 
and decisive nature, much of Akwanga society continued to depend on agriculture as 
a means of livelihood. The success of British economic policy was the 
transformation of the Akwanga region into a food producing area while preserving
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the pre-existing local methods of production. Thus, colonial mle in Akwanga marked 
a clear watershed in the history and the subsequent development of the region, and 
therefore its history has been and will continue to be very much influenced by the 
colonial experience.
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